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ABSTRACT
The discussion of aid effectiveness continues to gain prominence in international
development policy discourse and analysis. However, the question of why aid seems to
be ineffective is far more complicated and remains largely unanswered. While the
notions that aid drives donors’ interests and creates dependency are still relevant, this
thesis confronts the problem, by examining the issues that influenced the
operationalisation and effectiveness of aid programs in the context of Ghana’s
Community-Based Rural Development Project (CBRDP) (2005-2011). By arguing that
aid dependency and “aid as a concept” are different, the thesis makes the most basic
assumption that ‘aid’ is not negative; albeit, in the knowledge that its focus on aid in
Ghana will also bring to the fore the major issues that frame debate on international aid.
Two theoretical themes emerged from the thesis. First, the thesis argues that the
effectiveness of an aid program should be measured from the recipients’ point of view.
This is crucial, as donors tend to use their aid to successfully achieve their strategic
advantages, while not necessarily benefitting the recipient country, or those groups for
whom the aid was designed to help. Second, in lieu of the instrumentality of
international aid, the thesis found that aid effectiveness also depends upon the
‘externalities’ (programs, degree of dependency, motives, theories, concepts; social and
politico-cultural factors) that drive it. This notwithstanding, most of the current
mechanisms for achieving aid effectiveness, such as Results-Based Financing, AidAgenda Conferences and Program-Based Approaches, appear to pay negligible
attention to these ‘externalities’. The researcher contends that these mechanisms are not
enough for improving aid effectiveness per se.
The thesis employed ethnographic research to investigate the outcomes of the CBRDP
implemented in nine districts of Ghana. The findings suggest that, alongside the
mechanisms mentioned above, prior attention must be paid to the political and cultural
realities of the recipient country as well as the theories and complex concepts that drive
aid programs (by staff at donor agencies). Such attention, the thesis shows, should focus
on a clear and contextual conceptualisation of key terms such as ‘community’ and
‘empowerment’, while at the same time embedding strategies to manage unintended
outcomes. Efforts at making ‘aid work’ would also require further critical discussion of
the decentralisation theories that underpin aid programs, particularly, Community–
Driven Development (CDD); in this regard the thesis found that the indicators that the
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World Bank uses in relation to CDD (referred to as high and low functioning
intergovernmental systems), were far removed from the grounded realities of Ghana’s
decentralised system of local and regional politics.
The concept of ‘community’ is appealing, yet deceptive. Although a complex term,
‘community’ is often misused, and conceptualised only in the spatial sense, while it
transcends the notion of territoriality to include an entity that has a: 1) Function that
drives the group; 2) Opportunity for interaction; 3) Membership who identifies with and
contributes to it; and 4) Culture that makes it distinct from others. Analysis of the
empirical data presented in the thesis shows that the politico-cultural dynamics and
population settlement and mobility patterns of the CBRDP beneficiary localities did not
support interaction to the levels required for a coherent ‘community’ to exist. Put
simply ‘community’ in the functional and geographic sense had to exist in the CBRDP
beneficiary localities for the project to succeed. While the sense of ‘community’ can be
developed, the World Bank and Ghana’s Ministry of Local Government and Rural
Development, who designed the CBRDP, ignored the need to nurture it in the recipient
localities. As a result of this top down approach there existed no cohesive
‘communities’ to maintain the projects, and most of the CBRDPs were found to be in a
state of complete disarray at the time of fieldwork.
The term ‘empowerment’ is another complex concept the thesis examines to show how
its many theoretical complexities can, if ignored, have dire outcomes for aid programs.
Scholars disagree on whether empowerment is a process or an outcome or both, a
dilemma which presents many challenges for measuring it. The fact that
‘empowerment’ is predicated on the concept of ‘power’ makes it even more
complicated. The reason being that ‘power’ is not a neutral concept and cannot be
shared in the simple terms portrayed in donor discourse; also ignored is the fact that
‘empowering’ one group may mean disempowering others, a situation that could lead to
conflicts. These conflicts were self evident in the fieldwork and are present in the thesis.
Despite these theoretical realities, empowerment appears to have been vaguely applied
in the CBRDP as the project: 1) Had no working definition of ‘empowerment’; 2)
Targeted women and vulnerable groups, although it was meant to empower the general
population; 3) Measured ‘empowerment’ only in term of participation, ignoring the
conditions that perpetuated ‘powerlessness’; and 4) Had no strategy in place to monitor
unintended outcomes. Therefore, in their bid at ‘empowering’ Ghana’s local
government officials (Assembly and Unit Committee Members in the quest for further
iv

decentralisation), the designers of the project were unaware that they were actually
disempowering Traditional Chiefs, many of whom felt ostracised. Moreover, project
designers were also oblivious of the fact that the local government officials did not
function in isolation, but are part of a very complex socio–cultural system. These
shortcomings led to clashes between Traditional Chiefs and the newly ‘empowered’
local government officials. As the designers and managers of the CBRDPs did not
anticipate these eventualities, they had no plan in place to manage resulting conflicts,
which have ended up in protracted legal battles, leaving the CBRDPs in a state of
dereliction, some completely abandoned.
The thesis brings to the fore the need for more concerted efforts at making aid effective,
but at the same time arguing that all stakeholders need to pay closer attention to the use
of nebulous theories and normative, yet complex concepts in aid-program designs. It
underscores the essentiality for programs attempting to apply concepts such as
‘community’ and ‘empowerment’ to clearly define and conceptualise these terms within
the confines of the political, social and cultural forces and social dynamics of
beneficiary localities. If this were to happen development projects are more likely to
receive community support and be more likely to be effectively maintained. The thesis
below provides empirical insights into what becomes of aid programs that apply
concepts and terms that are promoted by ‘development pundits’, but are at variance with
the realities of the recipient country’s pervasive traditions, culture and indeed its success
or otherwise in adopting Western notions of decentralisation (as was the case outlined in
this thesis).
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
“Donors tend to know relatively little about the communities in which they are trying to
bring about change”
Lancaster (1999, p. 493)
1.0 Overview
This thesis critically examines International Development Aid (aid), and shows why an
understanding of the local context of aid recipients is crucial for achieving aid
effectiveness. The thesis argues that aid programs that are fashioned on contested
decentralisation theories and complex concepts (such as ‘community’ and
‘empowerment’), have a lesser chance of achieving positive outcomes, particularly if
such terms are at variance with the contextual realities of the beneficiary country and
local communities. The data was generated using qualitative and ethnographic research
tools over seven months in nine districts and localities of the Eastern, Greater Accra and
Volta Regions of Ghana, West Africa.
A joint World Bank and Government of Ghana pilot program, the Community–Based
Rural Development Project (CBRDP) was used as the case study. The overall objective
of the CBRDP was to empower rural populations to participate actively in issues
affecting their lives, while supporting Ghana’s decentralisation process. Beneficiary
localities received fixed seed money to implement and maintain projects selected from
predetermined categories (CBRDP Implementation Manual 2006; Yaron 2008).
Designed as a community-driven development program, the local people were expected
to contribute labour to complete and own the projects. Considering that only nine of the
projects (out of over two hundred) were studied, the thesis does not evaluate or audit the
CBRDP as a whole or draw generalised conclusions on its performance nationally.
Rather, it seeks to provide insights into how key concepts and decentralisation theories,
that underpin community-based programs, impacted on the CBRDPs. At the same time
the thesis found these concepts were at variance with the demographic realities of
Ghana and the selected localities.
This research developed out of my curiosity to understand why aid, altruistic as it
appears, sometimes fails to improve lives in Ghana and other aid–dependent countries.
After reviewing the aid literature, I found that although there is a great deal of published
work on aid in Ghana, it seemed to be predominantly ‘economicentric’, failing to
1

explain how it works practically on the ground. Although these econometric analyses
were sometimes hard to understand, they urged me to read further on global efforts at
making aid effective. Of importance was the inadequate focus on the theories and
concepts on which aid programs are based.
The popularity of Community–Driven Development (CDD) programs, as an effective
aid delivery mechanism at the World Bank, attracted me to review its concepts and
operations. Although CDD promised many prospects for achieving aid effectiveness, it
was found that, like other development programs, the approach is underpinned by
contested decentralisation theories and inherently complex concepts such as
‘participation’, ‘community’ and ‘empowerment’. Additionally, the readings revealed
that because these terms appear to be idealised, the World Bank in particular, and other
international development agencies seem to use them in program designs without
considering their appropriateness and the demographical realities of the relevant
contexts (see Botchway 2001; Mosse & Lewis 2005; Riddell 2007, Binswanger et al.
2010; Mavrotas 2010, World Bank 2006a, 2010a). Furthermore, little is known
empirically on how these complex concepts influence CDD programs in culturally–
complex contexts like Ghana.
As will be discussed in 1.5, three indisputable facts about Ghana make the country an
interesting context for studying CDD programs. First, Ghana’s local government system
is inherently partisan with weak sub–structures (Ahwoi 2010; Antwi–Boasiako 2010).
As argued in Chapter Five, this fact questions the World Bank’s categorisation of the
country’s local government system as highly functional, and better placed to implement
a CDD program (Binswanger et al. 2010). Second, while no part of the country is
ethnically homogeneous, Ghana is a multi–ethnic and religious country. Given that
‘community’ is complex and deceptive construct (Delanty 2003; Tesoriero 2010),
Ghana’s ethnic diversity presents an interesting case for understanding the term in
practice.
Designed as a type of CDD, Ghana’s Community-Based Rural Development Projects
(CBRDP) aimed to strengthen and empower the hitherto weak local government sub–
structures (Area Councils, Assembly Members and Unit Committees). A review of the
‘empowerment’ literature suggests that the concept is complex and could be
inappropriately applied (Clifford 2001; Mosse 2001; Cornish 2006; Tesoriero 2010;
Hancock et al. 2011). Additionally, empowerment is not a neutral term, as an attempt to
2

empower one group may lead to the disempowerment of others (Mansuri & Rao 2004;
Hancock et al. 2011). Regarded as development brokers at the local level, Traditional
Chiefs are very influential in Ghana (Arhin 2002; Knierzinger 2011). Therefore I was
curious to understand how the Chiefs would react to the CBRDP’s quest to ‘empower’
the country’s local government officials. These three intriguing observations influenced
the motivations and the framing of the research questions.
1.1 Primary Research Question
How were the outcomes of the Community–Based Rural Development Projects
in selected Districts of Ghana influenced by contested decentralisation theories
and complex concepts such as ‘community’ and ‘empowerment’?
Secondary Research Questions
1) How did the World Bank’s categorisation of Ghana’s decentralisation
system as highly functional impact on the design of the CBRDPs?
2) In what ways did the lack of ‘Community’ in the CBRDP beneficiary
localities impact on the project’s outcomes?
3) In what way(s) did the CBRDP’s inappropriate application of
‘Empowerment’ impact on the relationship between Traditional Chiefs and
Local Government Officials?

1.2 Significance of the Thesis
In the overarching sense, the thesis is a contribution to theory and practice of
international development studies, from an anthropological and community
development perspective. It also adds to the literature, theory and practise of the aid
effectiveness agenda, specifically the need to understanding aid recipients’ local
contexts. While the research is certainly not the first to examine Project Aid and the
policies that drive it (see Botchway 2001; Mosse & Lewis 2005; Pomerantz 2004;
Easterly 2006; Riddell 2007), the thesis seeks to make three specific contributions. The
first relates to the setting of the research, Ghana. Over the past fifty years in excess of
USD 5 billion worth of aid has been invested in the country1. While 60% of ODA to
Ghana came in the form of Project Aid, very little research has been carried out on how
the local context and its dynamics impact on such programs. The aid literature on Ghana
seems ‘economicentric’ and tends to focus on tied–aid (Baffour 1999; Osei 2004; Clay
1
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et al. 2009), lack of coordination among donors (Aryeetey et al. 2003; Whitfield 2005;
2008; Woll 2008), and aid politics (Whitfield 2008). Using Ghana’s CBRDP as a case
study, this thesis provides insights into how contested decentralisation theories and
complex concepts impact on Project Aid outcomes in the country, a subject which is
barely researched.
This is timely because, while ‘experts’ often cite the country as an example where
Project Aid really works, there have been concerns that this aid lacks sustainability. For
example, the Operation Evaluation Department of the World Bank found in 2004 that
projects completed in Ghana over a five–year period had been unsustainable and having
less impact on the rural sector (World Bank 2004a, p. 29). Other recent studies have
also arrived at similar conclusions on the National Health Insurance Scheme (Adusei–
Asante 2009); the Capitation Grant in public primary schools (Ampratwum & ArmahAttoh 2010); and on Social Investment Funds (Anyidoho forthcoming). In 2012, the
World Bank also warned the country against white elephant programs2. Thus, this
research provides insights into the issues that impact on development and aid–funded
programs in the country.
The second contribution of the thesis relates to the methodology. This thesis is an
example of the usefulness of employing ethno–methodology for researching the issues
that impact on aid programs. Termed ‘aidnography’ [qualitative study of aid], the
approach has been confirmed by others as an effective way of understanding how local
contexts affect aid outcomes (Botchway 2001; Gould 2004; Mosse 2005). This thesis
confirms the potency of the ‘aidnography’ research methodology and why the
‘development fraternity’ needs to start considering it in their quest to understand how
their aid works practically on the ground.
Finally, the thesis also contributes to a better understanding of issues affecting Ghana’s
local government and decentralisation systems, which many local scholars and the
country’s Constitutional Review Commission (CRC)3 have observed has stagnated
(Kyei–Baffour 2009; Owusu 2009; Ahwoi 2010; Gyimah–Boadi 2010; Antwi–Boasiako
2010; Constitutional Review Commission 2011). The thesis is therefore timely as it
unearths the problems and challenges confronting the local government sub–structures;
2

http://ghanaian-chronicle.com/?p=36829, retrieved June 15, 2012.
They were tasked with developing recommendations for amending the current constitution. Chapter
Seven of the final report indicates that the country’s local government laws needs to be amended so that
more power and resources are moved from the centre to the units.
3
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and may be useful to the CRC in drafting legislative instruments to improve and
strengthen the country’s decentralisation process.
1.3 Thesis Outline
This Chapter presents an introduction and background to the thesis. It informs readers
about the research by outlining its scope and focus. The chapter discusses the issues that
informed the research, the research questions, and the contribution of the research and
the thesis outline. The chapter also defines International Development Aid as used in
the thesis; discusses the relevance of focusing on complex concepts and how they
influence aid effectiveness. An overview of Ghana’s social, political and economic
settings is also presented to contextualise the country’s dynamics, which forms the basis
of the thesis. Additionally, the chapter discusses the CBRDP, the case study project on
which the thesis is based. Specifically, its design and implementation strategies are
examined to outline some of the loopholes that have bedevilled the project.
The history and trends of International Development Aid and how they have impacted
on various development programs in Ghana are discussed in Chapter Two. The chapter
seeks to justify the choice of Ghana as the setting for this research by establishing the
extent to which the country has increasingly depended on aid and experimented various
development assistance programs since the mid–1960s. As of 2012, the country is
believed to have consumed aid in excess of USD 5 billion (Government of Ghana
Budget Statement 2012; Quartey et al. n.d.).
Chapter Three reviews relevant aid literature so as to establish gaps the thesis attempts
to fill. The chapter discusses the factors believed to have contributed to aid
ineffectiveness as well as efforts at making it work, particularly, Program–Based
Approaches such as Community–Driven Development (CDD). It argues that while
CDD is celebrated at the World Bank, its pivotal theories and concepts are contested,
and as this thesis argues, can potentially impact negatively on the project’s outcomes.
Chapter Four explains the methodology: the research tools and techniques employed to
explore how complex concepts and contested decentralisation theories influenced the
outcomes of Ghana’s CBRDP. The chapter discusses the fieldwork experiences, the
positionality of the researcher and ethical considerations. Additionally, the chapter
presents the theoretical importance of the research approach, ethno–methodology; and
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thoroughly describes how the data were collected and analysed, as well as the
limitations of the research.
One of the pivotal theories of Community-Driven Development (CDD) program is that
countries (including Ghana) with ‘high–functioning’ local institutions are better placed
to implement CDD programs. Chapter Five challenges this claim. Within the
framework of the World Bank’s four indicators, the chapter uses secondary data to
argue that Ghana’s local government institutions do not appear to be highly functional
as the World Bank claims. Drawing on the empirical data, the chapter reveals some of
the issues that are impacting on the functions of Assembly Members, who are key
facilitators of local development in Ghana. The findings and the discussion that ensures
show that the country’s local government sub–structures are weak because of seeming
partisan political machinations and the centralising tendencies of the constitutional
provisions, which established the system.
The Sixth Chapter focuses on the term ‘community’ and how its ambiguity makes it a
complex concept. The chapter begins by briefly exploring the literature to establish an
analytical framework for securitising the ‘communitiness’ or otherwise of the localities
researched. Drawing on evidence from three localities as case studies, the chapter
concludes that, while the projects were supposedly ‘community–based’, ‘communities’
hardly existed in many of the beneficiary localities. Also, while the CBRDP was
supposed to be implemented in rural localities, some were implemented in urban areas,
a mistake that bedevilled the otherwise laudable CBRDP.
The Seventh Chapter examines another CDD pivotal concept, ‘empowerment’. Through
a brief discursive overview of the concept, the chapter draws readers’ attention to the
conceptual difficulties the term generates. It argues that because the concept carries a
broad meaning, it allows for many blind spots and pitfalls. Drawing on two case studies
from the empirical data, the chapter discusses conflicts that ensued between Traditional
Chiefs and local government officials during the implementation of the CBRDP. These
conflicts primarily stemmed from the fact that, while the project’s designers sought to
empower local government officials, they seem to have: 1) Taken the influence of
Traditional Chiefs for granted; and 2) Failed to appreciate the complexity of the concept
of ‘empowerment’ and the ‘non–neutrality’ of power: empowering one group means
disempowering others.
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The eighth and concluding chapter binds all the chapters into one integrative format. It
directly answers the research questions and presents the major findings of the thesis, as
well as their implication for development theory and practice.
1.4 International Development Aid Defined?
Various scholars have defined aid differently (see Lancaster 1999; Kanbur 2003; Moyo
2009). However, according to Riddell (2007), the Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)4 has
led the most substantial work undertaken to develop an operational definition of aid as:
Flows to countries and territories on the DAC list of ODA recipients and to
multilateral development institutions which are (i) provided by official agencies,
including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and (ii)
each transaction of which (a) is administered with the promotion of the
economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main
objective; and (b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at
least 25 percent
	
  (OECD 2008, p. 1).
Some commentators have criticised the above definition. For example, Riddell (2007, p.
1) argues that the definition fails to mention what the Official Development Assistance
(ODA) impact is, or the extent to which giving and receiving are voluntary acts based
on some degree of conditionality or coercion. Other scholars seem to interpret the
definition’s reference to ‘development’ as its main objective to mean promoting
‘westernization’. Such scholars argue that the concept carries with it a notion of
‘labelling’ and Western imperialism to imply ‘superiority’ and ‘differentiation’, where
some countries are labelled as ‘Third World’, [‘Developing’] or ‘Less Developed’ and
others as ‘First World’ and ‘Developed’ (Brown 1974; Fergusson 1990; Mehmet 1999;
Eyben 2007). The notion that aid promotes ‘development’, therefore, tends to generate
perceptions that the concept (aid) is ‘always’ used as a tool for the perpetration of
cultural imperialism; although aid may be given genuinely for humanitarian reasons
(Crush 1995; Escobar 1997; Li 2007).
There are three forms of aid: Humanitarian or Emergency Aid, Project Aid and
Systematic Aid (Easterly 2006; Collier 2007; Moyo 2009). Humanitarian aid is
mobilised in response to disasters, for example, to help flood victims (Moyo 2009).
Project Aid, according to Riddell (2007), refers to specific projects dominated by

4

Formed in 1960 by leading donor governments to coordinate and promote aid from donor governments
(see http://www.oecd.org/document, retrieved March 20, 2010).
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interventions in health, education and community development. Project Aid has
remained the dominant form of development assistance provided in Africa since 2000,
and accounts for over 50% of the net ODA Ghana currently receives (Amoako–Tuffour
2005; Riddell 2007; Quartey et al. n.d.). Systematic Aid refers to payments made to
governments either through government–to–government transfer (bilateral) or
transferred through institutions such as the World Bank Group (Moyo 2009).
The definition of aid is further complicated by the recent differentiation between ODA
and Official Aid, although both are provided under similar terms and conditions. The
World Bank and the OECD/DAC regard ODA as the assistance given to poorer or
developing countries outside of Europe, while the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union, and certain ‘advanced’ countries and territories
[such as Greece, Spain and Italy who may be temporarily experiencing economic
hardships] are the targets of Official Aid5. Owing to the controversies surrounding the
definition above, aid is used in this thesis to simply refer to ODA for Project and
Systematic purposes; while ‘aid effectiveness’ refers to delivering aid in a way that
achieves value for money and maximizes impact on the relevant beneficiaries within the
framework of donors specific program objectives (Riddell 2007; Killen 2011).
1.5 Aid Effectiveness: Why Do Theories and Concepts ‘Matter’?
After more than seven decades of its introduction, donors and their agencies,
development organisations and academics are still searching for ways to make aid
effective. The search is indicative of the dissatisfaction with the performance of aid, and
the desperate pursuit of ideas to make it effectual (Easterly 2006; Riddell 2007).
Consequently, since 2000, three different, but concurrently running mechanisms for
delivering and achieving aid effectiveness can be identified. These include: Results–
Based Financing, Aid–Agenda Conferences and Program–Based Approaches (Riddell
2007; Binswanger et al. 2010; World Bank 2000, 2006b, 2010b, 2011; Yogita et al.
2010; Savedoff & Martel 2011; OECD 2011). Notably, the World Bank has been a key
player in these efforts, which have partly contributed to the doubling of the aid quantum
from US$ 60 billion in 2002 to almost US$ 129 billion in 20106.
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See www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist; http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ghana/net–official–
development–assistance–and–official–aid–received–us–dollar–wb–data.html, all retrieved November 11,
2011.
6
http://www.oecd.org/document/35/0,3746,en_2649_37413_47515235_1_1_1_37413,00.html, retrieved
March 15 2012.
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Results–Based Financing (RBF), an aid delivery mechanism, was introduced in the
World Bank in 2002. RBF ties the disbursement of aid funds to the attainment of
specific results that directly improve access to specific sectors of the recipient country,
such as healthcare, education communication, energy, and transportation (Yogita,
Johannes & Kumar 2010; Birdsall, Mahgoud & Savedoff 2010). Proponents of RBF
claim that it increases transparency, accountability and the engagement of private sector
capital and expertise. They also maintain that RBF encourages innovation of public
funding and enables monitoring of results (Birdsall et al. 2010; Savedoff 20117).
However, the model’s focus on results rather than processes has been criticised. First, it
seems to contradict concerns that development is not just about results and money, but
trust (Pomerantz 2004; Eyben 2006; Kaberuka 2011); and as the thesis argues, about
beneficiaries’ contests vis-a-vis concepts, theories and discourses that shape
development programs. Second, the focus on results seems to reinforce
‘conditionalities’ and aid–tying, clauses known to have bedeviled aid effectiveness in
the past (Kanbur 2003; Easterly 2006; Moyo 2009). Lastly, the efficiency of RBF
mechanisms varies by sectors and countries, a limitation that weakens its potential of
being accepted as a standard model for achieving aid effectiveness globally (Yogita et
al. 2010; Savedoff & Martel 2011).
The second mechanism, Aid–Agenda Conferences (AAC), provides donors, aid
consumers and other relevant stakeholders with the platform to share ideas on aid
financing, effectiveness and policy formulation. Examples of AAC include the G8 and
G20 Summits; the Monterrey 2002 and Doha 2008 Conferences to review Financing for
Development; and the UK Commission for Africa. In recent times, the so–called High
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLFA) has become very popular with four
successfully held conferences in Rome (2003), Paris (2005), Accra (2008), and Busan
(2011). While some of the above AAC have achieved some results, the latter are
minimal. As argued in Chapter Three, despite its popularity, the HLFA appears to have
become a bureaucratic formality, as most donors ignore the agreements they pledged to
uphold (Mavrotas 2010). For example, the OECD (2011) painted a damning picture of
the achievement of the 2005 Paris Declaration, as members of the OECD/DAC are not
adhering to the benchmarks they set for themselves.
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http://www.gpoba.org/gpoba/what–is–oba, retrieved March 16, 2012.
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The third mechanism for achieving aid effectiveness, which is the focus of this thesis, is
termed Program–Based Approaches (PBA). PBA is a strong move away from projectbased approaches to delivering aid. PBA appear more promising as they seem to
promote programs that espouse local ownership and participatory development; and
normative, but inherently complex concepts such as ‘community’, and ‘empowerment’
(World Bank 1996; 2000a). Since 2000, Community–Driven Development (CDD)
programs have become a popular PBA celebrated particularly at the World Bank,
receiving funding worth over $1.3 billion (Mansuri & Rao 2003; Binswanger et al.
2010). While its proponents appear to deify it as the panacea to aid effectiveness
puzzles (Mansuri & Rao 2004; Binswanger et al. 2010; World Bank 2010b), this thesis
presents an opposite picture of how CDD programs work in complex societies.
Underlying the findings is the argument that the program is underpinned by complex
concepts and contested theories that have little relevance for complex societies like
Ghana.
Incidentally, as some commentators have observed, these concepts and theories are
constantly being used by ‘development experts’ because: 1) Many of them have never
set foot in the countries in which they are applied and as a result do not understand the
local dynamics (Lancaster 1999; Easterly 2008); 2) It offers the convenience of
homogenisation (Cohen & Uphoff 1980; Scrimgeour 1997; Guilt & Shah 1998); and 3)
They are terms one can hardly be against, because they seem good by definition and on
normative grounds, even if the empirical basis is not clear (Botchway 2001; Hancock et
al. 2011). This thesis therefore asserts that it is too early to deify CDD programs as the
answer to aid effectiveness enigmas, given that the pivotal theories and concepts are
questionable and at variance with the realities of the beneficiary country.
The aid literature, as Chapter Three of the thesis will show, appears to blame aid
ineffectiveness constantly on 1) The politics that influence the giving of aid (Cassen
1994; Riddell 2007); 2) Aid itself, in that it creates dependency (Easterly 2006; Moyo
2009); 3) The implementing country’s conditions (Burnside & Dollar 2000; Collier
2007); and 4) The lack of aid coordination among donors (Knack & Rahman 2007;
Woll 2008). While these factors are relevant and have led some to argue that aid must
stop (Easterly 2006; Moyo 2009), this thesis shows they are not the only reasons why
aid has been ineffective. Theories and concepts on which aid programs are based really
‘matter’. Concepts such as community, empowerment, participatory development and
sustainability seem to have been incorporated in the diction of the development industry
10

and used in aid policy documents (see Mansuri & Rao 2004; Easterly 2006; Riddell
2007; Binswanger et al. 2010, World Bank 1998, 2000, 2004b, 2005, 2006b, 2010b).
Beyond their normative values however, ‘what they mean’ theoretically, sometimes
seems irrelevant to the contexts in which they are practically applied. Even so, few
academic studies have scrutinised how they influence aid effectiveness in politicallyfactionalised and ethnically-diverse settings like Ghana.
1.6 Why Research on Community–Driven Development in Ghana?
As Figure 1.1 shows below, Ghana is located on the Gulf of Guinea along the West
Coast of Africa, a few degrees north of the Equator. The country had a population of
24,658,823 (Ghana Statistical Services 2012). A former colony of Great Britain until
March 6, 1957, Ghana is not just an aid–recipient country, but also a major player in the
aid effectiveness agenda, having hosted the Third High Level Forum on Aid
Effectiveness in 2008. Many donors are convinced that the country is the proof that
development works and an example that the sub–regional neighbours must emulate8.
Ghana’s social demographics, economy and political characteristics, similar to its sub–
regional neighbours, present interesting insights for aid policy discussions, particularly
those that espouse the ideals of Community-Driven Development (CDD). It is important
to explore briefly these characteristics and their relevance to the research.
1.6.1. Social Characteristics
Ghana is a multi–ethnic country defined by linguistic and cultural characteristics9.
There are over two hundred and fifty languages and dialects, but English is the
country’s official language, although most Ghanaians also speak at least one local
language. The 2010 Government Census broke down religious divisions in the country
as follows: Christian 71.2%, Muslim 17.6%, and African Traditional Religion 5.2%;
some 5.3% Ghanaians are not affiliated to any religion (Ghana Statistical Service 2012).
These diversities notwithstanding, no part of Ghana is ethnically, linguistically and
religiously homogeneous, although a certain group may dominate. All the three regions
researched (Greater Accra, Eastern and Volta Regions) share these characteristics, as
described below.

8
9

See http://www.dfid.gov.uk/ghana, http://www.usaid.gov/gh/welcome/, retrieved March 24, 2011.
Although the Akan make up 50% of the population.
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While the GA10 people dominate the Greater Accra Region, almost all ethnic groups in
the country are represented there. The nation’s capital city (Accra) is also situated there,
and although it is the smallest region in terms of geographical size, it is the second most
populated region11 (4, 010, 054), representing 16.3% of the country’s population
(Ghana Statistical Service 2012). Over two million people reside in Accra (GSS 2012).
Being multi–ethnic and busy, the city presents interesting demographical facts for
studying how CDD programs work on the ground. The Eastern Region is the third most
populated area in Ghana (2, 633, 154, representing 10.7% of the country’s population)
(Ghana Statistical Service 2012). The region is also one of the most ethnically diverse in
the country, comprising four major ethnic groupings, namely Akan (52.1%), the GA–
Dangme (18.9%), the Ewes (15.9%) and the Guans (7.2%)12. It is important to note that
within each of the major ethnic groups, there are differences. For example, the Akan
people in the region consist of the Akwapim in the south, the Akyem in the west and the
Kwawu in the north. All the three religious groups are also present in the region.
According to the 2010 census, 2, 118, 252 people, representing 8.6% of the national
population reside in the Volta Region (Ghana Statistical Service 2012). While the Ewe
are in the majority (68.5%), seven other major ethnic groups can be found there13. Like
the two regions mentioned above, all the three religions are present in the Volta
Region14 (Ghana Statistical Service 2012).
The multi–religious, cultural and dialectal characteristics of the three regions presented
many challenges for the implementation of the CBRDP. These stemmed from the
design of the project as a ‘community–based’ initiative. While on face value,
‘community’ is appealing and connotes collegiality and local collective ideals; it is a
contested and deceptive term (Amin 2005; Kelly 2008; Defillippis, Fisher & Shragge
2010). As Chapter Six will show, the designers of Ghana’s CBRDP seem to have taken
the characteristics of the regions in question for granted, oblivious to the fact that the
more ethnically diverse a locality is, the higher the risk of a community-based project
failing there (Labonne & Chase 2007). The term ‘community’ appears to have been
erroneously ‘spatialised’, homogenised, labelled and forced on many of the beneficiary
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Name of an ethnic group.
The Asante Region has the highest population of 4,725, 046 representing 19.5% of the population.
12
http://www.modernghana.com, retrieved December 13, 2011.
13
They include the Guan (9.2%), the Akan (8.5%) and the Gurma (6.5%). The region also houses other
minority ethnic groups constituting less than 2% of the population: The Ga–Adangbe, Mole-Dagbani,
Grusi and the Mande–Busanga.
14
http://ghanadistricts.com/region, retrieved December 15, 2011.
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localities, even though their grounded realities and mobility patterns showed that
‘communities’ on which the projects were ‘based’ seemed not to exist practically.

Figure 1.1 Locating Map of Ghana on the African continent

Source: http://thebrightestman.wikispaces.com/Sergio+Ghana+Safari, retrieved March 20, 2012.
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1.6.2. Political Setting
Ghana has a dual system of political governance: the Western-styled democratic system
and the traditional system or Chieftaincy. The country’s democratic system was
necessitated by British colonialism, which began in the early Nineteenth Century (Buah
1998; Donkor 2005). Ghana became the first Sub–Saharan African country to gain
independence from the British on March 6, 1957, led by its first President, Dr. Kwame
Nkrumah of the Convention People’s Party (CPP). Right from independence, Ghana has
adopted a presidential democratic system of government with an elected parliament and
independent judiciary. Since 1957, six military and civilian governments have led the
country, although the Fourth Republic (1992) has witnessed uninterrupted regimes of
J.J. Rawlings (1992–2000), J.A. Kufour (2000–2008), J.E.A. Mills15 (2009– July 24,
2012), and now, J. Mahama (July 25, 2012 to date).

Figure 1.2 Emblems of the two Dominant Political Parties in Ghana

Left: National Democratic Congress (Social Democrats), Right: New Patriotic Party (Liberals
Democrats). Source: www.ghanaweb.com.
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President Mills died and did not finish his first term. J. Mahama, who was the Vice President, has been
sworn in as the President.
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Ghana is a politically–sensitive country; virtually every national event or program is
politicised. As Chapter Five will show, the CBRDP was politicised. Two political
parties are dominant in Ghana (see emblems above): the ruling National Democratic
Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). Both political parties have activist
groups they call ‘foot–soldiers’; these are supposedly the men and women who work
hard for their respective political parties at the grassroots level to win elections. ‘Foot–
soldiers’ have become so influential that they are able to boycott and sabotage national
programs, seize state properties or even demand the dismissal of Ministers of state and
government officials16. As the findings will show in the fifth chapter, the ‘foot–soldiers’
of the NPP, under whose regime the CBRDP was implemented, tended to capture some
of the projects, a situation which discouraged ‘non–party members’ to contribute to the
implementation and sustainability of the projects.
Ghana’s democratic setting allows for the operation of a local government system that
consists of Regional Coordinating Councils and a four–tier and three–tier Municipal/
District (Figure 1.3). Within the local government system, District Assemblies (DAs)17
are the most influential (Tettey 2006; Antwi–Boasiako 2010). While constitutionally
mandated to be the hub of development at the local level, the operations of the DAs
offer many loopholes for political machinations. This is because, although Article 248
(2) of the Constitution requires that DAs be non–partisan, the opposite is the reality.
Ahwoi (2010), Antwi–Boasiako (2010) and other local scholars have blamed this
circumstance on the constitutional provision that allows the President to elect the
District Chief Executive (DCE) and 30% of the DA membership. Thus, local
government authorities in Ghana seem to be constitutionally subjected to the control of
the central government. The situation, Crawford (2004) and Antwi–Boasiako (2010)
have observed, has weakened the country’s local government structures and the
realisation of true fiscal and administrative decentralisation.
Despite these obvious flaws, the World Bank classifies Ghana’s local governance as
highly functional (Binswanger et al. 2010). As a result, the CBRDP was designed and
implemented based on an approach called the ‘Matching Strategy’ (see Chapter Three).
This meant that the country’s established decentralisation system was not adjusted to
accommodate the project. However, as argued in Chapter Five, the approach was a
16

http://elections.peacefmonline.com/politics/201108/64201.php; http://www.modernghana.com/news,
all retrieved November 25, 2011.
17
Could be Municipal Assemblies, depending on the population. But District Assemblies will be used
throughout the thesis.
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policy error, and led to the implementation of the project on an effectively weak and
politicised local government system.
Figure 1.3 Structure of Ghana’s Local Government System18
Regional Coordinating Councils

Metropolitan
Assemblies

Municipal
Assemblies

District
Assemblies

Sub Metropolitan
District Assemblies
Zonal Councils
Town Councils

Urban/ Town/
Area Councils

Unit Committees
Source: Ahwoi (2010).

Chieftaincy is the other governance institution in Ghana. It is often referred to as the
traditional institution because even before 1471, when Europeans first set foot in the
country, the local people governed and administered their affairs through this
institution. Chieftaincy was also the medium of British local governance during the
early colonial days in the late nineteenth century through a system known as the Indirect
Rule (Buah 1998; Arhin 2002). While the British colonial rule undermined the
evolutionary processes of the traditional administrative structures, colonialism could not
totally eradicate chieftaincy (Donkoh 2005; Knierzinger 2011). This is largely
attributable to the fact that, while chieftaincy varies in form among different cultures
nationwide, it is still very much respected. This is because chieftaincy provides people
with a sense of belonging, aside from the fact that Traditional Chiefs are also regarded
18

Several Units form an Electoral Area headed by an Assembly Member. Several Electoral Areas form a
Town /Area Council headed by an Area Council Chairman. Several Area Councils form a District
Assembly headed by a District Chief Executive.
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as the embodiment of the spirit of the ancestors and a link between the latter and the
living (Arhin 2002; Donkoh 2005; Manboah–Rockson 2007; Knierzinger 2011).
Scholars explain that after Ghana’s independence, the role that traditional rulers played
under the British colonial rule was terminated in the interest of democracy. Through the
enactment of the Chieftaincy Act of 1961 (Act 81), Traditional Chiefs became subject
to central government control during the 1960 and 1966 periods. However, when
Nkrumah’s regime that passed the Act was overthrown, the military government that
took over adopted a more liberal approach to the institution. For example, they passed
the Chieftaincy Act of 1971 (Act 370), which severed the central government control of
the institution; and also established the Regional and National House of Chiefs (Buah
1998; Arhin 2002; Donkor 2005; Knierzinger 2011).
The current (1992) Constitution has further enhanced the recognition of the chieftaincy
institution. For example, Article 270 (1) and (2) recognizes and protects the office of
Chiefs and debars the Parliament from making laws that interfere with the institution.
The Constitution in Article, 272, (a–d) also assigns the institution with the
responsibilities of: 1) Advising the government on chieftaincy issues; 2) Collecting,
refining, codifying customary laws; and 3) Performing other functions Parliament may
refer. Aside from these statutory functions, Traditional Chiefs also settle disputes
through arbitration and are able to mobilize people for development purposes (Arhin
2002; Donkor 2005).
Since 2000, while the legitimacy of the institution’s source of authority has been
questioned in the wake of succession disputes, Chieftaincy continues to be popular in
Ghana (Abotchie 2006; Manboah–Rockson 2007; Prah & Yeboah 2011). The institution
has since 1980 realised some form of modernisation. Unlike the pre-1980 period,
Ghanaian Traditional Chiefs are now acquiring formal education, with some setting up
foundations for improving education, healthcare and environmental sensitization in their
respective traditional areas (Knierzinger 2011). These initiatives and modernisation of
the institution have in a sense augmented their influence as brokers of social capital and
local development. However, the designers of Ghana’s CBRDP appeared to have
sidelined Traditional Chiefs by not assigning them clear–cut roles. Because Traditional
Chiefs are not just custodians of culture, but also of spaces with well–delineated
boundaries, they tended to demand the right of control over the CBRDPs that were
implemented within their localities. As the empirical data in Chapter Seven will show,
this led to conflicts between the Chiefs and local government officials, which eroded
17

any existing social capital in the localities. Ultimately, the conflicts impacted negatively
on the maintenance of the projects.
Social capital is noted as being indispensable attribute for developing communities
(Putnam 2000, 2003; Bauman 2004; Tesoriero 2010). Described as the willingness of
people to do things in concert and for one another, social capital is considered the glue
that holds people together (Tesoriero 2010). Through social capital, networks and bonds
can be created between people from different backgrounds or who have little in
common (Putnam 2003, Woolcock 1998; Woolcock & Narayan 2000; Bauman 2004;
Nyirenda et al. 2010). According to Kenny (2010), social capital is an observable and a
measurable resource that should be nurtured through trust, reciprocity, norms and
networks; but not necessarily for achieving positive outcomes. Therefore, as Yates and
Jochum (2003) argued, social capital can be drawn on, increased or depleted.
Despite its importance for facilitating communal activities, recent research by Ling and
Dale (2013) shows that social capital requires people and organisations to be nurtured
and used effectively. They argue that social capital does not develop in a vacuum and
that it requires the efforts of an influential individual or a group to cultivate it. Relative
to Ghana, Arhin (2002), Donkor (2005), Ahwoi (2010) and Knierzinger (2011) have
identified Traditional Chiefs as influential agents of social capital in the country.
Respected as trustworthy individuals, Ghanaian Traditional Chiefs settle disputes,
provide social welfare services and contribute to national debates on various topical
issues. Aside from Ghana, Arcand and Bassole (2007) and Binswanger et al. (2010)
outlined the roles Traditional Chiefs played in the implementation of various
community-based programs in Senegal and Benin respectively. By implication,
Traditional Chiefs in the West African subregion wield the influence to determine the
fate of development projects. As the thesis shows in Chapter Seven however,
Traditional Chiefs seemed to have been ignored in the implementation of Ghana’s
CBRDP, an oversight that came with dire consequences for the projects. Despite this
positive literature and neat packaging of social capital, this concept proved elusive and
complex in the field and like power and empowerment, was a concept not well
implemented or understood, which in turn led to the negative impacts on the projects
studied in this thesis (see Chapters Six and Seven).
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1.6.3 Ghana’s Economy and Aid
Ghana has an agro–based economy (35% of GDP), and the world’s second largest
producer of cocoa (Bawumia 2010). Ghana is also known for its large gold and other
mineral export industry (Bawumia 2010). The country relies on its local taxes and
remittances from Ghanaians abroad to support the fiscal budget (Aryeetey, Harrigan &
Nissanke 2000; Amoako–Tuffour 2005; ISSER 2010). According to Amoako–Tuffour
(2005) and Bawumia (2010), although significant, tax revenue has not been enough to
meet the country’s fiscal budgetary needs. In 2008, Ghana achieved Middle–Income
Country status. The country’s economy recorded the highest ever GDP growth of 13.6%
in 2011 (see Figure 1.4; Government of Ghana 2012 Budget Statement, World Bank
2012). Poverty levels have also decreased significantly from nearly 40% in 2000 to
28.5% in 2009 (African Human Development Report 2012). Since 2010, Ghana has
been producing oil from offshore reserves discovered in June 2007 and is raising hopes
for an economic boost to further reduce poverty levels.
Despite the oil find and economic growth in the last decade, Ghana is aid–dependent
(Harrigan and Younger 2000), and one of the top ten recipients of development
assistance in Sub–Saharan Africa (see Table 1.1)19. As of 2010, the International
Development Association of the World Bank Group, the US, the UK and the EU
Institutions were the country’s largest donors20. According to Harrigan and Younger
(2000), until the mid–1960s, aid was relatively insignificant in Ghana. This meant that
very little donor assistance was needed. Two reasons accounted for this. First, Dr.
Kwame Nkrumah, the first President of the country 1957–1996, was distrustful of
Britain and the USA, major donors of the time. Aid in these times, as the next chapter
discusses, was used to ‘make friends’ because of the Cold War (1947–1991). The
Ghanaian President refused any aid advances to the country and adopted a non–aligned
posture. Second, Ghana’s economy had sizeable foreign exchange reserves, little debt,
and a small public sector at the close of colonial rule (Harrigan & Younger 2000;
Quartey 2005).
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See also Development Aid at a Glance statistics by region, Africa 2012 edition, retrieved from
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/27/42139250.pdf, retrieved on March 24, 2012.
20
See http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd /21/40/1881076.gif, retrieved March 25, 2012.
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Figure 1.4 GDP– Real Growth Rate (%) in Ghana in a Decade Compared
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Source: World Bank 2008; Ghana Statistical Service 2010; Gov’t of Ghana 2012 Budget Statement.

Table 1.1 Aid–Dependency in Ghana and Sub–Saharan Compared
1968
2000
2009
Indicators
Net Aid as % of GNI

Ghana S–Sahara Ghana S–Sahara
Africa
Africa
3.85
2.25
12.37
4.02

Net Aid as % of Gross
Capital Formation
Net Aid as % of Imports
of Good/Services

33.62

Net Aid per Capita ($)

7.44

-

Ghana
6.12

S–Sahara
Africa
4.49

12.52

50.2

22.96

30.9

24.85

-

17.2

10.83

13.9

11.81

31.18

19.61

66.44

53.5

4.14

Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/sub-saharan-africa/net-oda-received-per-capita-us-dollar-wbdata.html; http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ghana/net-oda-received-percent-of-gni-wb-data.html, all
retrieved under various indicators March 24, 2012. There are no data for 1968.
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Nevertheless, since the mid–1960s, aid–dependency has become a common feature in
Ghana. It commenced with the National Liberation Council (NLC), the military
government, which ousted Nkrumah’s regime21 (Harrigan & Younger 2000). The NLC
government claimed that they needed fiscal support to balance the payments on large
accumulated commercial debts incurred by the Nkrumah government. These
developments laid the foundation for the phenomenon of aid–dependency in Ghana. As
a share of Gross National Income (GNI) and other indicators (see Table 1.1), aid to
Ghana, has for most periods, been higher than the Sub–Saharan African averages. As
Figure 1.5 also shows, while aid ODA levels have been decreasing since 2005, aid as a
percentage of Ghana’s central government expenditure for the decade has averaged over
46%22.
Figure 1.5 Net ODA as Percentage of Central Government Expense
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Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ghana/net-oda-received-percent-of-central-governmentexpense-wb-data.html, retrieved March 25, 2012.
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In a coup d’état in 1966.
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ ghana/net-oda-received-percent-of-central-government-expensewb-data.html, retrieved March 25, 2012.
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It is within this context that Ghana’s ‘friendship’ with the IMF, World Bank (who
funded the CBRDP) and the donor fraternity must be understood - a relationship that
has been mutually beneficial. Ghana regards its donors and their agencies as
‘development partners’ (Government of Ghana 2012 Budget). On the other hand, the
donors regard the country as a reference point for where ‘development works’ and aid
policy succeeds (English 1999; Africa Development Outlook 200823). Significantly,
although the implementation of the CBRDP meant that Ghana was still economically
tied to donors (aid-dependency), there were a lot at stake for the World Bank who
funded the project. Among other things, when successfully executed, the CBRDP would
offer the World Bank and proponents of community-driven driven development
programs the theoretical grounds to promote it in other developing countries.
For Ghana, it would also mean more aid and reinforce the notion that aid works better
there (English 1999; Azeem et al. 2006). Consequently, in an obvious support of aid,
former President J.A. Kufour (2001–2008), on a local media network [Joyfm],
recounted the role aid has played in the country’s development agenda, particularly
during his tenure (July 1 2010, Joyfm midday news). In the face of recent flood and
sanitation challenges facing the country, the former President urged the current
government not to be ashamed to beg for aid24. Interestingly, the immediate past
President, H.E. Professor J.E.A. Mills, while addressing the African Diplomatic Corps
in Ottawa, Canada in November 2011, urged his fellow African leaders to take bold
steps to untie themselves from aid–dependency (Ghana News Agency, November 19,
2011).25 Two days later, his government released the 2012 budget, of which a
significant percentage was to be aid–funded, particularly with a USD 3 billion loan
facility from China, the highest ever aid arrangement in the country’s history
(Government of Ghana Budget Statement 2012). While addressing the 2012 UN
General Assembly in New York, H.E. John Mahama, the current President, also pleaded
with the World Bank not to withdraw development assistance to Ghana, although the
country has attained a middle-income status26. Despite Ghana’s obvious dependence on
aid, academics do not agree on the direct relationship between aid flows and the
23

See also http://www.dfid.gov.uk/ghana, retrieved March 24, 2011.
http://edition.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201111/76753.php, retrieved on January 10, 2012.
25
See http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9163:president–
mills–urges–african–nations–to–be–self–reliant&catid=28:general–news&Itemid=162, retrieved
20/01/12.
26
Middle income countries are expected to go to the financial market to borrow at commercial rates
instead of relying on the World Bank for concessionary loan facilities.
(http://www.modernghana.com/news/419992/1/mahama-pleads-with-world-bank-not-to-withdrawfina.html, retrieved September 30, 2012).
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country’s economic growth and poverty reduction (Aryeetey & Cox 1997; Osei,
Morrissey & Lloyd 2005; Bawumia 2010; Clemens et al. 2011; Osei 2012).
1.7 The Case Study: The Community–Based Rural Development Project
The Community–Based Rural Development Project (CBRDP) (2004–2011) was a joint
pilot initiative of the Government of Ghana and the World Bank. Theoretically, Ghana’s
CBRDP was designed as a type of the World Bank’s Community–Driven Development
program. However, Ghana’s CBRDP was supply–driven, unlike conventional
Community–Driven Development Programs which are demand–driven. This means that
the beneficiary communities did not initiate the projects, but were selected, trained and
funded to implement pre–categorised project types. Ghana’s CBRDP was funded with
loan facilities from the World Bank’s International Development Association and the
Agence’ Francaise Development. The Government of Ghana implemented the project
under the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) and the
Regional Coordinating Units (RICUs) in conjunction with an independent CBRDP
secretariat. The project was piloted in two phases, 2004–2008 and 2009–2011 in all ten
regions, all hundred and thirty-eight Districts, and one hundred and forty five Area
Councils (see Figure 1.3; CBRDP Implementation Manual 2006). The thesis is based on
the Area Councils, which are found in Metropolitan and District Assembly areas. Area
Councils consist of Government Appointees, ordinary residents, Assembly and Unit
Committee Members (Ahwoi 2010).
The CBRDP served as one of the principal vehicles for the implementation of Ghana’s
Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) to bridge the gap of uneven distribution across
socio-economic groups and geographical locations (CBRDP Implementation Manual
2006). The CBRDP had two objectives. First, build and strengthen the capacities of
National, Regional, District, Area Councils and rural communities to deliver services
and manage resources. At the Area Council and local levels, the assumption was that,
by empowering rural populations to participate actively in local development processes,
they would improve their productive assets and their local infrastructure (CBRDP
Implementation Manual 2006). As a result, the second objective was to introduce a new
fiscal transfer mechanism for the development of infrastructure and income generating
activities in rural areas (Yaron 2008; Binswanger et al. 2010).
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As will be argued in Chapter Five, fiscal administration in Ghana is centralised and very
bureaucratic (Inanga & Osei–Wusu 2004; Baffour–Kyei 2009). Thus, the CBRDP’s
strategy was to pilot the transfer of funds directly to the hitherto weak Area Councils for
local developments. Interestingly, while the CBRDP’s objective was to avoid the fiscal
and administrative bottlenecks at the Regional and District levels, the designers of the
project tied it to the existing bureaucratic government planning and procurement
systems. Also, unlike conventional CDD projects, where various localities compete for
funding (Dongier et al. 2003; Platteau 2004; Labonne & Chase 2007; Platteau &
Gaspart 2009), the CBRDP was different; District Assemblies selected the recipient
localities. Because Ghana’s District Assemblies are effectively controlled by the central
government (see Chapter Five; Antwi–Boasiako 2010; Ahwoi 2010), the selection
processes appears to have been politicised.
1.7.1 The CBRDP Implementation Strategy
To facilitate implementation, the country was divided into four Zones (see Figure 1.6):
Upper East, Upper West and Northern Regions as Zone I; Asante and Brong Ahafo
Regions as Zone II; Central and Western Regions Zone as III; and Eastern, Greater
Accra and Volta Regions as Zone IV (the focus of this thesis). Each Zone had a Zonal
Head and other staff to provide administrative and coordinating support to the project
during the five stages of implementation; these are described briefly below.

Table 1.2 Implementation Processes of the CBRDP in the Area Councils
Stage

Activity

Stage I

Training in the rudiments of the CBRDP

Stage II

Preparation of Action Plans

Stage III

Examination and Approval of the Action
Plans

Stage IV

Implementation

Stage V

Monitoring and Evaluation

Designed by author, based on CBRDP Implementation Manual (2006).
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Stage I: Training of Area Councilors
All selected Area Councils27 were taken through the rudiments of the project. In
seminars run by consultants, Area Councillors were trained in financial, project
tendering and procurement management processes. The Area Councillors were also
trained in how to prepare project proposals (Action Plan). The Action Plans contained
demographic information and the prioritised needs of the Area Council as well as a
project implementation plan and a budget. While they were prepared as a requirement
for receiving the CBRDP, the Action Plans were also meant to be the Area Council’s
development blueprint (CBRDP Implementation Manual 2006).
Stage II: Preparation of Community Action Plans
Once the training was over, Stage Two required that the Area Councillors return to their
respective localities to prepare their Action Plans. The process was ‘supposed’ to be
participatory and consultative between the local people [including women], the
Assembly and Unit Committee Members, and local people. Once an Action Plan was
finalised, it was forwarded to the Zonal Head of the CBRDP to be considered for
funding.
Stage III: Examination/Approval of Action Plans
Stage Three rested with the CBRDP secretariat, which examined the Action Plans using
four benchmarks. First, the Action Plan had to reflect the ‘needs’ captured in the
respective district’s development blueprints, referred to as the District Approved
Development Plans. Second, it had to be explicit about the project’s implementation and
procurement plans. Third, the prioritised needs had to fall within the ‘menu’ of the
CBRDP components, each consisting of different, but specific sub-projects (see
Appendix A). These included: 1) Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building
(ISCB); 2) Infrastructure for Agricultural Development (IAD); 3) Rural Enterprise
Development (RED); 4) Infrastructure for Social and Human Development (ISHD); and
5) Community–Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM). Finally, the
implementation budget had to match the CBRDP seed money of GHC15, 00028. As will
be discussed later, some ‘good’ projects were either rejected or downsized because they
could not be funded by the project’s inadequate seed money or that they were
27

The selection of the Areas Council was based on two criteria: a functioning office with staff and a
three–party– signatory bank account. But a number of the Area Councils researched did not have offices.
Before the CBRDP, although the Area Councils existed, with no project to implement, they were virtually
in a state of inertia, as the District Assemblies executed most local projects. The CBRDP was the seminal
nationwide project that tested the facilitation and implementation capacities of the Area Councils
28
Approximately US$10, 274, based on exchange rate effective March 31, 2004, GH⊄ 9050 = US$1.
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inconsistent with both the District Approved Development Plans and the project’s subcomponents.
There were two types of the funding: the Normal and Rapid Response Initiative (RRI).
Under the Normal funding arrangements, the Area Councils received the funding as
they progressed and were not time bound. In the RRI category, Area Councils were
required to complete their chosen project within a hundred–day limit, after which they
received the funds (see Table 1.3). Yaron (2008), for example, observed that the RRI
procedures had interesting empowerment impacts and proved to be very helpful in
promoting greater accountability, transparency, ownership and effective management of
associated sub–projects. However, in two of the nine localities where projects were
implemented under the RRI were found the projects to be showing signs of structural
deterioration, as they seemed to have been hastily constructed (see Table 1.3).
Once the CBRDP secretariat approved the Action Plan, the beneficiary locality received
the seed money in three equal instalments into the Area Council’s bank account. The
expectations were that the District Assembly would contribute 10% of the project sum,
while the beneficiary ‘community’ contribute labour or offer hired services at a reduced
market rate. In some of the localities researched, the District Assembly funds never
came, while others also suffered the ‘usual’ financial bureaucratic delays. In such
circumstances, certain ‘influential’ local people pre–financed the projects, but were later
reimbursed, when the seed money arrived (CBRDP Implementation Manual 2006;
CBRDP Annual Reports 2006 – 2010; Field notes 2010).
Stage IV: Implementation
At the project implementation stage, the Area Councils had to collaborate with the
District Assembly for technical assistance. This depended on the sub-project chosen.
Commonly, the District Planning Officer, Accountant, and Engineers offered relevant
technical assistance at various stages of project implementation. Most aspects of
procurement and technical components were supposed to be achieved on a ‘community
contracting’ basis. This meant that businesses in the beneficiary locality had priority
over ‘outsiders’ in the supply of the project materials, albeit through a tendering
process. However, as the sixth chapter of the thesis will show, in some localities, the
Area Councillors awarded contracts to themselves or their ‘cronies’, an act that
contravened the project’s principles.
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Figure 1.6 CBRDP Zonal Demarcations

ZONE 1

ZONE II
ZONE
IV

ZONE III

Source: http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/geography/maps.php retrieved under administrative
maps on August 10 2010. Demarcated by author.
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Stage V: Monitoring and Evaluation
As each of the CBRDP beneficiary localities was expected to implement, own and
maintain their projects, monitoring teams were established to oversee the sustenance of
the projects. The state of most of the projects studied, as highlighted below, suggested
that the monitoring teams were not functioning. Some of the monitoring officials
complained of being controlled at every turn by the District Assembly bureaucrats, who
sometimes delayed the release of funds for the maintenance of the projects.
1.7.2 State of the Projects as of Fieldwork
As of March 2011 when the data collection was completed, all the projects studied were
completed, some for more than two years. Apart from the eight–seater school toilet
project at Ahugakorpe in the Volta Region, which was awaiting commissioning and the
Tease market sheds, which appeared to be ‘boycotted’, the other seven projects studied
were in use. During the fieldwork, it was observed that most of the nine projects studied
had not been well maintained; these aberrations were confirmed in the interviews
conducted. Some of the anecdotes have been reproduced with pictures on the projects in
Chapters Five, Six and Seven of the thesis. Table 1.3 below depicts the state of each of
the projects.
Table 1.3: Profiles of the CBRDPs in the sampled Localities in Zone IV
Region

Project

Eastern Pakro
Mechanised
bore–hole

Ntoaso
sixteen-seater
Public toilet

Tease Market
sheds

State of the projects
The project was in use, but had broken down
several times. Some members of the committee
taking care of it complained that the local people
do not want to pay user fees, so they have to rely
on the District Assembly for funds to maintain it.
A beautiful structure, but the surroundings were
bushy and unmaintained. While the facility was
being patronised, on all four visits to the village,
the researcher found the inside of the facility not
disinfected. The caretakers of the facility
explained that it was in that state because of a
seeming power struggle between the Assembly
Member and the Traditional Chief over who
should control the money meant to maintain the
project.
The sheds looked abandoned and deteriorating.
While empty, traders were seen selling in the sun
outside. There were residues of human excreta in
the sheds, which sheltered squatters in the nights.

Funding
Type
Normal

Normal

Normal
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The culverts looked well–maintained, but anytime
Greater Agoe Culverts it rained, they were flooded. The local people
Accra
complained that they wanted them a bit wide, but
the District Engineer, who they alleged paid no
attention to them, indicated that there were no
funds available to execute that.
The renovation and the government schoolRenovation of feeding program increased school enrolments to a
Tashie Presby rate that the facilities could not support. The
Primary
school had no electricity and fans. Because the
School
Tashie locality had no public toilet facilities, some
of the local people were defecating in the
classrooms and on the school’s compound.
Aboloo
Community
Library
Volta

Agbetor

Dedenu
Mechanised
Bore–hole

Lume
Ahugakorpe
eight–seater
school toilets

The library was deteriorating. Most of the louver
blades were broken; and there were numerous
cracks on the building, which had no electricity
and fans. Most of the bookshelves were empty,
there not being enough books.
The structure lacked many basic educational
amenities like textbooks and educational aids.
Also because there was no toilet facility in the
school, staff and students were using the bush as
places of convenience. The school had outgrown
the three–unit structure, so Classes Three & Four
and Five & Six were merged in makeshift
structures. The project looked to be resting on the
shoulders of the local Chief who pre–financed it.
This was one of the well–maintained projects.
People in the locality had no problems paying
tokens. Even so, the pipe did not always flow and
the people had to wait sometimes for a week. The
maintenance committee was always active, but
complained of District Assemblies bureaucratic
processes of releasing funds to maintain the pipes.
They were virtually frustrated by having to always
go through the District Assembly to access funds
to maintain the project.
The project has been completed but the school had
been waiting for the District Chief Executive to
commission it. In the mean time, the entire Lume
locality and the school were sharing an overused
4-seater toilet facility built there by DANIDA.

Normal

Normal

Rapid
Respond
Initiative
Rapid
Respond
Initiative

Normal

Source: Field notes (2011).
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CHAPTER TWO
GLOBAL AID TRENDS AND RAMIFICATIONS
FOR GHANA
“[Ghana has] been turned into a veritable laboratory for the investigation of different
approaches to endemic African problems”
(Antwi–Boasiako 2010, p. 166).
This chapter provides an historical and global overview of International Development
Aid (aid) and how the trends in this aid have impacted on Ghana. The researcher argues
that Post–War II aid successfully met its aims of restoring the economies of Western
Europe under the Marshall Plan. However, because it was originally designed for a
specific context, aid has largely been unable to replicate the Marshall Plan’s results in
other settings. Therefore, over the last two decades in particular, desperate for evidence
that ‘aid works’, international development agencies have been experimenting with
various programs, many of which have achieved mixed outcomes and also turned the
recipients into ‘aid–addicts’ (Moyo 2009; Antwi–Boasiako 2010). Within the context of
aid to Ghana, one of the top ten aid–dependent countries in Sub–Saharan Africa, the
impacts and limitations are considered for major aid programs such as Structural
Adjustment, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, Multi–Donor Budgetary
Support and the Millennium Development Goals. Based on the literature, this thesis
argues that, when aid programs concentrate on economic theories and indicators
(‘economicentric’), while ignoring the social, political and other relevant contexts
within which they are implemented, mixed results or failure seem inevitable.
2.1 A Brief Overview of Aid in the Pre–World War II Period
Long before the institutionalisation of aid in the 1950/60s colonial governments and
voluntary Christian missionaries provided and managed large–scale humanitarian aid
(Hjertholm & Howard 1998). Thus, as early as 1811 and 1896, the US Government was
providing relief aid to the citizens of Venezuela and food aid to other parts of the world.
The US Department of Agriculture also funded agriculture research centres in parts of
Latin America. Hjertholm and Howard (1998) argued further that, while the French
funded universities in their colonies, Great Britain’s colonial administration provided
non–administrative aid to their colonies through the 1929 Colonial Act and the Colonial
Development and Welfare Act of 1940 and 1945 (see also Lumsdaine 1993; Riddell
2007). During much of the Pre–War II era, church–based organisations also provided
key services to poor people. For example, in Eastern Africa, Riddell (2007) argues that
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church–based organisations provided between 40% to 60% of health, education, water
and food–security services. Relative to Ghana, Buah (1998) asserts that Christian
missionaries championed formal education in the country during much of the Pre–
World War II period.
Apart from the colonial governments and church–based organisations, Riddell (2007)
explains that during the 1940s, there were discussions in the International Labour
Organisation for the provision of funds to raise living standards in poor countries.
Also, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), after its
establishment in 1943, received funds from over forty countries to help provide food,
medicine, and agricultural and industrial goods to recipients in more than fifty
countries. These early international commitments for alleviating poverty in poor
countries were not only championed by Western countries, as Asian and Latin
American countries were among those who called for the establishment of substantial
programmes of development assistance29 (Lancaster 2007). Even so, the genesis of the
current aid regime is traceable to the aftermath of World War II.
2.2 The Post–World War II Period: The Birth of the Bretton Wood Institutions,
the Marshall Plan and the Cold War
The immediate Post World War II period (1945−1955) significantly influenced the
institutionalisation of International Development Aid and several contemporary aid
institutions developed from organisations originally created to cater for post–war needs
(Riddell 2007). These include, but not are limited to, Oxfam (1942), which originally
catered only for refugees from Greece; CARE (1945), which was originally the Centre
for American Relief in Europe; the UN (1945) which began as the United Nations
Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA); and the so–called Bretton Wood
Institutions30 (Hjertholm & Howard 1998; Riddell 2007).
The birth of the Bretton Wood Institutions (International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development [now the World Bank], the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and the
International Trade Organisation [now the WTO]) to establish a framework for a global
29

It was in the 1940s that the Indian Chair of the UN’s Sub–Commission on Economic Development
formally called for the UN to provide concessional loans to poor countries to help them obtain loans from
commercial sources.
30
Named after the Bretton Woods suburb in New Hampshire USA, where over seven hundred delegates
from some forty-four countries met in Mount Washington Hotel in 1944. The meeting was held against
the backdrop of World War II and was meant to restructure international finance, establish a multilateral
trading system and construct cooperation that would avoid a repetition of the Great Depression of the
1930s.
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system of financial and monetary management, is considered by many scholars as the
genesis of the dominant framework for aid–infused development (Crush 1995;
Lancaster 2007). In broad terms, the World Bank was designed to facilitate capital
investment for reconstruction, while the IMF was designed to manage the global
financial system31 and stabilise the world economy. Subtly underlying the operations of
the two institutions was the idea that if war–devastated Europe was to return to its
previous level of development, massive capital [aid] injection was required. This
principle, later referred to as the ‘Gap–Theory’, was based on the ideas of Britain’s J.M.
Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) and America’s H.D. Dexter White (1892–1948) (Erixon
2005). At the end of the 1940s therefore, the notion of using aid to drive economies had
been established, starting with the US Marshall Plan32 of 1948 for Western Europeans.
Although an economic program, the Marshall Plan also propelled the US into leadership
of foreign policy (Cassen 1994; Lancaster 2007).
Driven by the Keynesian33 Economic Theory [given huge capital investments, weak
economies would be revived], the Marshall Plan was tailored for the reconstruction of
war–torn Western Europe in the face of the threats of communism in Eastern Europe
(Mehmet 1999; Lancaster 2007; Riddell 2007). Under the program, the US through its
Secretary of State, George C. Marshall (1947–1949), embarked on an aid program
worth USD 13 billion34 to fourteen Western European countries in a five–year
development plan (1948–1952). The Marshall Plan was successful in bringing Western
Europe back onto a strong economic footing, restoring infrastructure and reinstating
political stability (Hjertholm & Howard 1998; Riddell 2007).
Although designed for Western Europe, the Marshall Plan significantly influenced the
establishment and globalisation of aid in two ways. First, in the wake of its relative
success, the Marshall Plan tended to lend credence to the Keynesian Economic Theory.
As a result, some argued for its replication in developing countries, based on a
simplistic assumption that if it worked for Western Europeans, why could it not produce
the same results in other contexts (Mehmet 1999; Crush 2005; Erixon 2005; Reinert
2007)? However, as some scholars have observed (see Escobar 1995; Botchway 2001;
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France (1946), Netherlands, Denmark and Luxembourg (1947) were the earliest beneficiaries of loans
from the World Bank and these were for reconstruction.
32
Also known as the European Recovery Program (Riddell 2007).
33
Referring to the ideas of Maynard Keynes.
34
USD 86 billion in today’s terms and only surpassed in 2005. Great Britain had the largest share of 24%
according to Riddell (2007).
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Li 2007), and this thesis will argue, ‘development’ is not just about capital investment,
as the contextual differences and concepts on which aid programs are based also matter.
Second, as the US provided large sums to Europe, monies that the Bretton Wood
Institutions had earmarked for the reconstruction of Europe were freed up and were
ready to be directed towards developing countries (Cassen 1994; Lancaster 2007). This
coincided with: 1) Britain and France’s resolve to maintain their geopolitical hold on
their former colonies in Africa and Asia; and the 2) US and Russia’s quest for allies in
Africa during the Cold War. Despite this, by the end of the 1960s, over thirty-one
African countries had become independent, beginning with Ghana in 1957. However,
their independence seemed nominal; they remained financially dependent on their
colonial masters (Mehmet 1971; Kanbur 2003). Thus, aid became the tool for countries,
Britain and France in particular, to maintain their geopolitical influence, a situation
some commentators argue laid the foundation for aid–dependency on the African
continent (Ashimolowo 2009; Moyo 2009).
Aid was also the instrument of Cold War diplomacy (1945–1991), as the US and the
Soviet Union used it to gain allies in African countries (Mehmet 1971; Riddell 2007). It
is within this context that the famous inaugural speech of US President Harry Truman
(1945–1953) must be understood35. While the speech tended to portray the US
commitment as being the altruistic use of aid, the reality was that the US employed it to
gain more allies in its challenge to Soviet communism (Lancaster 2007). Thus, Zaire’s
Mobutu Sese Seko (1965 – 1997), Liberia’s Samuel Doe (1986 – 1990) and Uganda’s
Idi Amin (1971–1979) became beneficiaries of US aid at the time. The Soviet Union
also funded the regimes of Patrice Lumumba (Congo: 24 June 1960 – 14 September
1960), Mengistu Mariam (Ethiopia: 1977 – 1987), Jean Bokassa (Central African
Republic: 1966 –1979) and Muamar Gaddafi (Libya: 1977 – 2011) (Meredith 2005;
Lancaster 2007). Interestingly, while most of these leaders were dictators with
despicable human rights records, both the US and the Soviet Union overlooked their
infamous records to further their respective strategic advantages. Ghana remained non–
aligned during the Cold War, a position some aver accounted for the American CIA’s
complicity in the overthrow of its first President, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah in 1966 (Shivj
2003; Meredith 2005; Botwe–Asamoah 2005). During the Cold War period, aid also
funded Poverty Reduction and Structural Adjustment Programs.
35

See http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres53.html, retrieved April 28, 2012.
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2.3 The 1970s: Poverty Reduction Focus, the Herald of Structural Adjustments
This decade saw two major oil crises in 1973 /436 and 197937. According to Riddell
(2007), for the most part of the decade, oil prices soared, sending most African
economies into chaos. The greatest beneficiaries of the price hike were oil–exporting
countries, which deposited their huge profits into international banks. Within Sub–
Saharan Africa, incidences of food price hikes and economic recession occurred,
situations that compelled many governments to borrow more from international banks.
Owing to these crises, donors shifted their aid programs from the 1960s model of
funding infrastructure to addressing poverty directly with projects in agriculture, rural
development, social services, mass inoculation programs, adult literacy campaigns and
the provision of food for the malnourished (Lancaster 2007).
Championed by the World Bank38 and the UNDP39, the ‘poverty focus’ was driven by
the notion that economic growth was insufficient to reduce poverty, and that it was
important for donors to tackle poverty directly (Ghai et al. 1980; Erixon 2005). The new
approach compelled donors to abandon the Keynesian Economic Theory and also
amend their international aid policies to focus on satisfying ‘basic human needs’.
Accordingly, the US passed the International Development 1973 Act, which stipulated
that 75% of its Food for Peace Program should go to countries whose per capita income
was USD 300 per annum or less (Lancaster 2007). According to Riddell (2007), in
1975, the UK also released a paper titled Changing Emphasis in British Aid Policies:
More Aid for the Poor, to reflect the ‘poverty focus’ paradigm. Riddell further asserts
that the notion of addressing poverty directly laid the foundation for the
professionalisation of the aid industry, more technocrats being needed to create,
implement and monitor projects.40 More importantly, the shift gave rise to poverty–
oriented lending to Africa, rising sharply from 5% in the late 1970s to 50% in the early
1980s (Moyo 2009). By the end of the decade, the African continent had consumed
USD 36 billion worth of aid, while many nations remained hugely indebted to
international banks (Moyo 2009; Lancaster 2007). The situation led the World Bank
Group to introduce and experiment with yet another aid program on the continent,
Structural Adjustments.
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Arab States placed an embargo on oil in retaliation for US support for Israel in the Yom Kippur War.
Precipitated by the Iran–Iraqi War.
38
Redistribution–with–growth policy.
39
Basic Needs policy–adopted from the ILO.
40
Riddell (2007) estimates that over 40,000 people are employed in the aid industry.
37
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2.4 Precursors to the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment in Ghana
Aid was irrelevant in Ghana in the first decade of its independence (1957–1966). As
Harrigan and Young (2000) observed, President Nkrumah’s policy of non–alignment
during the Cold War meant that he refused any aid advances to the country. At the time,
Ghana also had a relatively good economy. According to Konadu–Agyemang (2000),
although the British plundered the country, they left it in a better shape than any other
country in Sub–Saharan Africa at the time, Ghana’s primary material export–based
economy being well established. At independence in 1957, the author insists that Ghana
was the world’s leading producer and exporter of cocoa, and exported 10% of the
world’s gold. The country also had foreign reserves of £200 million and an external
debt of just £20 million (see also Buah 199809). Furthermore, Ghana had one of the
best infrastructure systems in Africa, arguably with the most educated, skilled, and
experienced workforce in Sub–Saharan Africa, and well–formulated development plans
(Huq 1989; Roe & Schneider 1992; Werlin 1994). By all criteria, Ghana was probably
much better endowed than most countries labelled ‘Third World’, and had better
potential to develop its economy. At independence, Ghana was a middle–income
country with a per capita income of £50, equivalent to that of South Korea. In 1960,
Ghana’s per capita income of £70 was still higher than that of Nigeria (£29), India
(£25), and Egypt (£56), with a growth rate of 6% per annum (Huq 1989; Leite et al.
2000).
Under Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party (CPP) government (1957–1966),
manufacturing industries boomed in Ghana. The CPP government inherited a colonial
economy that promoted only primary industries, mainly for the extraction of the
country’s natural resources, agricultural and forest products as raw material for
metropolitan and Western industries (Buah 1998; Okyere 2000). However, Nkrumah
took steps to reverse the trend to ensure that the raw materials were reserved for local
production or that the government controlled their marketing locally and overseas. In
pursuit of its policy of self–reliance and independence, Nkrumah’s government set up
the Capital Investment Board and the Industrial Development Bank to source funding
for the country’s industrialisation drive. Aside from entering into partnerships in some
manufacturing sectors, the government itself established several enterprises that
produced goods ranging from safety matches, canned foods, pharmaceutical products
and fishing vessels to electronics. The Ghana Standards Board was also established to
control the quality of production (Buah 1998; Okyere 2000).
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Because industries thrive on a reliable power supply, the CPP government built the
Akosombo Hydro–Electric Power Station, which still supplies much of the domestic
and industrial needs of the country. The government also built rail lines, feeder roads
and motorways to ease general transportation in the country and facilitate the haulage of
export products and raw materials from the hinterlands (Buah 1998; Okyere 2000).
Under Nkrumah, Ghana experienced a golden decade of self–initiated development. As
Apter noted:
Richer than most (African) countries, carefully groomed for independence, with
trained cadres exceeding those of far larger countries ... having inherited a good
and expanding educational system, Ghana [had] ... the resources, manpower ...
moral and spiritual qualities to set the pace and tone of political development in
all Africa
(Apter 1972, p. 337).
However, as Whitfield (2008, p. 185) observed, ‘Ghana became the epitome of Africa’s
decline.’ By the middle of the 1960s, Ghana was bankrupt, the country having a huge
debt burden of USD 1 billion. The country’s GDP growth rate in 1966 fell to –5.1%,
while its foreign reserves became minimal. From this period onwards, aid dependency
became a common feature in Ghana commencing with the National Liberation Council
(NLC) government, which ousted Nkrumah’s CPP in a military coup d’état in 1966.
The NLC government claimed it needed fiscal support to balance payments on the large
accumulated commercial debts incurred by Nkrumah’s government (Harrigan & Young
2000). According to Bawumia (2010), in per capita terms, aid increased from USD
20.88 in 1966 to USD 24.28 in 1969.
Ghana returned to democratic rule in 1969, under K. A. Busia’s Progress Party, raising
hopes that the economy will be restored. However, this did not happen as the economy
was hit by the effects of the oil crises of the 1970s and decrease in aid levels from USD
24.28 in 1969 to USD 16.79 in 197241 (Bawumia 2010). This led to harsh economic
conditions and the overvaluing of the exchange rate to almost 1000% (Bawumia 2010).
Citing the poor economic conditions of the time, Colonel I. K. Acheampong overthrew
the K. A Busia’s government in a coup d’état in 1972 and ruled the country until 1978.
This government, the National Redemption Council (NRC) and later the Supreme
Military Council I42; decided to repudiate some of the country’s commercial debts for
supposed irregularities. This led to a considerable decline in aid flows to Ghana in the
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In per capita terms.
Acheampong changed the name of his government in 1978.
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first half of the 1970s (Bawumia 2010).43 Under the NRC, Ghana experienced import
substitution, restrictions on foreign exchange imports and price controls (Okyere 2000;
Bawumia 2010).
According to Bawumia (2010), from 1975 the NRC successfully approached
multilateral lenders44 leading to increases in aid levels, which reached USD 20.93 per
capita by 1979. However, Ghana’s inability to repay these loans on time increased the
country’s external debt stock. Thus by 1980, Ghana’s total external debt had reached
USD1407 billion, causing international financial institutions to refuse credit to the
country. Meanwhile, cocoa production, the main source of foreign exchange at the time,
dropped and industries stalled for lack of machine parts and intermediate inputs
(Aryeetey, Harrigan & Nissanke 2000; Fosu n.d). The huge debt situation and the
general harsh economic conditions that ensued were complicated by three years of
political unrest (1978–1981), during which several governments, mainly the military,
ruled the country.
In 1981, Flt Lt. JJ Rawlings (1981–2000) seized power in a coup d’état.45 In his bid to
restore the economy, Rawlings engaged in what Bawumia (2010, p. 43) calls “popular
nonsense.” The policy ensured that traders reported by the regime’s vigilantes for
hoarding and overpricing goods were arrested and their wares sold to the public at
reduced prices. However, Rawlings abandoned that policy because it was an inadequate
vehicle for growing and sustaining the economy. Compelled by an already bad
economic situation including a severe drought and famine that hit the country in 1983,
and the repatriation of many Ghanaians from Nigeria in the same year, Rawlings sought
foreign assistance (Okyere 2000). After being disappointed by the Soviet Union,
Rawlings approached the World Bank Group in 1983, which prescribed Structural
Adjustment Programs (SAP), and a tight fiscal, neo–liberal and market–oriented
program (World Bank 1984; Aryeetey et al. 2000; Bawumia 2010).
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For example, in per capita terms, aid decreased from USD 16.79 in 1972 to USD 7.43 in 1974.
IMF, World Bank and the African Development Bank
45
His first coup was in 1979, but handed over to Dr. Hilla Limann’s People’s National Party.
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2.5 1980/1990: Structural Adjustment Programs in Ghana
Following the effects of the 1979 spike in oil prices, many African countries were
hugely indebted, as they had borrowed and were servicing their debts at high cost. As
Moyo (2009) argues, Africa’s debt servicing had escalated to USD 8 billion by 1982
from USD 2 billion in 1975. As a result, the IMF formed the Structural Adjustment
Facility, intended to lend monies to defaulting countries so helping them to repay their
debts in a program referred to as Structural Adjustment. In simple terms, Structural
Adjustment meant that beneficiary governments reduced the excessive involvement in
economic activities by their countries, liberalised these activities, and then adopted
privatisation, import substitution and export–oriented economic policies (World Bank
1984; 1991; 1995). The policy also postulated that African economies, in particular,
carried ‘excess baggage’ that served as barriers to development. Examples of the
barriers were, the World Bank indicated, unwarranted state interference in the workings
of the price mechanism, a bloated public service, exchange control, state ownership of
manufacturing enterprises, and investment in social welfare. Once removed, poverty
reduction and strong economies were guaranteed (World Bank 1984; 1991; 1995).
Although Ghana adopted Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) from 1983–1995, by
1991, most of the structural reforms were concluded. Undoubtedly, the country
experienced some positive improvements between 1984 and 1991. Interestingly, these
transient improvements have earned the country the label as ‘the most successful SAP
case in Africa’ (English 1999; Aryeetey et al. 2000; Aryeetey & Tarp 2000). Initially,
SAPs helped to rehabilitate the country’s physical infrastructure. According to
Bawumia (2010), before Ghana adopted the program, its roads, highways and railways
were in such an appalling state that important export products like cocoa and timber
were locked up in the hinterland. The successful rehabilitation of roads linking exportproducing regions opened up many rural areas and allowed export products to reach the
ports. With increases in exports, Ghana’s GDP, which was negative in 1981, rose to an
annual average of 5% between 1984 and 1991. Micro–economic stability was also
restored during this period, while poverty levels dropped from 51% in 1991/92 to 43%
in 1998/99 (English 1999; Aryeetey & Tarp 2000; Aryeetey & Fosu 2003; Ghana
Statistical Service 2000; Bawumia 2010).
However, these successes were momentary as the country began to experience the
economic and social effects of SAPs. Thus, SAPs have been condemned generally as
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laying the foundation for Ghana’s current economic woes and continued aiddependency (Osei & Quartey 2001; Tetteh 2003; Aryeetey & Fosu 2003). Three
negative impacts are considered for discussion. First, under SAPs, many Ghanaians
became unemployed. Nkrumah had made the state the driver of the Ghanaian economy
meaning that the: 1) State completely dominated production; and 2) Government
employed a large workforce, approximately 75% of formal employees. Thus, the SAPs
stipulation that the Ghanaian government downsize its public service through
retrenchment, while it divested its shares in many state–owned companies, should have
been carried out cautiously. The directive, which led to the dismissal of over fifty
thousand civil servants by 1990, brought much pain to families and the economy. The
divestiture of several state–owned companies, some very strategic, also led to abrupt
layoffs, and exacerbated the unemployment situation in the country. While it made
some ‘economic sense’ to divest many of the state–owned companies at the time, as
some were considered a drain on the economy, considering that a large percentage of
the country’s workforce would lose their jobs, the social context should have been
considered to mediate the economic context.
Second, given that Ghanaians had been used to ‘the government doing virtually for
them’, many were not used to paying realistic fees for public health and education.
Although over 55% of the population was defined as poor in 1985 (Aryeetey n.d.; Sarris
& Shams 1991) the Ghanaian government was compelled by the program to recover
costs in critical sectors such as health and education in order to be eligible for loan
facilities (Bawumia 2010). Thus, during much of the mid–1980s, fees for hospital beds
and consultation were raised, a situation that led to what became known in Ghana as the
‘Cash and Carry system’, meaning that people could access the healthcare system only
if they had the money to pay. The practice, Senah (1997) and Arhinful (2003) argued,
led many people to resort to ‘unorthodox’ means of seeking health support, as they
could not afford the cost of allopathic cure in health centres. Thus, while SAP is
believed to have reduced poverty levels in the country, Aryeetey & Cox (1997) and
Tetteh (2003) argue that it [poverty reduction] was confined to the capital city and the
forest localities only, worsening the existing regional, spatial and the rural/urban
disparities throughout the country.
Finally, SAPs made Ghana economically vulnerable to external shocks such as trade
shocks and crude oil price hikes. Because SAPs promoted exports, Ghana relied heavily
on cocoa and gold exports. However, when prices for these two commodities fell in
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1992 and 1999/2000 due to the trade shocks that came with further rise in crude oil
prices46, Ghana’s economy atrophied (Bawumia 2010). With a weak tax administration,
the country experienced shortfalls in revenues, while the government continued to
spend47. This led to huge budget deficits of almost 9.4% and 9.5% in 1992 and 1996,
respectively. Bawumia (2010) argues that, although the government embarked on
concessional borrowing in response to these slippages and thus mitigating these external
shocks, the economic situation remained essentially unaffected. By 2000, Ghana’s
currency, the Cedi had lost 50% of its value. As discussed below, the country’s external
debt also rose to unsustainable levels, so much so that by 2000 Ghana qualified as a
Highly Indebted Poor Country.
The analysis of the factors that bedevilled the implementation of Structural Adjustment
in Ghana points to the fact that aid programs have a less chance of being effective if
they fail to address local circumstances. Clearly, the World Bank and the IMF seemed
to have ignored Ghana’s social context at the time, focusing on economic indicators as
providing the framework for the implementation of the program. Specifically, they
overlooked the facts that 1) Ghana’s economy was state-driven, and approximately 75%
of the work force were government employees; 2) Ghana’s economy was not
diversified, and was driven by cocoa and gold; and 3) Ghanaians in the period were not
used to paying realistic fees for public health and education, over 55% being poor.
Although SAPs may have been good policy in principle as its relative achievements in
other regions show (Glassman & Carmody 2001; McColls & Young 2005; Ostry et al.
2009), its implementation in Ghana offered a key theoretical and development policy
lesson – giving consideration to aid beneficiaries’ local contexts in development policy
program designs. However, as the analysis of the progress towards achieving the
Millennium Development Goals and the findings of this thesis will show (see Chapters
Five, Six and Seven), international development agencies appear to have paid less
attention to this lesson by continuing to promote and design aid programs that are at
variance with the settings of development beneficiaries.

46

In 1999/2000.
Some of the expenditure was political as they financed election–motivated projects in 1992, 1996 &
2000.
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2.6. 2000–2010s: The Decade of Global ‘Aid Boom’
Following the mixed results of Structural Adjustment Programs and the end of the Cold
War, international aid flows in the 1990s were considerably reduced. Aid as percentage
of donors’ Gross National Income (GNI) decreased consistently from 0.33% in 1992 to
0.22% in 1997 (see figure 2.1). Aid to Africa in the mid 1990s also remained below
USD 20 billion. Hence, some anti–aid crusaders, who attributed the trend to aid
ineffectiveness and ‘donor fatigue’, argued that aid was over (Collier 1999; Easterly
2006; Moyo 2009; Mavrotas 2010).

Figure 2.1: DAC48 Members net ODA49 1990–2008 and DAC
Secretariat Simulation of Net ODA to 2009 and 2010

Source: OECD Development Cooperation Report (2010).

48
49

Development Assistance Committee.
Official Development Assistance.
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However, aid reinvented itself (Riddell 2007). As Figure 2.1 illustrates, and confirmed
by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the last
decade has recorded an unprecedented increase in global aid levels (‘aid boom’), so that
by 2010, aid to Ghana had hit a record high of almost USD129 billion50. Consequently,
over the period in question, aid has promoted and financed several programs and
initiatives. These include the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative; Multi Donor
Budgetary Support Programs; and the Millennium Development Goals, which are
discussed below. The others, discussed in the next chapter include: Output–Based Aid;
High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness; and Community–Driven Development
programs. While most of these initiatives were direct derivatives of and contributors to
the ‘aid boom’, other factors have also influenced the trend, some of which predated the
2000s. These include: 1) The publication of influential scholarly works; 2) International
aid campaigns; and 3) The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the US. It is important
to analyse these factors briefly before discussing how some of them impacted on Ghana.
2.6.1 The Publication of Influential Scholarly Works
In a period when aid was condemned as being ineffective and a waste of tax payers’
monies, Robert Cassen’s seminal work, Does Aid Work? (1986, 1994) criticised the
prejudices characterising the public perception of the concept of aid. Arguing that most
aid did succeed in terms of its own objectives and obtained a reasonable rate of return,
Cassen’s work revived public hope in aid. In 1996, the OECD of the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) followed with the famous Shaping the 21st Century: The
Contribution of Development Cooperation. Remembered for advocating the reduction
of world poverty by 2015 which has been captured in the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs), the report reiterated the 1970 UN General Assembly Resolution for
economically advanced countries to set aside 0.7% of their GNI annually for
international aid (UN General Assembly Resolution 2626, October 1970; CIDA 2010).
Although most donors have not met this target, it still remains the benchmark for
measuring aid levels (see OECD 2011).
The World Bank’s 1998 study, Assessing Aid and Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) Aid,
Policies and Growth were other landmark publications during the period. They
augmented Cassen (1994) and OECD publications by drawing together the relationship
between aid, the recipient–country’s environment and economic growth. Burnside and
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See http://www.oecd.org/ document/35/0,3746,en_2649_ 37413 _47515235 _1_1_1_37413,00 html,
retrieved March 15, 2012.
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Dollar were particularly influential, theorising that aid worked in ‘good policy
environments’ and among sound fiscal, economic and trade policies (see also Crook &
Manor 1998). The theory emanated from the poor economic performance of most
African economies in the 1990s51, which seemed to place blame on the continent’s
weak political leadership and institutions. Burnside and Dollar’s report also influenced
the establishment of the US Millennium Challenge Account to reward ‘well–governed’
African countries, including Ghana (Easterly 2006). British Prime Minister, Tony
Blair’s Commission on Africa was also established, based upon the ideas presented by
Burnside and Dollar (Easterly 2006).
Significantly, the report ushered in the era of aid conditionalities. Thus, unlike the Cold
War era, when aid was a ‘gift’, it was now a ‘contract’ (Leon & Eyben 2005; Amoako–
Tuffour 2005). Aid as a ‘contract’ seemed to have been given impetus by the terrorist
attack on the US. As argued below, after the incident, the adoption of good governance,
civil service reform and Western–styled democracy have become the ‘conditions’ for
giving aid (Gastel & Nuijten 2005; Easterly 2006; Moyo 2009). Although the claims of
the Burnside and Dollar (2000) report are now challenged together with the earlier
publications, their work can be credited with stimulating academic interest in the subject
of aid. These earlier works have led to further research and other publications, some
very provocative. These include, but not limited to, the works of Hirvonen (2005),
Mosse & Lewis (2005), Sachs (2005), Easterly (2006), Collier (2007), Lahiri (2007), Li
(2007), Riddell (2007), Moyo (2009), Walz & Ramachandran (2010) and Mavrotas
(2011).
2.6.2 International Aid Campaigns
The current ‘aid boom’ is also a result of two streams of international aid campaigns.
The first was organised by NGOs within specific European Countries who decried the
cuts in aid of the early 1990s. These NGOs called on their governments to stop further
cuts in ODA, and instead to support increases in development support. These included,
but were not limited to, the ‘Just 1%’ campaign in the US and the German ‘Pro 0.7%’
campaign (Lancaster 2007). Also, development oriented NGOs began to collaborate
across borders in pursuance of aid. For example, in Japan, international NGOs launched
the Reality of Aid publication to review and assess aid programs worldwide
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This was a backlash of the SAP as high cost of their servicing debts which equalled the total amount of
aid they received leading to a net reverse flow, from poor countries to rich countries, of USD 15 billion
from 1987–1989 (Lancaster 2007; Moyo 2009).
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independently52. The period also witnessed the restructuring of Japanese and French
fragmented aid agencies to engage better the NGOs in advising and implementing their
aid programs and aligning them to conform to the OECD/DAC (Lancaster 2007;
Riddell 2007).
The other campaign stream was much more global, being manifested in the ‘Jubilee
2000’ and Drop the Debt’ campaigns. According to Sachs (2005) and Moyo (2009),
towards the end of the 1990s, there were concerns from some quarters that huge debts
were holding Africa back, a situation largely the result of Western lending institutions’
operations. Consequently, in the early 2000, there arose an army of aid campaigners,
pop and movie stars, philanthropists and the clergy, who not only fought for
cancellation of African debts, but also pressed for a swathe of new aid. For example, in
2005 the Irish singer, Bono met the US President George W. Bush, while Bob Geldof
was also a guest at the G8 meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland, all in the pursuit of debt
forgiveness for poorer economies (Easterly 2006; Lancaster 2007; Moyo 2009). Both
streams of campaigns were significant as they influenced the World Bank’s debt
forgiveness initiative, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), which led to the
reduction of the debts of some African countries for the first time. For example,
Lancaster (2007) notes that member states of the OECD/DAC forgave debts amounting
to USD 3.7 billion in 2004, a substantial rise above the 1990 forgiveness figure of USD
650 million. Ghana benefited from the initiative, as later discussed.
2.6.3 September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attack on the USA
Global aid has not remained the same after the terrorist attack on the US on September
11, 2001. The incident, popularly referred to as 9/11, claimed thousands of lives,
destroyed infrastructure and inclined American and European political elites to support
higher levels of aid for the prevention of ‘failed states’, believed to be a derivative of
poverty, conflicts and weak institutions and a haven for terrorists (Coll 2004; Collier
2007). As a security measure, rich countries around the world, led by the US and its
allies, started employing aid as a tool to prevent state failures in the Arab world,
particularly countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Somalia, each labelled as
‘havens for terrorists’ (see Figure 2.2 below; Jones, Riddell & Kotoglou 2005; Collier
2007). Legitimised by the unfortunate incident, ‘security aid’ regained currency in aid
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(See http://www.realityofaid.org/content/about–roa/parent/17/name/RoA–Profile/id/7, retrieved March
25, 2012).
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discourses, the philosophy having first influenced aid giving during the Cold War. As
Brenda Killen of the OECD Development Co–operation Directorate submits in the
OECD 2012 Yearbook53, “in our highly interdependent world, what happens with the
economy, security, climate and health of any country affects us all”.
Firmly underpinning the concept of ‘security aid’ was the notion that poverty and
inequality around the world generate hostility and resentment towards the West (Lozada
2002; Hirvonen 2005; Woods 2005). As a result, most Western countries and their
media argued for increasing aid to poor countries for poverty reduction and conflict
prevention in ‘failed states’ (Hirvonen 2005; Collier 2007; Lancaster 2007). James D.
Wolfensohn, the former World Bank President (1995–2005) supported the idea
observing that:
Poverty in itself does not … lead to conflict, let alone to terrorism ... and yet we
know that exclusion can breed violent conflict. … Civil wars have often resulted
not so much from ethnic diversity… poverty is a central ingredient and conflict–
ridden countries in turn become safe havens for terrorist ... Our common goal
must be to eradicate poverty, to promote inclusion and social justice to bring the
marginalised into the main stream of the global economy and society … What
should be our agenda? First scale up foreign aid.
(cited in Lancaster 2007, p. 59).
The 9/11 incident has influenced the aid landscape significantly. Among other things,
countries that had hitherto not been receiving aid have been included in the aid recipient
list. For example, after the 9/11 incident, countries considered to be havens for terrorists
– Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan – appeared on the UK’s top eleven aid beneficiary
countries, although they had not been among the top fifteen in previous years (Jones et
al. 2005). Meanwhile, these ‘terrorist–haven’ countries also appeared on the aid list of
donor countries, sometimes as new aid providers, such as Sweden and Norway, whose
ODA, until the 9/11 incident, was value–free. Figures from the OECD indicates that
Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan, ‘supposed’ terrorist haven countries, have for the last
decade remained in the top ten of aid beneficiary countries of the US and its wealthy
allies in the fight against terrorism54. Thus, as illustrated in Figure 2.2 below, aid to
Afghanistan has since 2000 risen significantly, while at the peak of the US war on
terrorism, aid to Iraq soared. Although aid to Pakistan is relatively smaller, the rise in
US assistance to the country since the 9/11 incident is significant.
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http://oecdinsights.org/2012/04/04/development-aid-drops-for-the-first-time-in-15-years/.Retrieved
August 22, 2012.
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http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats, retrieved May 04, 2012. For the 2009/2010 period see the top ten gross
ODA recipients of the US, the UK, Australia, Sweden and Canada.
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Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/afghanistan/net–oda–received–percent–of–gni–wb–data.html,
retrieved March 12, 2012. Figures from 1982–2000 are unavailable.
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/iraq/net–oda–received–percent–of–gni–wb–data.html, retrieved March
12, 2012. Figures from 1982–2000 on Afghanistan and Iraq 1991–2003 are unavailable;
http://www.globalissues.org/ article /35/foreign–aid–development–assistance, retrieved January 2012.

It is within this context that the 2002 UN Conference on Financing Development in
Monterrey, Mexico; and the convening of the 2005 G–8 Summit in Gleneagles,
Scotland must be understood. The Monterrey conference, which coincided with the
international aid campaigns and the terrorist attack on the US, significantly impacted the
first decade of 2000, as many donor countries promised to increase their aid to the
developing world. For example, the US promised to increase its aid by USD 5 billion or
by half by 2006, and to make that increase permanent (UN Monterrey Consensus 2003).
According to Lancaster (2007), by 2003, worldwide aid rose by USD10 billion as
governments began to implement their commitments. The G–8 Summit in Gleneagles in
2005 also renewed calls for donors to increase their aid to Africa in particular, where it
was projected that a total aid volume of USD 25 billion was needed by 2010 to reduce
poverty and conflicts55.
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http://www.unmillenniumproject. org/press/ g8overview.htm, retrieved January 18, 2012.
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2.7 Ghana in the Decade of Aid Boom: 2000–2010
The discussion above addressed the factors that accounted for the ‘aid boom’ in the first
decade of 2000. As earlier indicated, the trend has led to the promotion of many aid
programs and initiatives in developing countries. Below, three such initiatives are
discussed, within the context of Ghana to demonstrate the country’s continued aid
dependence, and the challenges facing some of the programs. However, a brief
overview of the country’s economic situation in the decade is crucial.
Figure 2.3: Net ODA to Ghana 1970–2010 Compared in USD Millions
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Source: OECD (2011); World Bank Database; Quartey et al. (n.d.).

Ghana’s economy at the start of the millennium was poor. While the poverty level had
been reduced from 51% in 1992, it was still high at approximately 40% in 2000, with
almost 79% of the population living on less than USD 2 a day (Human Development
Report 2002). The country also had huge debts burdens (see Figure 2.4). Thus, the
newly elected New Patriotic Party (NPP) government was ‘desperate’ for programs that
would improve the lives of the people and the country’s debt situation (NPP 2000
Campaign Manifesto). The NPP was fortunate as their regime coincided with the ‘aid
boom’. As a preferred destination in Sub–Saharan Africa for the experimentation with
aid programs, Ghana benefited significantly from the ‘aid boom’ with an unprecedented
increase in ODA volumes, most of them as Project Aid (see Figures 2.3 & 2.5).
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2.7.1. Ghana and the Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC)
The Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) was a World Bank and IMF debt
forgiveness program. Under the initiative, huge monies that poor countries were
expected to use to service their debts to international creditors were channelled into
poverty reduction programs, named HIPC Savings or HIPC Funds (IMF & IDA 2001).
Apart from the worldwide campaigns for debt relief, the HIPC initiative was
theoretically premised on several commentators’ assertion that debt servicing was
compromising the ability of developing economies to provide basic social amenities for
their poor, and that the situation would hinder their achievement of the MDGs56 (Osei &
Quartey 2001; Eaton 2002; Tarp 2000; Birdsall et al. 2002; Easterly 2002; Kanbur
2003). With debt relief, the commentators were convinced that more resources would be
freed and made available for investment in both human and physical capital, while
achieving pro–poor growth targets and sustainable debt levels.
Beneficiary countries of HIPC had to go through three stages: a 1) Satisfactory three–
year reputation, mainly the reduction of non–ODA debt by 65% in net present value
terms; 2) Decision point; and 3) Completion point. The last two stages were tied to the
HIPC country’s ability to produce and implement its Poverty Reduction Strategy
(Whitfield 2005; Woll 2008), after which donors would commit to the provision of 90%
or more flow reduction in debt (Bawumia 2010). The Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers (PRSP) was a country–driven, results focused, long–term, comprehensive and
partnership–oriented document that spelt out the economic priorities of countries that
wished to access World Bank and IMF concessional lending and debt relief. The PRSP
sought to introduce the principles of greater ownership of economic reforms by
countries, and of wider participation by citizens in determining the content of their
country's development strategy (IMF 2003; World Bank Country Assistance Strategy
2005; Killick 2001; Woll 2008).
Ghana commenced the year 2000 with huge debts (see Figure 2.4 below). The country’s
external debt as percentage of GDP was over 150%. According to the 2002 Africa
Economic Outlook Report, Ghana’s debt servicing in 2000 was over 20% of all exports
in the country. The total external debt due for repayment in 2001 was USD 560 million
(Bawumia 2010). Faced with such an huge debt–burden, the NPP government explained
to donors that achieving the MDGs was a challenge, and upon the advice of the World
56

In the case of Ghana an economic growth rate of 8% was projected as the condition for the country to
attain the MDGs (Osei & Quartey 2001; Bawumia 2010).
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Bank57, declared the country HIPC in March 2001(GOG 2001; 2003a).58Apart from the
usual harsh political criticisms of the opposition, Japan, Ghana’s leading bilateral donor
at the time, also threatened not to extend new loans to Ghana if the country signed up
for HIPC (Osei & Quartey 2001). However, the government remained resilient and
braced itself to present its PRSP to be considered for debt relief.

Figure 2.4 Ghana’s Public Debt as Percentage of GDP
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According to Whitfield (2005), the National Development Planning Commission
(NDPC) of the outgoing Rawlings’ government in 2000 formulated the first draft of
Ghana’s PRSP. The New Patriotic Party under President J.A. Kufour (2001–2008)
adjusted the draft and modified it to reflect the priorities of their election campaign
promises while taking into account comments by the IMF and the World Bank. Named
the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper I (GPRP I) the paper defined the
government’s medium–term development strategy. In 2003, the donors endorsed the
document, although Whitfield (2005) argues that the formulation process was not
consultative enough, Parliament being marginalised, and the paper lacking a ‘pro-poor’
face (see also IMF 2006).
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After the IMF conducted a Debt Sustainability Analysis
Although the country had been technically HIPC since 1999.
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The launch of the GPRS I coincided with several other development initiatives. Apart
from the MDGs, the country had signed in 2002 the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD) of the Organisation of African Union as well as the United
Nation’s Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Most of the medium–
term development priorities of these commitments were similar to the GPRS I. Thus the
NPP government reviewed and revised the GPRS I for the period 2006–2009,
producing a single document, the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper II
(GPRS II), that combined all the government’s development and policy commitments
(Whitfield 2005; IMF 2006; Woll 2008).
Ghana reached the HIPC decision point in February 2002, after which an amount of
USD 96 million of the total external repayable debts of USD 375 million was written
off as debt relief (GoG Budget Statements 2002; 2003; 2004). In 2005, Ghana was also
among eighteen African countries that benefited from another debt relief package
totalling USD 40 billion under the Multi–Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) of the world’s
richest countries (G–8). Under the MDRI, Ghana’s debts of USD 4.2 billion were
written off in January 200659. Thus, the country’s external debt was dramatically
reduced further from 156% of GDP in 2000 to 27% in 2008 (Bawumia 2010). Tellingly,
owing to the problematic nature of aid–dependency, the country’s debt stock seems to
be rising again. Data from the World Bank indicate that in 2009, Ghana’s external debt
to GDP was 34.3%, 39.2% in 2010 and 41.2% in 201160.
2.7.2 Multi–Donor Budgetary Support
Another noteworthy milestone in Ghana’s aid profile was the Multi Donor Budgetary
Support Program (MDBS). Theoretically, the idea of the MDBS was borne out of the
donors’ strong commitment to making their aid effective. Because aid flows were
unpredictable, governments of developing economies did not know how much to expect
so enabling them to formulate their respective country budgets (Woll 2008; Amoako–
Tuffour 2005). The idea of a multi–donor-funding mechanism was that all donors paid a
fixed, so–called base tranche at the beginning of each year into a single fund so
ensuring predictability of cash flow (World Bank 2006a; Amoako–Tuffour 2005; Woll
2008). The MDBS mechanism allowed a recipient government the freedom to
determine which priority areas to which it wanted to allocate the funds, within the limits
of its own budgetary processes (Walters 2005; World Bank 2006a). The initiative was
59
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IDA (USD 3,482.9 million), IMF (USD 274.6 million), AfDB (USD 445.5 million).
See http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ghana/ government–debt–to–gdp, retrieved April 13, 2012.
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also a way of reducing aid transaction costs, while enhancing better coordination among
donors and promoting recipient–government’s ownership of its development agenda
(Amoako–Tuffour 2005; Walters 2005; World Bank 2000a; 2006a).
Figure 2.5: ODA Forms Ghana Received in a Decade compared in Millions USD
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Ghana’s MDBS was established in 2003 to support the implementation of the GPRS I,
while harmonising development cooperation reporting mechanisms (Woll 2008). When
Ghana’s GPRS I was replaced with GRPS II, donors signed a new Framework
Memorandum with the government of Ghana in 2008 to finance fiscal actions broadly
aimed at reducing poverty, reaching the MDGs and promoting growth. The MDBS has
contributed a substantial amount of aid monies to Ghana (see Figure 2.5). Currently
there are eleven donors61 participating in the MDBS. While the MDBS has led to aid
predictability in Ghana, four challenges still remain. First, although there are many
donor agencies in the country, not all of them have joined the MDGS. For example,
while Australia has been providing aid to Ghana in recent times, the Australian aid
agency (AusAid) prefers to implement projects in areas of its choice (Australian High
Commission Accra 2010). Furthermore, none of the eleven donors, currently involved
in the initiative, channel all their aid through the MDBS, the UK excepted (Geddes et al.
2009; Clay et al. 2009). Clearly, the situation has tended to fragment and lead to aid
61

The World Bank, European Commission, UK, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands,
the Africa Development Bank and Japan.
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duplication in the country, as well as allowing speculation into the motives of donors
(Easterly & Pfutze 2008).
Additionally, Woll (2008) observes that the operational structure of the MDBS reflects
continuing divergence in different donors’ institutional structure, as well as in their
priorities. Consequently, accounting structures have not been harmonised as donors
continue to employ different accountability, planning and disbursement mechanisms,
particularly whenever harmonisation requirements are at variance with their respective
organisational requirements. Thus, while in principle the MDBS is supposed to make it
easier for donor agencies to harmonise their aid policies with the Ghanaian government,
the former continue to employ their respective reporting and monitoring mechanisms
(CIDA 2010). Finally, donors usually fall short of the amounts they pledge (Table 2.2).
Clearly these shortfalls have significant impact on the Ghanaian Government’s fiscal
budget and planning.

Table 2.2 MDBS Disbursements for the Period 2003 – 2010 (in millions)

Pledges
in USD
Actual
(USD)
MDBS%
of ODA

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

281.40

302.16

285.33

372.43

319.57

347.90

278

311

282

299

316.57

368.13

30.1

26.74

29.34

33.34

26.48

25.72

2009

2010

525.2

451.2

Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (2010); Quartey et al. (n.d.). There are no figures for
Pledges and MDBS % of ODA for 2009 and 2010.

2.7.3 The Millennium Development Goals
The launch of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in September 2000, added
further momentum to the ‘aid boom’. The MDGs were intended to be a vehicle for
renewed global determination to achieve peace and decent standards of living for every
man, woman and child62 (Sachs 2005). The eight goals that were to be reached by 2015
included:
1) Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger;
2) Achieve universal primary education;
3) Promote gender equality and empower women;
62

See also http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm, retrieved January 14, 2010.
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4) Reduce child mortality;
5) Improve maternal health;
6) Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other diseases;
7) Ensure environmental sustainability; and
8) Develop global partnership for development (MDG Reports 2006; 2008).
Three years to the target, developing countries are reported to be on track or close to
achieving MDGs 1, 2, 3 and 7 (Figure 2.6). However, unless efforts are stepped up,
MDGs 4 and 5 may not be achieved. Details of the distance to MDG 6 are lacking
because the World Bank has conceded their hypothesis about HIV/AIDS must be reevaluated as some impact evaluations have shown the original assumptions to be
wrong63. However, according to the MDG 2011 Report, while some efforts have been
made, MDG 6 is unlikely to be achieved globally. ‘Develop Global Partnership for
Development’, MDG 8, is also facing evaluation challenges. While ODA has increased,
an OECD (2011) report indicates that donors are not adhering to the tenets of the 2005
Paris Declaration and the UN 0.7% of GNI aid target. Also, although there have been
efforts to broker global development partnerships, the World Bank admits that poor
economies have not been fully integrated into the global trading system and banking
regulations, which impose excessive capital requirements on trade and finance
transactions that still remain64 (Global Monitoring Report [GMR] 2011). From this
analysis, the Africa Human Development Report (2012) was right to project that
globally, only four of the MDGs may be achieved by 2015.
In terms of regional analysis, Sub–Saharan Africa lags behind the other regions (see
Figure 2.7). As a group, the region is unlikely to reach a single MDG target by 2015, a
fact acknowledged by the African Region MDG Report (2011). Of the forty–seven
countries engaged, the GMR (2011) indicates that only nine countries have shown
progress on extreme poverty, eight on hunger, twenty seven on gender parity in primary
education, and fifteen on access to safe drinking water. Goals related to child and
maternal mortality, access to sanitation, and primary education completion require
stepped–up efforts, as they seem to have lost their direction (Africa Human
Development Report 2012).

63
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http://www.worldbank.org/mdgs/diseases.html, retrieved October 09, 2012.
See also http://go.worldbank.org/ JGENXDULT0, retrieved April 15, 2012.
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Relative to Ghana, progress is mixed (see Table 2.3). According to the GMR (2011) and
the MDG Report (2011), none of the MDGs has been fully achieved in Ghana. While
the country is heading in the right direction to achieve MDGs 1, 2, and 3, the remaining
MDGs will not be fulfilled. Incidentally, according to the Ghana MDG Report (2010),
there is a dearth of data to track the progress of the under-performing MDGs. Thus,
Baidoo (2011) asserts that Ghana would need nearly forty years to achieve the MDGs.
The reality that the MDGs will not be fully achieved globally by 2015 has led its
realities to blame the situation on the: 1) Global financial, food and fuel crises; and 2)
Notion that the Sub–Saharan Africa region is far behind (GMR Report 2011; MDG
Report 2011; African Region MDG Report 2011). Consequently, the UN Secretary
General, Mr Ban Ki Moon, the Special Advisor on the MDGs, Professor Jeffery Sachs,
and Robert B. Zoellick, President of the World Bank Group have called for renewed
international efforts and commitments for achieving the MDGs (see reports above).
Meanwhile, even before it became obvious that the MDGs would not be achieved, many
scholars warned the UN and the World Bank to review the MDGs as they seemed
arbitrary and had ‘context problems’. For example, Easterly (2009) argued that the
MDG are unfair to Sub–Saharan African countries as they do not take into account the
historical and the contextual diversity of the region. In other words, because the
indicators are universalised, relative successes of the Sub–Saharan African countries in
some of the MDGs tend to be portrayed as worse or even failures. Therefore, as
Clemens & Moss (2005) and Clemens et al. (2011) observed, in most discussions on the
MDGs, the ‘failure’ of the region seems to be emphasised compared to other regions,
although some progress has been made in specific countries.
Others have also argued that the MDGs would exacerbate aid dependency in many
economically poor countries. Because the initiative emphasises foreign financing of
domestic social and redistribution policies, recipient countries are being flooded with
resource transfers, leaving them permanently aid–dependent or ‘welfarised’ (Reinert
2007; Easterly 2009; Haque 2011). Finally, Hancock et al. (2011) have criticised MDG
3, “Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women” on the ground that it isolates
rather than mainstreams women. They argue that seeing women in isolation is not a
sustainable way of empowering them as they do not live in isolation, but are a part of
society. Thus, if ‘uncontextualised’, MDG 3 could lead to the inadvertent
disempowering of men and result in conflicts. The phenomenon of the simultaneity of
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empowerment and disempowerment is empirically supported by the findings of this
thesis (see Chapter Seven).

Figure 2.6 Current Global Distance to the MDGs
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Figure 2.7 Countries on Target to Achieve the MDGs, by Region

Source: Global Monitoring Report (2011).
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Table 2.3 Ghana’s Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals
MDG TARGETS

ACHIEVEMENTS

MGD 1:
Eradicate
Extreme Poverty
& Hunger
MDG 2: Achieve
Universal
Primary
Education

The percentage of those living below the national poverty line has
fallen from 52% in 1992 to 29% in 2005–06. The 2010 report is
confident that this target will be achieved by 2015.

MDG 3: Promote
Gender Equality
& Empower
Women
MDG 4: Reduce
Child Mortality

MDG 5: Improve
Maternal Health
MDG 6: Combat
HIV/AIDS,
Malaria & Other
Diseases
MDG 7: Ensure
Environmental
Sustainability

MDG 8: Develop
Global
Partnership for
Development

The percentage of children of official school age (net enrolment)
who are enrolled in primary schools rose from 81% in 2006/07 to
89% in 2008/09. The total number of children enrolled at the
primary level irrespective of age (gross enrolment) increased from
91% in 2006/07 to 95% in 2008/09.
Currently, for every 100 boys in primary education, there are 96
girls. It is likely that this target will be met.
There has been significant progress on under–five mortality,
although for every 13 children in Ghana, one child still dies before
his/her fifth birthday. Previously 1 in 10 children died before
his/her fifth birthday. This target can only be achieved if the
country scales–up and sustains the recent child survival
interventions.
Ghana is off–track in improving maternal health. Although
Ghana’s maternal mortality ratio has improved slightly in recent
years, for every 100,000 women giving birth, 451 die (down from
560 deaths per 100,000 live births, WHO, 2005).
HIV/AIDS prevalence rate was 2.2% in 2008 but increased to
2.9% in 2009. With this trend, it is unlikely that the country will
achieve the 2015 target of halting and reversing the spread of the
epidemic. The incidence of malaria still remains the leading cause
of mortality and morbidity, particularly among pregnant women
and children under–five years.
Ghana is not on course to achieve this goal in full. Only 12% of
households have access to improved sanitation. While the nation is
on track in reducing by half the proportion of people without
access to improved water, critical challenges exist in the area of
proportion of land area covered by forest, and reducing the
proportion of urban population living in slum areas.
Donors are partnering for development, most significantly through
the Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy (GJAS). While ODA inflows
to Ghana appear to have increased in nominal terms between 2001
and 2010; the challenge has been quality of the aid the country
receives. This target remains a challenge as global issues continue
to negatively impact on the economy and debt situation.

Source: Ghana Ministry of Education 2008/2009 Annual Report; Ghana Health Service Annual Report
(2009); African Development Outlook (2008); Ghana MDG Report (2010); MDG Report (2011); GMR
(2011); African Human Development Report 2012.
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2.8 Conclusion
This chapter traced global aid trends and explained how they have impacted on the
Ghanaian aid landscape. Three conclusions were apparent. First, Post–War II aid did not
start as a package for poorer economies nor was it geared to ethnically diverse contexts,
as it was designed to save only the West. Second, Ghana is aid–dependent, being best
described as both a beneficiary and victim of an experimental global aid system as the
country has experienced most forms of aid introduced on the continent: SAPs, HIPC,
MDBS, and the MDGs– a matter which justifies the choice of the country for this
research. Lastly, the chapter showed that a country’s political and social context play
crucial roles in the fate of aid programs implemented there. Accordingly, a well–
intended program could fail or achieve mixed results, if the beneficiaries’ grounded
realities are taken for granted or judged within the framework of demographically
different settings. The next chapter discusses the factors believed to have contributed to
aid ineffectiveness as well as efforts to making them ‘work’.
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CHAPTER THREE
MAKING AID EFFECTIVE: EFFORTS, ISSUES AND GAPS
“Effective aid matters to developing countries, as it can enable them to move beyond
aid dependence and reach development effectiveness”
Dr. Kwabena Duffuor (2010)65.

Over the last two decades discussions on the effectiveness of international development
aid (aid) have gained prominence in international development discourse and policy
analysis. The interests in the subject stem from the argument that, although Sub–
Saharan Africa, for example, has received much aid in the past fifty years, lives have
not improved, as 70% of the one billion poorest people on earth live in the region
(Collier 2007; Moyo 2009). The prevalence of poverty in the region is considered so
serious that not a single Millennium Development Goal (MDG) will be achieved by the
target date of 2015, although some progress has been made (MDG Report 2011; Global
Monitoring Report 2011; Africa Human Development Report 2012). While the
incidence of poverty in Sub–Saharan Africa is caused by the interplay between so many
factors including: leadership crises, ethnic hatred, corruption, politics, social structures
and aid–dependency, the last factor is most often cited (Mehmet 1971; Cassen 1994;
Meredith 2005; Calderisi 2006; Ashimolowo 2007). This has led some to argue that aid
must stop entirely, as it does more harm than good (Easterly 2006; Moyo 2009). Others
disagree and argue that aid can work, but only under very specific conditions (Cassen
1994; Sachs 2005; Collier 2007).
This chapter argues that global efforts for achieving aid effectiveness appear to focus on
condition–driven and bureaucratic mechanisms, while the need to understanding local
contexts of aid recipients is ignored. To put this argument in perspective, the first part
of the chapter discusses two prevalent arguments believed to account for aid
ineffectiveness that: 1) Aid drives donors’ motives and; 2) Aid creates dependency in
the recipient–country. While relevant, the section argues that the problem of aid
ineffectiveness goes beyond these two widespread arguments; understanding aid
recipients’ contexts vis-à-vis the theories and concepts on which aid programs are
based, is crucial.

65

Ghana's Minister of Finance and Economic Planning (2009–2012) shared his perspective on how the
DAC can help in providing aid more effectively to ensure that the country reaches its development goals
(http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/22/45298985.htm, retrieved April 27, 2012).
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The second section of the chapter examines Results–Based Financing, Aid–Agenda
Conferences and Program–Based Approaches, three currently popular mechanisms for
addressing aid ineffectiveness globally. As will become obvious, while these
approaches are celebrated, none seems to address the ‘context argument’, a gap this
thesis seeks to fill.
3.1 Why Has Aid Been Ineffective?66
Although there are several arguments for why aid is considered by many to be
ineffective, the two most prevalent in the literature are explicated below. These are the
notions that: 1) Donors use aid to achieve their strategic interests; and 2) Aid creates a
culture of dependency in the recipient–country (Mehmet 1999; Riddell 2007; Moyo
2009; Mavrotas 2010).
3.1.1. Aid and Donors’ Strategic Interests
Although inherently altruistic, aid is believed never to have been ‘an honest gift’
(Mehmet 1971; Amoako–Tuffour 2005). In their Who Gives Aid to Whom and Why?
Alesina and Dollar (1998), exposed non–developmental motives that inform aid
allocation. They found that the direction of aid is dictated by political and strategic
considerations much more so than the economic needs and policy performance of the
recipient country. Jones et al. (2005, p. 26) also observed that:
Aid from the largest bilateral donors ... [is] provided for motives that are not
purely based on poverty reduction objectives, although the latter have been
made more explicit in recent years and are formally the sole or major
justification for development assistance for some donors. Security and regional
relations are the most significant drivers of aid allocations for donors.
As previously discussed, the phenomenon of using aid to achieve donors’ strategic
interests dates back to the Marshall Plan, which was meant not just to revive Western
European economies, but also to challenge the spread of Soviet communism in Europe
(Lancaster 2007; Mavrotas 2010). The same principle also underlined British and
French colonial aid after World War II as well as the US and Soviet aid during the Cold
War (Riddell 2007).
Contemporary bilateral donors continue to use aid to advance their respective national
interests. For example, a Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs remarked, “it must not be
forgotten that in the end Official Development Assistance is implemented for Japan’s
66

This review does not take Emergency Aid into account.
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own sake” (Riddell 2007, p. 97). Australia is also forthright, “the objective of the
Australian aid program is to assist developing countries reduce poverty and achieve
sustainable development in line with Australia's national interest”67. Canada is also no
exception (Pomerantz 2004). It is within this context that Riddell condemns the MDGs
as being deceptive and tending to portray ‘development’ and the welfare of the poor as
the only reasons why aid is given; however without doubt, security and commercial
interests are influential (Jones et al. 2005; Riddell 2007).
The use of aid to advance donors’ commercial interests dates back to 1896 when the US
used food aid as a ploy to find markets for their food surpluses (Hjertholm & Howard
1998). The British Colonial 1929 Act, which allowed for loans and grants to their
colonies for infrastructure, was also meant to absorb the outputs of British
manufacturers (Riddell 2007). As a result, during the 1940s the British viewed their
colonies as the producers of materials for their industries (Hjertholm & Howard 1998).
The British Minister of Food in the World–War II Labor government is quoted, saying
that, “by one means or another, by hook or by crook, the development of primary
production of all sorts in the colonial area ... is ... a life and death matter for [Britain’s]
economy” (Gupta 1975, p. 320).
Modern bilateral donors have maintained the commercial–interest philosophy through
strategies such as tied–aid. Tied–aid is defined as Project Aid determined and contracted
by the source country to private firms in the donor country (Mehmet 1971; Svensson
2000). In simpler terms, if Australia gave aid to Sri Lanka to build schools, for example,
Australian firms would be awarded the contracts. In the mid 1980’s, Jempa (1991)
found that 52% of donors tied their aid. In 2006, the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development of the Development Assistance Committee
(OECD/DAC) also revealed that more than 50% of total Official Development
Assistance (ODA) remained tied68.
Some have argued that in principle, tied–aid is common sense, and that it could
strategically promote the recipient country’s business or exports (Aryeetey 1995; Sowa
& White 1997). However, others disagree and argue that tied–aid promotes corruption
and does not promote local ownership of aid programs (Bhagwati et al. 1983; Jempa
67

http://ausaid.gov.au/ about/default.cfm, retrieved May10, 2011.
http://www.oecd.org/document/50/0,3746,en_2649_33721_46345330_1_1_1_1,00.html, retrieved
April 26, 2012.
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1991; Baffour 1999; Osei 2004; Quartey 2005). Riddell (2007) estimates that tied–aid
costs recipient–countries about USD 7.3 billion extra; for example, Osei (2004) found
that between 1990 and 1997, tied–aid raised the price of imported goods in Ghana from
USD 40 million to USD 80 million a year (see also Mehmet 1971; Cassen 1994).
As a result of the negative impact of tied–aid on recipient–countries, the OECD/DAC
has intensified its efforts since 2000 to get its member states to “untie” their aid (Clay,
Geddes & Natali 2009). The efforts stem from empirical studies which suggest that
untied aid promotes the development of the recipient country’s local businesses and
employment, while aligning projects to local priorities (Jempa 1991; Lahiri &
Raimondos 1997; OECD 2009). These efforts culminated in a Recommendation to
Untie Official Development Assistance to the Least Developed Countries, which came
into force in January 2002 (DAC High Level Meeting, April 2001; Riddell 2007). The
recommendations aimed to: 1) Untie ODA to the least developed countries to the
greatest extent possible; 2) Promote and ensure adequate ODA flows, in particular to
the least developed countries; and 3) Achieve balanced efforts among DAC Members in
untying aid. This effort was augmented by the 2005 Paris Declaration, which as
discussed below, emphasised local ownership, aid coordination and donor/ recipient
partnership as a means to achieving greater aid effectiveness69. The recommendations
were amended in 2006 and 2008 to expand the coverage to heavily indebted poor
countries70.
A recent report of Clay et al. (2009), Untying Aid, Is It Working? based on case studies
from Burkina Faso, Ghana, Laos, South Africa, Vietnam and Zambia, indicates that the
proportion of untied bilateral aid has risen progressively from 46% in the period 1999 –
2001 to 82% in 2008. The report also claims that since January 2002, ODA to the least
developed countries has been untied in the following areas: balance of payments and
structural adjustment support, debt forgiveness, sector and multi–sector programmes
assistance, investment project aid, import and commodity support, commercial services
contracts and ODA to NGOs for procurement related activities.
Despite OECD’s efforts, tied–aid still exists. In Ghana, with the exception of the UK,
most bilateral donors do not channel all their aid to the country’s budgetary support
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See http://www.oecd.org/document /18/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html,
retrieved April 2005, 2012.
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http://www.oecd.org/document/ 50/0 , 3746,en_2649_33721 _46345330_1_1_1_1,00.html, retrieved
April 20, 2012.
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mechanism that uses untied aid modalities (Woll 2008; Clay et al. 2009; Geddes et al.
2009). Technical assistance to most developing countries remains tied under the de
facto tying principles which are applied in contexts where the aid recipient’s local or
regional contractors ‘supposedly’: 1) Are unable to compete internationally; 2) Have
unequal access to information; and/or 3) Lack the capacity to implement the projects
that may require speedy execution. Some donors also apply the principle because they
want to avert potential risks or follow their ODA regulations (Clay et al. 2009; OECD
2011). While de facto tying may be a consequence and not necessarily intended, the
practice offers loopholes for donors to manipulate their aid. As most donors are thought
to focus their technical assistance in areas of their comparative advantage (Amoako–
Tuffour 2005), the principle seems to provide donors with the convenience of
promoting their country’s businesses, while local capacities, which may need such
opportunities to grow, are bypassed (Geddes et al. 2009).
While tied–aid does have some impact on the quality of aid; it does not offer enough
grounds to argue in general that donors’ interests contribute to aid ineffectiveness. The
reason is that the commercialisation aspect of tied–aid is just one ruse of donors’
strategic agendas. Interestingly, some donors have “successfully” employed the
instrumentality of aid to accomplish security, climate, and immigration policy agendas.
An example is the US Marshall Plan for Western Europe, which was an overt economic
program, but in reality was ‘security–driven’71 (Lancaster 2007). Others include the
2009 UN Conference on Climate convened in Copenhagen, Denmark, where aid was
used as a “bait” to gain support for the deal72; and the use of aid to curb illegal
migration to many developed countries (AIDWATCH 2011; Arthur & Quartey 2008;
DFID 2012).
The fact that some donors have been able to use aid to accomplish their national
agendas presents two points for discussion. First, it gives rise to problems as to what
defines “aid effectiveness”. If defined and assessed as just “outcomes”, aid programs
that accomplish donors’ objectives, but lead to increased local corruption and keep
despots in power may also be considered as “effective” or “successful” (Alesina &
Weder 1999; Annist 2005; Eyben & Leon 2005; Labonne & Chase 2007). The question
then becomes: from whose perspective should “aid effectiveness” be measured: donors
or recipients? Relative to this thesis, “aid effectiveness” is measured through the lenses
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of donors’ specific program objectives and how these impact on beneficiaries at the
local level. However, understanding the impact of aid on recipients, this thesis shows,
requires a considerable appreciation of their local dynamics.
Second, it suggests that untying aid would not necessarily lead to “aid effectiveness”, as
it is a broad concept (Li 2007; Mavrotas 2010). For example, although the UK has, as
of 2008, untied all its ODA to Ghana (Geddes et al. 2009), this laudable action has not
necessarily improved the successes of its programs in the country. This is because other
problems with aid, such as lack of coordination among donors, still exist there, a
challenge that has no correlation to tied or untied aid (DFID 2012; see also Woll 2008).
Further, although multilateral aid programs are untied, appear to be less politically–
driven, and are more likely to be channelled to recipients’ needs, some of them fail or
do not meet all goals for other reasons, including the notion that aid creates dependency
(Riddell 2007).
3.1.2 Aid and the Dependency Theory
Dependency Theory has its roots in the Leninist theories of imperialism (Chase–Dunn
1975; Kaufman et al. 1975; Bornschier et al. 1978; Barrett & White 1982). It refers to
“a situation in which the economy of a certain group of [developing] countries is
conditioned by ... another [mostly rich] country or external forces [multilateral
corporations, international commodity market, aid]” (Santos 1971, p. 321). Aid became
the medium for dependency after World War II (Hjertholm & Howard 1998). Hitherto,
minerals (gold or silver), agricultural products and raw materials were the instruments
(Santos 1971; Bauer 1982; Mehmet 1999).
Arguing within the framework of Dependency Theory, most anti–aid authors contend
that aid is a disincentive for development, as it leaves the recipient country dependent
on donors and lenders (Pankaj 2005; Easterly 2006; Moyo 2009). Because of its
“addictive” nature, they argue further that if a country relies on aid as a channel for
mobilising fiscal resources, it would be difficult to “wean” them off it. Other grounds
for criticisms against the concept include the notions that aid: is unpredictable and
cannot be relied upon as a permanent source of income; is used to drive donors’
agenda(s); reduces the incentive to adopt good policies; creates ‘welfarism’; stifles
economic growth; and leads to consumption rather than investment (Barrett & White
1982; Bauer 1982; Collier 1999).
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However, aid proponents would disagree with the above claims. For example, Barrett
and White (1982) argued that the proposition of aid dependence leading to slower
economic growth should not be considered as a generality. Drawing on evidence from
Taiwan, they claimed that the country received massive foreign aid and investment, but
also had one of the highest sustained rates of economic growth in the 1980s. Cassen
(1994) also averred that aid has specifically contributed to raising food production in the
South Asian sub–continent and to experimental rural education programs in Africa.
Maintaining that majority of aid is successful in terms of its objectives, Cassen
condemns “public demonisation” of aid, which, he argues; tends to be swayed by only
one or two horrible stories of failed projects. Collier (1999 & 2007) and Sachs (2005)
also argue that, subject to a satisfactory policy environment, aid improves economic
growth, and that aid welfare and disincentive effects are negligible.
Despite these disagreements, there is no doubt that most Sub–Saharan African
countries, including Ghana, are aid–dependent. As the consumer of two–thirds of
global aid and often cited as the target of aid, the region is also showing little signs of
“weaning” itself off donor largesse (Easterly 2006; Reinert 2007; Riddell 2007;
Mavrotas 2010). For example, at the 2005 G–8 Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, it was
projected that the African continent would need a total aid volume of USD 25 billion by
201073. Figures from the OECD indicate that in 2010, bilateral aid to the continent rose
to USD 29.3 billion. Of this, 90% (US$ 26.5 billion) went to Sub–Saharan region
alone74. Despite this, the region has little to show for these huge aid investments, as
poverty is still widespread (African Region MDG Report 2011). In fact numerous
reports have stated that the region stands in the way of the achievement of the MDGs
globally (Collier 2007; MDG Report 2011; GMR 2011).
The culture of aid dependency in Sub–Saharan Africa has spurred some Africans to join
the campaign against aid even though Ghana’s former President J.A. Kufour [2001–
2008] argued that the African continent cannot do without it for now75. Among the
campaigners are Africa’s richest man, Dangote Aliko76; Nigerian Pastor Mathew
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Ashimolowo (2009); Ghana’s Archbishop Palmer Buckle77; and Paul Kigame, the
Rwandan president, who said that “the only type of aid that is worth[while] to Africans
is the type of aid that will … not exist in future’78. The most assertive of the African
anti–aid crusaders is a former World Bank employee, Dambisa Moyo. In her
provocative book, DEAD AID: Why Aid is Not Working and How There Is another Way
for Africa?, Moyo (2009) argues strongly that African governments must “wean”
themselves off aid as it is ruining their economies. Aid, she argues, makes African
leaders underperform and too comfortable, while avoiding innovative ways of
improving their economies.
Moyo’s (2009) arguments and those of many anti–aid authors seem to suggest a subtle
demonisation of ‘aid as a concept’. However, ‘aid as a concept’ and ‘aid dependency’
are not the same. Amidst the controversies it tends to generate, scholars, including
critics like Moyo and Easterly, concede that aid is a way of mobilising investment and
capital resources, and that when employed within in a short, finite and time–bound
period, aid can produce positive results (Cassen 1994; Reinert 2007; Collier 2007). For
example, the US Marshall Plan, which succeeded in reviving Western European
Economies after World War II, lasted for a short time (1948–1952). Also, many
countries, referred to as the International Development Association [IDA] Graduates,
have lowered poverty, increased income levels and achieved, relative economic
successes because of their short–term reliance on aid (Reed 2005; Collier 2007; Riddell
2009). These include: Chile, Columbia, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and
Turkey. Within sub–Saharan Africa, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, and Swaziland are
examples of the transformative power of aid (Cassen 1994; Collier 2007).
Although the figure below provides evidence to the contrary, Moyo (2009) contends
that Botswana did not succeed economically because of aid. She argues that Botswana
has been pursuing numerous market options; and that by 2000, aid as percentage of the
country’s Gross National Income (GNI) was less than 2%. However, as illustrated in
Figure 3.3, Botswana relied significantly on aid in the decade of 1980, when it
accounted for nearly 7.7% of its GNI, while aid to Ghana stood at 6%. Although factual
that Botswana reduced its reliance on aid in the 1990s, aid as percentage of the
country’s GNI in 2008 rose to 5.6%, clearly higher than that of Ghana. Even though the
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http://news.peacefmonline.com/social/201111/77515.php, retrieved November 4, 2011.
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correlation between aid and Botswana’s growth lies beyond the scope of this thesis, it is
clear that the country has not entirely been “aid–free” as Moyo (2009) and others claim.
3.1 Aid as Percentage of Ghana and Botswana GNI 1980–2008
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Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ghana/net–oda–received–percent–of–gni–wb–data.html,
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/botswana/net–oda–received–percent–of–gni–wb–data.html, retrieved
may 13, 2012, all retrieved May 12, 2012.

The above analysis has revealed that the question of why aid seems to be ineffective is
far more complicated. While the notions that aid drives donors interests and creates
dependency are still relevant, the discussion has 1) Problematised what is defined as
‘aid effectiveness’; and 2) Shown that aid dependency and ‘aid as a concept’ are not the
same. The effectiveness of an aid program, it was argued, should be measured through
the perspectives of donors’ specific program objectives and how they impact on
beneficiaries at the local level. Furthermore, while aid-dependency may have long-term
negative effects for recipients, it does not justify any attempt to demonise ‘aid as a
concept’. What has emerged from the discussion so far is the fact that “aid” is not a
negative concept and that it produces results, or otherwise, depending on the
‘externalities’ (programs, motives, theories and concepts) that drive it. However, as the
next section will show, most of the current mechanisms for achieving aid effectiveness
seem to ignore these ‘externalities’; particularly contested theories and complex
concepts (such as ‘community’ and ‘empowerment’), which are the focus of this thesis.
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3.2 Efforts at Making Aid Effective
Owing to the recent global financial crises, global aid levels dropped in 2011 by 3% to
USD 133.5 billion compared to 201079. Coupled with the perception that aid does not
work, the debate on aid effectiveness has been very active in the last decade. Among
other issues, including the idea that donors must use their aid monies to solve domestic
problems, or achieve tangible outcomes for beneficiaries, the aid effectiveness debate
has led to the launch of many initiatives in pursuit of making aid ‘really work’ (Cassen
1994; Riddell 2007). Accordingly, the World Bank listed seven key principles for
achieving aid effectiveness. These include the need to: 1) Improve [recipient] country
ownership; 2) Build capacity and use country systems; 3) Increase the use of Program–
Based Approaches; 4) Engage with fragile/post–conflict country situations; 5) Promote
the use of non–DAC donors and funds and South–South cooperation; 6) Refine
management for development results; and 7) Bolster transparency, governance and
accountability (World Bank 2010a). Many of these principles are part of three broad
categories of global efforts towards achieving aid effectiveness: 1) Results–Based
Financing (Birdsall et al. 2010; Yogita et al. 2010; World Bank 2011); 2) Aid–Agenda
Conferences (Walz & Ramachandran 2010; OECD 2011; Zimmermann & Kimberly
2011); and 3) Program–Based Approaches (World Bank 2010a; Binswanger et al.
2010).
3.2.1 Results–Based Financing (Tied–Aid Repackaged)
Introduced by the World Bank in 2002, Results–Based Financing (RBF), is considered a
modernised approach to delivering aid. Results–Based Financing links disbursements to
outputs, after the achievement of agreed measurable outcomes (Yogita et al. 2010;
Birdsall 2010; Birdsall & Savedoff 2010). Advocates of the mechanism argue that RBF
increases recipient–country ownership, transparency, accountability, the quality of
governance and the engagement of private sector capital and expertise (Yogita et al.
2010; Birdsall et al. 2010). RBF is also believed to encourage innovation of public
funding and enables monitoring of results, while reducing corruption (Birdsall et al.
2010; World Bank 2011; Bollyky & Glassman 2012).
Presently, two models of RBF exist: 1) Output–Based Aid; and 2) Cash on Delivery
Aid. According to Yogita et al. (2010) Output–Based Aid (OBA), unlike traditional aid
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delivery approaches, fund projects in specific sectors of the recipient country, including:
Information Communication Technology (ICT), Roads, Energy, Water and Sanitation,
Health, and Education. Under OBA, service delivery is contracted to a third party,
which receives a subsidy to complement or replace user fees, and is paid after the work
is done (Yogita et al. 2010). As of 2010, OBA projects totalling USD 3.5 billion80,
which had supposedly benefitted 17.4 million people worldwide, were identified at the
World Bank (GPOBA 2011). The Global Partnership for Output Based–Aid (GPOBA)
created by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the World
Bank has, since 2003, provided technical assistance to donors wishing to use the
mechanism (OBA Fact Sheet 2011). While currently being piloted in some developing
countries, Australia, the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, the International Finance
Corporation (IFC), and the World Bank have adopted RBF81.
The Centre for Global Development (CGD) is piloting another RBF model, ‘Cash on
Delivery Aid (COD)’. COD builds on the OBA approach, but links payments more
directly to a single specific outcome. Unlike the OBA, which hires the service to a third
party, COD allows the recipient–government the leverage to achieve progress (Yogita et
al. 2010; Savedoff & Martel 2011). However, the donor pays for an outcome, not an
input, agreed to by both the recipient and funder (Birdsall et al. 2010). The outcome
must be measurable and should be continuous, such as number of children enrolled in
school or surviving to age five, making it possible to pay in proportion to progress
(Birdsall et al. 2010; Eyben 2010; Savedoff & Martel 2011).
In January 2012, the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors approved the latest
COD model, Program–for–Results (PforR). The mechanism is an innovative financing
instrument for the World Bank's client countries that links the disbursement of funds
directly to the delivery of defined results82. According to Birdsall (2011)83, when fully
operational, PforR will be the third lending mechanism84 at the World Bank, and the
first to be added to the investment and adjustment instruments since 1980. PforR is
expected to enable the World Bank’s partner countries to improve the design and
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implementation of their development programs thereby providing lasting results by
strengthening institutions and building capacity (World Bank 2011). The mechanism
will also enhance partnerships with government, development partners and other
stakeholders by providing a platform for collaboration in larger country programs
(World Bank 2011)85. PforR is currently in the pipeline to fund projects worth almost
USD 1.3 billion in Ethiopia, Mozambique Tanzania, Uganda, Morocco, Nepal,
Uruguay, Vietnam, and Indonesia.86
While RBF seems to provide evidence of achieved results to donors, the mechanism has
been criticised on many grounds. First, the literature on RBF is dominated by its ardent
supporters: World Bank, GPOBA and the CGD, for example. As RBF does not specify
the use of, and there seems to be no independent, third–party performance audit of its
programs, the claims about its effectiveness remain subjective (Birdsall et al. 2010).
Second, there are concerns that donors who use RBF tend be interested in results and,
for example, ignore social and environmental safeguards. This criticism has been raised
by the US, which has withheld its support for the RBF, despite being incessantly
lobbied (Birdsall 2011). Third, Savedoff and Martel (2011) argue that outcomes of RBF
vary by contexts, sectors and countries. For example, while RBF has been achieving
successes in the ICT in Latin America, the mechanism has not produced equivalent
results in Sub–Saharan Africa, for example (Yogita et al. 2010).
Finally, RBF seems to reinforce conditions and ‘neo tied–aid’, an approach identified as
hampering aid effectiveness (Kanbur 2003; Easterly 2006; Moyo 2009). The seeming
repackaging of tied–aid to results also appears to contradict the claims of RBF
proponents that the mechanism enhances country ownership as most RBF projects are
executed by a third party. The operational strategies of RBF also seem to suggest that
donors: adopt ‘a hands–off attitude’ to aid program processes, mistrust recipient
governments, and ignore the principle that development is more than increased funding
and results (Pomerantz 2004; Eyben 2006; 2010; Kaberuka 2011).
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3.2.2 Aid–Agenda Conferences
In their efforts to ensure that aid is effective, many donors have also resorted to using
international conferences as platforms for the discussion of issues on global aid
financing and effectiveness. Examples include: those held in Monterrey (Mexico) 2002
and Doha (Qatar) 2008 to review Financing for Development; the UK Commission for
Africa; the G8 and G20 Summits; and the now popular High–Level Forum on Aid
Effectiveness (HLFA). The HLFA is specifically organised for discussing issues on aid
effectiveness with four being already held in Rome (2003); Paris (2005); Accra, Ghana
(2008) and Busan, South Korea (2011). In Rome, representatives of donor and
developing countries committed themselves to work with developing countries to
coordinate and streamline aid activities better at the country level (HLFA Rome 2003).
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD 2005) has enhanced the importance of
HLFA as an Aid–Agenda Conference (AAC)87. The document committed participants
of the HLFA–2 (Paris) to fostering partnerships to ensure that developing countries
were in–charge of their own development processes. Furthermore, the Paris Declaration
stipulated that donors and aid recipients hold each other accountable for attaining
development results through a set of indicators having thirteen targets to be achieved by
2010 (OECD 2011). The targets, which have become the only international framework
on the quality of aid with overarching influence on the MDGs and the UN/G8–led
commitments on development finance, cover five broad themes: 1) Ownership:
developing countries set their own priorities for development, strengthen their
institutions and lead in coordinating aid; 2) Alignment: donors arrange aid through
developing countries’ priorities and make better use of each country’s plans, policies
and systems; 3) Harmonisation: donors coordinate to avoid duplication, simplify
procedures and agree to a better division of labour with partner countries; 4) Managing
for results: developing countries and donors focus on effecting and measuring results;
and 5) Mutual accountability: donors and developing countries become accountable to
their parliaments and citizens for the results they achieve (OECD 2011; Killen 2011).
In September 2008, development partners met in Accra (Ghana) to accelerate the
achievement of the Paris Declaration. Named the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), the
forum promoted the idea that donors and partner country governments recognise the
necessity for national ownership of programs and for a wider dialogue on development
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processes. At the AAA, participants also assessed the progress of the PD 2005 and
concluded that, while some progress had been made, it was minimal and very slow.
Three major challenges identified were: country–ownership; building more effective
and inclusive partnerships; and achieving development results, and openly accounting
for them. Agreement therefore was reached on: 1) Aid predictability; 2) Use of
recipient–country systems; 3) Avoidance of conditionalities; and 4) Untying aid88.
Before discussing the HLFA-4 at Busan, it is important to show the extent to which the
commitments to the PD 2005 have been realised. A report released by the OECD in
2011 reveals sobering outcomes. While some progress has been made, only one out of
the thirteen targets established for 2010 (coordinated technical cooperation)89 has been
met, albeit by a narrow margin. The report also portrays stark variations in the direction
and pace of progress across donors and partner countries since 2005 (OECD 2011).
Other studies have made similar conclusions. For example, a study released in 2011 by
a campaign group, “Publish What You Fund” indicates that aid harmonisation still
remains wishful thinking because some donors continue to conceal a large proportion of
their ODA (AIDWATCH 2011; Faust 2011; www.aidtransparency.net).
Following the report, aid proponents blamed aid ineffectiveness on a lack of
coordination between traditional and new donors such as Brazil, China, India, Kuwait,
Turkey, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, the United Arabs Emirates, and recently,
South Africa. Walz and Ramachandran (2010) estimated the aid flows of these donors
in the last decade to be between USD 11 billion and 41.7 billion representing 8% and
31% of the global gross ODA respectively. Interestingly, while many of them have high
rates of poverty, their ODA reach the UN aid target of 0.7% of GNI, a benchmark,
which only 10% of the traditional donors attain (Walz & Ramachandran 2010;
Zimmermann & Kimberly 2011).
The OECD/DAC argues that the new donors have no standard system for reporting their
ODA nor follow the ‘official’ OECD/DAC definition of aid (Zimmermann & Kimberly
2011). Further, the OECD/DAC notes that this practice is impacting on global aid
coordination and transparency, and has given rise to three distinct models of aid giving:
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the OECD/DAC; Arab; and Southern models90. These models are distinguished by the
level of transparency and accountability to areas such as military aid, peacekeeping
contributions, debt relief and direct foreign investment (Walz & Ramachandran 2010).
Although collaboration with the new donors started in 200391, it has intensified in recent
years through the OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP–EFF). Its
main task is to get the new donors to adopt OECD/DAC guidelines for giving aid while
working towards recommendations on ways by which the ‘traditional donors’ can
engage the former by achieving the MDGs. This was discussed at the HLFA–4 held in
Busan, and attended by many traditional and new donors (Walz & Ramachandran 2010;
Zimmermann & Kimberly 201192).
The Busan discussion did not focus on coercing the new donors to adopt the
OEDC/DAC model, but on fostering partnerships between the traditional and new
donors to increase and reinforce development results. Within the framework of
diversity, that will underpin this partnership, the OECD/DAC urged the new donors to
commit to the PD 2005 to pursue the achievement of the MDGs. A significant
development at the Busan Forum was the commitment to scrap the role of the
OECD/DAC’s WP–EFF as the convener of all development cooperation meetings. The
WP–EFF will be replaced by a new, inclusive and representative Global Partnership for
Effective Development Co–operation to support and ensure accountability for the
implementation of commitments at the political level (Busan Partnership for Effective
Development Co–operation 2011). This development was crucial because, as Walz and
Ramachandran (2010) argued, the WP–EFF is an arm of the OECD/DAC and is not an
independent body for facilitating discussion of international aid cooperation and
understanding. In their view, the Southern and Arab donors were unlikely to subscribe
fully to a donor dialogue led by the OECD/DAC; the international aid fraternity needed
a more independent body to lead such discussions.
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Some have argued that because many of the new donors are trying to break down the
traditional Western hegemonies,93 and build their profile and influence in the
international arena, it is highly unlikely they will cooperate with the traditional donors
(Zimmermann & Kimberly 2011; Walz & Ramachandran 2010). Tellingly, some of the
new donors have formed an alliance organisation called the BRICS (Brazil, Russia,
India, China and South Africa), where economic and other strategic areas of
cooperation are discussed94. Whether the new donors will adhere to the Busan principles
and the traditional donors will take the HLFA agreements seriously cannot be predicted.
3.2.3 Program–Based Approaches (Community–Driven Development)
The Program–Based Approach (PBA) is premised on the notion that donors contribute
to a coherent set of development activities at the national sectoral, sub–sectoral or
thematic level95. Within the World Bank, PBA is considered one of the seven guiding
principles for achieving aid effectiveness (World Bank 2010a). The OECD defines it as
sharing the following features:
Leadership by the host country or organisation; (ii) a single comprehensive
programme and budget framework; (iii) a formalised process for donor co–
ordination and harmonisation of donor procedures for reporting, budgeting,
financial management and procurement; (iv) efforts to increase the use of local
systems for programme design and implementation, financial management,
monitoring and evaluation96.
The Paris Declaration (2005) enjoined donors to commit 66% of their aid in the form of
PBAs. Listed as a way of achieving both harmonisation of aid and the MDGs, donors
support and implement PBAs in different ways and across a range of aid modalities
including: budget support, sector budget support, project support, pooled arrangements
and trust funds31. Although most donors have not achieved the 66% benchmark, there is
evidence that many are investing in the approach (See CIDA 2010).
The World Bank’s Community–Driven Development (CDD) has, since 2000, become a
popular PBA and aid delivery mechanism. CDD is noted for espousing local
community involvement, participation and empowerment (World Bank 2000b; Dongier
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et al. 2003; Binswanger et al. 2010). Before discussing the World Bank’s commitment
to CDD, it is important to point out that the concept is not new. Historically, CDD or
community–based development approaches date back to the days of Mahatma Gandhi
and Paul Freire, and the activities of S.K. Dev and Akhter Hameed Khan of the
Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development (BARD) in the 1960s (White 1999;
Mansuri & Rao 2004).97 Similarly, the World Bank in the 1970s used the approach in
their Integrated Rural Development Programs which implemented many combined
projects including: irrigation, agricultural credit, rural infrastructure, education, health,
water supply, and small–scale industries (Binswanger et al. 2010)98.
However, the CDD approach became unpopular, many commentators of the period
criticising it as a Marxist paradigm and lacking external stimuli (Hardin 1968; Olson
1973; Mansuri & Rao 2004). These criticisms reinforced existing beliefs in the top–
down, centralised and state–led machinery for the provision of public goods, state
regulation of common–pool resources, and an emphasis on the development of private
property rights (Mansuri & Rao 2004). In relation to developing countries, Binswanger
et al. (2010) argues that the criticisms offered their leaders grounds for building strong
centralised governments to allow them to stay in power under the guise of avoiding
neo–colonialism.
Community-Driven Development approaches regained popularity from the mid–1980s
(Binswanger et al. 2010), four factors accounting for this. First, allegations of
corruption against leaders of centralised regimes, particularly in developing countries,
led many to lose confidence in top–down paradigms (Collier 1999; Binswanger et al.
2010). Second, during the period in question, CDD approaches achieved better
development results than government–initiated or ‘top–down’ projects in many
developing countries such as: the self–employed women’s association in India; the
Orangi slum improvement project in Pakistan; the Iringa Nutrition project in Tanzania;
and the Mexican Zacatecas projects99 (Krishna et al. 1997; Mansuri & Rao 2004;
Binswanger et al. 2010). These successes were in contrast to the failure of large-scale
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‘macro–initiated’ projects in many sectors around the world (Scott 1998; World Bank
2000a; Mansuri & Rao 2004; Binswanger et al. 2010).	
  	
  
The popularity of CDD approaches is also attributable to its promotion by Western
governments during the period in question. Rooted in the so–called ‘neo–liberal’
philosophy, community–based approaches became a strategy of most governments in
the West for encouraging their citizens to do things for themselves and not rely on
public funding. As discussed below, this has led some to mistrust community-based
development paradigms (Pandey 2010; Tesoriero 2010; Kenny 2010).
Finally, academics played a vital role in promoting CDD approaches as opposed to top–
down paradigms. Chambers’ Rural Development: Putting the Last First was an example
of such influential scholarly works. Rooted in Foucaudian and Marxist ideologies,
Chambers (1983) contended that wastage of billions of dollars occurred due to
centralisation of power at the top. Many scholars have followed suit, arguing that local
voices are crucial in determining the fate of project outcomes as they can enhance or
dampen participation and sustainability tendencies (Cernea 1985; Ostrom 1990; Escobar
1995; Fergusson 1997; Scott 1998; White 1999; Narayan 2002; Cleaver 2001; Mosse
2001). According to Mansuri and Rao (2004), these writings have been instrumental in
the World Bank’s renewed interest in CDD programs.
3.3 The World Bank’s Commitment to Community–Driven Development
Community–Driven Development (CDD) programs have been embraced as an effective
Program–Based Approach (PBA) to delivering aid. The World Bank defines CDD as ‘a
development approach that gives control over planning decisions and investment
resources to community groups and local governments’100. CDD is not considered a
project, but rather the strengthening of political and administrative structures to
empower communities and local governments with the resources and authority to
control fully all project stages as shown in Figure 3.2 below (Chase & Woolcock 2005;
Labonne & Chase 2007; 2008; Binswanger et al. 2010). While their operations vary by
[country] context and objective, CDD is largely a joint–venture between ‘communities’,
local governments and the central government, with support from the private sector and
civil society (Mansuri & Rao 2004; Binswanger et al. 2010). However, in some
contexts, different localities or “communities” wishing to use CDD approaches write
project proposals to compete for funds (Annist 2005; Conning & Kevane 2005).
100

http://go.worldbank.org/ 24K8IHVVS0, accessed August 04, 2011.
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Because CDD provides ‘communities’ with a voice and control over all project stages,
it is believed to; 1) Enhance sustainability; 2) Improve [aid] efficiency and
effectiveness; 3) Allow poverty reduction efforts to be taken to scale; 4) Make
development more inclusive; 5) Empower poor people, build social capital, and
strengthen governance; and 6) Complement market and public sector activities (Dongier
et al. 2003; Baird et al. 2009; van Domelen 2007; 2008; Binswanger et al. 2010; World
Bank 2010b). Thus, the World Bank Group claims that CDD programs have
empowered ‘communities’, delivered cost–effective infrastructure, enhanced
livelihoods, and improved ‘community’ dynamics in Sub–Saharan Africa and Asia
regions, while solving critical problems in Haiti and Somalia (World Bank 2010b )101.
Figure 3.2 Characteristics of CDD Projects

Source: Asian Development Bank (2006)

101

http://www.worldbank.org/ida, retrieved in January 2012; see also Van Domelen (2008).
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Figure 3.3 World Bank Lending in Support of CDD Programs in USD (Billions)
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Figure 3.4 CDD as Percentage of IDA Lending
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Figure 3.5 Number of Active IDA–Funded CDD Operations by Fiscal Year from
2000

Source: World Bank (2010b).

The World Bank’s investment in CDD programs since 2000 has averaged almost USD
2 billion a year (see Figure 3.3). A recent Independent Evaluation Group review of
sixty–two country assistance strategies found that CDD operations are an important part
of the World Bank’s strategy in more than 74% of relevant countries (Binswanger et al.
2010). In 2008, the International Development Association’s (IDA) lending for CDDrelated programs averaged 17% of its total lending (World Bank 2010b; see also Figure
3.4) while the number of CDD programs active at the IDA for the 2007 – 2009 period
averaged over seventy–two (see Figure 3.5). Although there are no recent published data
on the regional distribution of the World Bank’s CDD lending, there is evidence that
between 2000 and 2003, a greater proportion went to Sub–Saharan Africa (Asian
Development Bank 2006). The focus on the region reflects the World Bank’s vision in
2000 to reducing poverty on the continent through program and community–based
approaches (Narayan 2002; World Bank 2000a; 2004b; 2010b).
The above notwithstanding, some scholars have criticised CDD programs. First,
Tesoriero (2010) and Warwick and Overton (2011) argue that the World Bank’s
promotion of the concept cannot be trusted, as they have a hidden agenda. In their
view, like Structural Adjustments of the 1990s, the World Bank is now using CDD to
promote neo–liberal and neo–structural ideals, which shielded governments’
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commitment to welfarism, while encouraging privatisation and reliance on families and
women (see also Amin 2005; Defillippis et al. 2010; Pandey 2010).
Second, some scholars contend that because, in some contexts, different localities have
to compete for funding, CDD inadvertently promotes ‘survival of the fittest’, the rich,
the educated and the politically–connected (Platteau 2004; 2009; Labonne & Chase
2007). Because the approach usually funds those with the best project proposal, it has
been argued that the approach posits ‘style’ over ‘real needs’, and that the ‘genuinely
needy’ (the poor, illiterate or marginalised), may not always be those who obtain ‘the
help’, due to the possibilities of corruption and conflict of interests (Annist 2005;
Conning & Kevane 2005; Araujo et al. 2008; Baird et al. 2009).
Furthermore, there are concerns that CDD programs lack generalisable and uniform
indicators for assessing aid effectiveness, as its successes are context–specific (Mansuri
& Rao 2004; Chase & Woolcock 2005; Labonne & Chase 2008). Finally, some argue
that CDD programs tend to create new allocation rules, while altering existing structures
of engagement and neglecting traditional institutions (Mansuri & Rao 2004; Miguel &
Gugert 2005; Habyarimana et al. 2007). In other words, while CDD attempts to
empower marginalised people, it is criticised for failing to appease the ‘traditionally
powerful’. Because ‘power’ is not neutral, and ‘empowering’ one group may mean
‘disempowering’ the other; CDD programs can potentially threaten ‘community’
cohesion (see Chapter Seven; Chase & Woolcock 2005; Mansuri & Rao 2004; Vail
2004; Hancock et al. 2011).
As pointed out in Chapter One, ‘community’ and ‘empowerment’ are pivotal concepts
in its operations. Without a certain entity called ‘community’, CDD programs cannot
function. Further, although its operations may vary, CDD has one agenda:
‘empowering’ people. While appealing, both concepts are complex (Guijt & Shah 1998;
Cleaver 2001; Amin 2005; Tesoriero 2010; Hancock et al. 2011). Interestingly, there
seems to be no empirical study on how these concepts impact on CDD program
outcomes in multi–cultural and ethnic settings. This will be the focus of Chapters Six
and Seven of this thesis. Apart from these complex concepts, the World Bank also avers
that countries with ‘high functioning’ inter-government systems are better placed to
implement CDD programs (Dongier et al 2003; Binswanger et al. 2010; World Bank
2010b). While Chapter Five challenges this theory within the framework of Ghana’s
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decentralisation system, it is important to first examine the theory to contextualise the
arguments advanced against it.
3.4 The World Bank’s Framework for Engaging Local Government Structures
The World Bank and other proponents of CDD programs opine that better outcomes are
guaranteed if the implementing country’s existing inter–government institutions are
effective, or have genuine commitment to decentralisation (Crook & Manor 1998;
World Bank 2002; 2004b; 2006b; Whitford & Kavita 2006; Binswanger et al. 2010). In
the words of Dongier et al. (2003, p. 23):
Local governments can be critical to the success and sustainability of [CDD].
When local government interacts with communities and informal groups in a
participatory way, it is possible to achieve economies of scale in producing and
providing goods and services ... Furthermore … local governments are needed to
support operation and maintenance of services, and for continuing funding of
community groups.

Figure 3.6 CDD Institutional Alternatives
1. Partnership
between CBOs and
Local Governments

2. Partnership between
CBOs and NGOs/
Private firms

CBOs

3. Direct Partnership
between CBOs and
Central Government

CBOs

CBOs
Local or
Municipal Govt

NGOs &
Private firms
Elected local or
municipal Govt

Elected local or
municipal Govt

Central Govt or
central fund

Central Govt or
central fund

Central Govt or
central fund

Source: Adopted from Dongier et al. (2003).
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As Figure 3.6 illustrates, Dongier et al. (2003) identified three institutional alternatives
for CDD programs. While each varies operationally, their contextual appropriateness
depends on the state of the country’s decentralisation. While the World Bank’s scholars
provide guidelines for each option, they favour the first: partnership between
Community–Based Organisations (CBOs) and local governments. They argue that
because it engages existing elected and functioning local government structures, it has
better prospects for galvanising local support for CDD programs. By so doing, the
argument continues, it strengthens the national system of inter-governmental transfer of
resources and allows resource allocation decisions to be accountable to local priorities
(Dongier et al. 2003; World Bank 2006b; Binswanger et al. 2010). Ghana’s CBRDP
was fashioned on this format, but with some variations

Table 3.1 Classification of African Countries Context
Low–functioning Intergovernmental System
Dysfunctional De-concentrated
Government
System

High–functioning
Inter-governmental System
Incipient
Consolidating
Decentralisation Decentralisation

Characteristics

CPIA cluster
D is less than
2.5

Local state
bodies are
upwardly
accountable,
but not elected

Decentralisation
law creates local
governments with
some autonomy
in resource
management &
local elections
are held

Countries

Angola, Chad,
Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep.
of Congo,
Liberia,
Sudan

Mauritania,
Mozambique,
Niger, São
Tomé and
Principe

Benin, Burkina
Faso, Cameroon,
Gambia, Guinea,
Kenya,
Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali,
Nigeria, Rwanda,
Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Zambia

Description

Conditions for
incipient
decentralisation
are met,
combined
with fiscal
decentralisation
& devolution of
service delivery
Ethiopia, Ghana,
Tanzania, Uganda

Source: Binswanger et al. (2010).
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The World Bank distinguishes between low and high–functioning inter–government
systems (decentralization) and categorises some African countries by the approach. The
World Bank’s indicators of a high–functioning inter–government systems include
contexts where there exist: 1) Decentralisation laws create local government structures
with autonomy in resource management; 2) Local elections; 3) Fiscal decentralisation
and; 4) Devolution of service delivery (see Table 3.1 above). Accordingly, the World
Bank has put forward operational strategies appropriate for both the low and high–
functioning contexts: the Leading, the Conservative or Lagging and the Matching
strategies (Dongier et al. 2003; Binswanger et al. 2010).
The ‘Leading strategy’ is used in low–functioning inter-governmental system countries
that have dysfunctional government structures. Under this strategy, a community–based
or driven project becomes an initiative that pushes the boundaries of the institutional
environment and accelerates change in the political, fiscal, administrative or social
aspects of local governance (Binswanger et al. 2010). The ‘Conservative or Lagging
strategy’ is largely employed in a low–functioning inter-governmental system with a deconcentrated system or a high–functioning inter–governmental system and incipient
decentralised system. The strategy is cautious in allowing the country’s local
government institutions the full power to set priorities, manage resources and
implement subprojects. It does not take full advantage of the opportunities to promote
the role local of government in program implementation (Binswanger et al. 2010).
The ‘Matching strategy’ is employed in a country such as Ghana, categorised as having
high–functioning inter–governmental system, with a consolidating decentralised
system. The World Bank considers such countries as being better placed to execute
CDD programs successfully, a notion which influenced the design and implementation
of Ghana’s Community–Based Rural Development Project (CBRDP ) (Serrano–Berthet
et al. 2010; Binswanger et al. 2010). However, as argued in Chapter Five, Ghana’s
inter–government system does not appear to be highly functioning as claimed by the
World Bank, a finding that questions the validity of some of the pivotal concepts and
theories of CDD programs. Given this revelation, this thesis also cautions the use of
CDD programs as PBAs to achieve aid effectiveness.
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3.5 Conclusion
Based on the discussion so far, it can be argued that ‘aid as a concept’ should not be
blamed for its ineffectiveness, but the motives, concepts and programs that drive it, and
the tendency to depend on it perpetually. Two prevalent reasons for the relative failure
of aid have been explored: 1) Donors use aid to advance their respective strategic
interests; and 2) Aid is ‘addictive’ and creates dependency. Given the evidence that
donors’ interests go beyond aid commercialisation (tied–aid); and that aid has
‘successfully’ facilitated the achievements of security, climate and immigration
agendas, it remains debatable whether a causal link between donors’ strategic interests
and aid ineffectiveness can be found. The chapter also revealed that ‘aid-dependency’,
which obviously has adverse effects on recipients, is different from ‘aid as a concept’.
Evidence was given to show that aid has promoted growth and has had positive impacts
in many countries, including Botswana, whose reliance on aid is denied by some anti–
aid crusaders. Therefore, it emerged that aid effectiveness must be measured from the
perspectives of recipients and not as just ‘outcomes’ or within the framework of donors’
objectives. In this way, it becomes easier to identify such ‘externalities’ as motives,
recipient structures and dependency level, and how they impact on aid program
outcomes.
The second part of this chapter examined three existing mechanisms for achieving aid
effectiveness, including: 1) Result–Based Financing; 2) Aid–Agenda Conferences; and
3) Program–Based Approaches. The purpose was to establish the extent to which these
mechanisms pay attention to the impact of theories and complex concepts on which aid
programs are based (‘the concepts factor’). It became clear that none of them pays
significant attention to the ‘concepts factor’. Result–Based Financing mechanisms were
found to be essentially ‘results–oriented’, and in the process, concentrate on
conditionalities. The chapter also showed that, while Aid–Agenda Conferences provide
donors, aid consumers and other relevant stakeholders, and the platform to share ideas
on aid financing and effectiveness, these donors do not adhere to the principles
established at those conferences. Thus, although some of the conferences have achieved
very good results, it seems evident that the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness
(HLFA) appears to have become a mere ‘bureaucratic formality’ as donors have
reneged on their commitments to, for example, the 2005 Paris Declaration. As Mavrotas
(2010, p. 3) observed “... it is apparent that some donors intend to slack off, and do not
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take the [HLFA] process seriously enough”. Incidentally, the agreements of all four
HLFA do not, at least explicitly, address the ‘concepts factor’
The last section of the chapter focused on Community–Driven Development programs,
one of the celebrated Program–Based Approaches at the World Bank. Despite its many
advantages, highly contested theories such as, “CDD programs succeed in high–
functioning local and inter–government contexts”; and complex concepts like
‘community’ and ‘empowerment’, were identified as pivotal in CDD programs. Even
so, little appears to be known as to how these ‘externalities’ influence CDD programs.
The remainder of the thesis examines how these contested theories and concepts
impacted on Ghana’s Community–Based Rural Development Program (CBRDP). In
particular, the next chapter will explore in detail the methodology used to examine the
CBRDP programs in Ghana.
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CHAPTER FOUR
METHODOLOGY
It remains an open empirical question, however, whether and how such
[positive] outcomes are achieved by a given Community–Driven Development
[Program]; if they are, then it is likely that only a more diverse package of
methodological tools than is typically deployed in (‘rigorous’) program
evaluation is likely to detect them
(Chase & Woolcock 2005, p. 6).
This chapter discusses the methods and tools that were employed to explore how
contested theories and complex concepts influenced the outcomes of Ghana’s
Community–Based Rural Development Programs (CBRDP). The chapter discusses the
methodological basis of the study, the fieldwork experiences, the limitation of the
research, ethical considerations as well as the data collection and analysis processes.

4.1 Why Ethno–Methodology?
The option of using quantitative data collection techniques was discarded in favour of
an ethno–methodology research practice being identified as the most appropriate
technique for data collection (Patton 2002; Darkwa & Tsikata 2009; Liamputtong 2009;
Travers 2010; Willis 2010). Using this approach, qualitative research tools such as
participant–observation, interviews, focus group discussions, review of
literature/documents and open–ended questionnaires were deployed. Because the
research questions draw on people’s understanding of how CDD programs work on the
ground, it was crucial to employ qualitative techniques in order to view the world
through the eyes of the participants (Padgett 2008; Liamputtong 2009; Travers 2010;
Willis 2010) as quantitative methods use structured (survey) instruments designed on
pre–conceived biases (de Vaus 1995; Patton 2002; Walter 2010). Other factors as
follows influenced the decision.
First, ethno–methodology is directly human–related and facilitates the collection of data
in natural settings (Patton 2002; Liamputtong 2009). As this research sought to
investigate the impact of intangible, but human–related concepts (such as ‘community’
and ‘empowerment’) on Ghana’s CBRDP, an ethno–methodological approach was
more suitable (Mansuri & Rao 2004; Chase &Woolcock 2005; Darkwa & Tsikata 2009;
Liamputtong 2009). Since humans are generally complex and their “actions are
significantly influenced by the setting in which they occur” (Marshall and Rossman
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2006, p.53) ethno–methodological techniques such as participant–observation,
interviews and focus group discussions offered the possibilities of interacting and
empathising with the beneficiaries of the project. These techniques enabled the
researcher to gain insight into how the attitudes, behaviours, value systems, concerns,
motivations, aspirations and culture or lifestyles of the beneficiaries impacted on the
CBRDP processes102 (Patton 2002; Padgett 2008; Liamputtong 2009; Walter 2010).
Second, the choice of ethno–methodology was also necessitated by the dearth of
qualitatively–generated research of aid programs (aidnography) in Ghana; although
several independent scholars have effectively used it in other contexts to research and
produce influential works on aid (Escobar 1995; Fergusson 1995; Grillo & Stirrat 1997;
Gould 2004; Mosse 2004, 2005; Li 2007; Eyben 2007, 2010). While Ghana is one of
the top ten aid–dependent countries in Sub–Saharan Africa103, there are not many
published independent, academic and ethnographic studies concerning aid to the
country. As earlier indicated, the related aid literature appears to be dominated by the
writing of economists, who ignore ‘human–centred’ and conceptual issues, and reports
of aid agencies. Whilst some of the publications of the latter are scientific, many of
them tend to be less critical and as Riddell (2007, p. 193) observed, “present a [more]
flattering picture than it probably deserves”. Furthermore, owing to the concern that
internally–initiated research and evaluations of donors and their agencies tend to suffer
conflict of interests, their publications do not provide scientific and objective grounds
for understanding the issues affecting aid programs at the grassroots level in Ghana
(Azeem et al. 2006; Riddell 2007; Easterly 2008; Cullen 2009). Thus, although the
ethno–methodological approach to this research may not be a theoretical novelty, it fills
a significant gap of ‘aidnographies’ on Ghana.
One advantage of ethno–methodology is its compatibility with case studies (Patton
2002; David 2006; Willis 2010). The fundamental principle underlying case study is the
purposive focus on [one, specific] individualised outcomes within a larger social group,
or what Gerring (2007, p. 1) calls the “micro–macro link ... and cross level inference”
(Gillharm 2000). By focussing on a key element [called a case], Gerring argues further
that researchers gain insight into the whole, and that an in–depth knowledge of a case is
more helpful than fleeting knowledge about a larger number of examples. Riddle (2007,
p. 169) argues that “an effective way of addressing the methodological problems in
102
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Project identification, implementation and maintenance.
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/27/42139250.pdf , retrieved March 24, 2012.
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understanding how aid works on the ground is to undertake sampling studies of where
projects have been implemented”. Additionally, both Patton (2002) and Liamputtong
(2009) aver that through case studies, researchers are able to compare, draw generalised
inferences and stimulate further research (David 2006; Yin 2008; Padgett 2008).
Relative to this research, as indicated in Chapter One, Ghana’s CBRDP was
implemented in one hundred and thirty eight districts. However, as it was not possible
to study all, the research focuses on nine districts [cases] to gain insights into the
CBRBPs nationally. Even so, experts in research methodologies insists that researchers
clearly define the boundaries of their ‘cases’ and justify what/who is included and why
(David 2006; Luck, Jackson & Usher 2006; Liamputtong 2009; Willis 2010).
4.2 Case Study Boundaries
This research focused on Ghana’s CBRDP Zone IV: Eastern, Greater Accra and Volta
Regions104. Several reasons influenced the choice of this zone. First, it was a practical
impossibility to research the entire country; second, the zone is arguably the most
developed and populated area of the country; third, it has better communication
infrastructure, road networks, and was more stable, in terms of ethnic conflicts,
compared to Zone 1 (the northern parts of the country), for example. Furthermore, the
convenience that both the National and Zonal Headquarters of the project were situated
there made the zone the best location for the fieldwork, as the researcher had to be in
constant communication with both offices for documents and informal interviews on the
project. Finally, although Zone IV differs topographically from the other zones, as
pointed out in Chapter One, they share relatively analogous social characteristics, such
as ethnic and dialectical diversities, Traditional Chieftaincies, political sensitivity,
rural/urban dichotomy, relatively high levels of poverty and so on. The similarities of
the zones legitimised the case study approach as well as the confident generalisation of
the findings (Patton 2002; Padgett 2008).
Within Zone IV, nine municipalities/districts, three from each region, were selected. In
each district, one Area Council (locality) was selected. While the districts were selected
randomly, the localities were sampled purposively (Willis 2010, Travers 2010).
Although all the districts in the country benefitted from the CBRDP, not all Area
Councils or localities did; some could not meet the criteria of having offices and a
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See Figure 1.6 in Chapter One.
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three–person signatory bank account. Thus, the localities that received and completed
their projects, and where relevant contacts had been established were selected.
4.3 The Fieldwork Experience
The fieldwork was carried out over a period of seven months (2010/2011) in three
phases: familiarisation, data collection and follow–ups. The familiarisation phase
involved collecting the project’s documents and securing contact of all relevant persons
in all nine Districts researched. The second phase involved visiting or living in the
CBRDP beneficiary localities while collecting data. The final phase included the
follow–up of some unresolved issues arising from the second phase, these ranging from
obtaining relevant documents and information to ascertaining the results of the 2010
local government elections, which coincided with the fieldwork. As Chapters Five and
Seven will show, the election outcomes were crucial for this research.
Although Ghanaian, the researcher had to adjust to the insider and outsider realities of
fieldwork (Altorki 1994; Boudewinjse 1994; Chiseri–Strater & Sustein 2007; Al–
Makhamreh & Lewando–Hundt 2008). Researching in Ghana allowed the researcher
much flexibility and independence, as no permit was required. Although I am dark–
skinned, and possess some intimate knowledge of the Ghanaian culture, for strategic
reasons however, introductory letters from the CBRDP National and Zonal
Headquarters were secured for identification purposes (see Appendix D & E). Being a
Ghanaian also facilitated the identification of key informants and settling into the host
localities. Further, except in some parts of the Volta Region, the use of interpreters in
the data collection process was not necessary as many of the respondents could either
communicate in Akan or English. Aware that being Ghanaian could breed familiarity,
the researcher had to be reflexive and observe familiar socio–cultural patterns carefully
(Altorki 1994; Boudewinjse 1994; Al–Makhamreh & Lewando–Hundt 2008).
Throughout the fieldwork however, the researcher was an ‘outsider’ in many respects.
Three reasons explain this. First, most of the localities researched were relatively less
populated, and meant that the residents easily identified ‘strangers’ in their midst, even
if they spoke the local dialect or ‘looked like them’. Second, except for Tease in the
Afram Plains District105, the researcher had no consanguineous ties with the other eight
localities researched. Third, because ‘community’ and ‘empowerment’ research tends to
105

The researcher had conducted a research there in 2009.
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relate to females (Tesoriero 2010, pp.12 & 13; see also Hancock et al. 2011), the data
tended to be drawn more from females than males106. In most Ghanaian rural localities,
there seems to be a social distance between women and men (Apusigah 2004a; 2004b).
Thus, my frequent interaction with women as a stranger, particularly in smaller
localities, exposed my ‘outsiderness’, as both men and women found it strange.

Photo 4.1: The researcher on a familiarisation tour in Pakro, the Eastern Region

As an outsider, some of the research subjects tended to have doubts about the
researcher’s status. Thus, letters of introduction obtained from the Edith Cowan
University and the CBRDP Headquarters were always carried to all formal interview
sessions as proof of identity (see Appendices D & E).
Also, the researcher consciously tried to reduce all asymmetrical variables between
myself and the research subjects (Boudewinjse 1994). This meant, for example,
downplaying the social status of coming from abroad, wearing casual clothes most of
the time, speaking the local dialects, and briefing the respondents and interviewees
thoroughly before the sessions started. These proved very effective, as it enhanced the
106

Women form 55% of Ghana’s population (Ghana Statistical Service 2012)
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trust of the respondents in me and allowed them to relate to me “as one of their own”,
thereby facilitating the data collection procedures and the tenets of ethnographic
research (aidnography).
During the fieldwork, the local customs of the host localities were observed. Indeed,
some were so crucial that by defying them, the fieldwork or relationship with the
research subjects would have been jeopardised. Examples included going through a
Linguist during interview session with Traditional Chiefs. In Ghana, Traditional Chiefs
are not addressed directly but through Linguists; culturally inappropriate language or
expressions to Traditional Chiefs could lead to punishment for the offender. Linguists
are the mouthpiece of Traditional Chiefs as well as the communication link (not
interpreters or translators per se), between the former and visitors to the palace. Their
main job is to edit information in a culturally appropriate way before they are spoken to
Traditional Chiefs. Working with Linguists in some of the research localities proved
very frustrating and time consuming, particularly during transcription. In most
instances, as local traditions demanded, I had to pay money ‘to open the door’ into the
palaces. In one village, the Traditional Chief was unwilling to welcome me, until the
‘palace knocking fees’ was paid.
4.4 Limitations
Like many social research activities, this research also had some limitations. Being
Ghanaian came with some drawbacks. I concede that many aspects of the ‘Ghanaian
culture’, which were familiar to me, must have been taken for granted, irrespective of
my conscious reflexiveness (Boudewinjse 1994; Chiseri–Strater & Sustein 2007).
During the fieldwork, the researcher also experienced what Altorki (1994, p. 60)
referred to as ‘threat of exposure and judgement’. As most of the interviews and focus
group discussions were recorded, the participants must have been cautious of their
responses and withheld some vital information. However, because multiple data
collection tools were employed for triangulation, the empirical rigorousness of the data
is still credible (Liamputtong 2009; Travers 2010). Relative to the questionnaires, some
of the respondents who could either not express themselves on paper or in the English
language were assisted by the research assistants. While the respondents were debriefed
about their answers, some of them may have been misquoted.
The final limitation relates to the transcription. Most of the interviews were conducted
in Akan and transcribed into English. Owing to the variation in translations, despite
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earnest endeavour, some interviews were difficult to transcribe verbatim with all its
heuristic effects; thus some nuances that may have been better expressed in the original
languages may have been lost (Patton 2002; Liamputtong 2009).
4.5 Ethical Considerations
All aspects of this research required adherence to many ethical considerations. These
were important so that the confidentiality of the respondents’ identity would not be
jeopardised, while enhancing the credibility of the process. Several ethics formalities
were completed and approved before and after the data collection process by the Ethics
Committee of Edith Cowan University. Accordingly, all respondents were briefed about
the research purposes and gave their consent before the implementation procedures with
the protocols of the interviews and questionnaires. Respondents were also assured of
confidentiality and informed about their rights to withdraw, if they felt uncomfortable.
The data were protected in lockable filing cabinets or protected with passwords on hard
disks. At the end of the research, much of the confidential data were shredded and
deleted from the hard drives.
During the fieldwork, the magnitude of the work necessitated the use of research
assistants. Thus, one permanent and two casual research assistants were employed.
They were all trained in the rubrics of data collection and transcription and the ethical
considerations of fieldwork. They signed contracts in which they assured me of
confidentiality and to respect the social structures and cultures of the research subjects.
Although permission of the CBRDP offices in Ghana to carry out the fieldwork was not
necessary, letters of introduction were obtained from them for proof of identity and
mission purposes whenever questioned. Substantial volumes of documents were
obtained from them with the assurance in writing of their sole use for the purposes of
this research (Appendices C & D).
For ethical reasons the names of the respondents and some of the towns and districts,
where the fieldwork was carried out have been deidentified with pseudonyms.
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4.6 Data Collection
In tandem with the Chase and Woolcock (2005) assertion that only a more diverse
package of methodological tools were likely to detect how CDD programs work on the
ground, five key research tools were employed in this research (see Figure 4.1). This
was crucial to obtaining data for triangulation purposes, while enhancing the credibility
of the findings (Patton 2002; Liamputtong 2009). Each of the instruments employed and
the type of data they generated is described next.
Figure 4.1 Data Collection Tools
Tools

Review of
Literature/
Documents

Participant–
Observation

50
In–depth
Interviews

10
Focus Group
Discussions

225
Open–ended
Questionnaires

4.6.1. Review of Literature/Documents
Because the research focused on theories and concepts, a review of literature and policy
documents was crucial. The purpose of the review was to: 1) Establish the absence of
empirical studies on how contested theories and concepts influence aid outcomes, a gap
this research seeks to fill; and 2) To understand aid policy discourses and analysis to
establish the conceptual and an analytical frameworks for scrutinising the themes
emerging from the data (see Figure 4.2). Four categories of literature were reviewed.
The first category was academic literature which included the works of both local and
‘foreign’ scholars in scholarly peer–reviewed journal articles, books, conference papers
and policy briefs that related to aid, CDD, community, empowerment, Ghana and
decentralisation or local government.
CBRDP documents constituted the second category of literature consulted. Some
aspects of the project that were directly unobservable were captured in the CBDRP
documents. For example, the National Reports, which spanned the years 2005–2010,
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established the trends and aims of the project. The Zone IV CBRDP Reports also
provided some demographic information on the research localities and many aspects of
the project that preceded the fieldwork. Both reports, most of which were obtained
before entering the field, facilitated the framing of the interview questions, assembling
the focus group discussions, sharpening the questionnaires and clarifying the nature of
field observations. Copies of the CBRDP Action Plans, which described the planning
and implementation processes of the projects in the respective beneficiary localities,
were also obtained.107
Official documents from the Government of Ghana were also reviewed. While some
were directly downloadable online, others were obtained through formal applications to
the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP) (see Appendix F) and the
Electoral Commission, for example. The documents from MOFEP, which ranged from
annual budget statements to policy briefs, provided insights into various aid initiatives
in the country since the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs. The
‘ghanadistricts.com’ website also provided useful information on the social–cultural and
demographical characteristics of the districts and localities researched.
The last category of documents consulted were literature from the World Bank, the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP). The databases of these institutions provided
statistical information on global and Ghana–specific trends regarding aid. They also
provided useful insights into the Millennium Development Goals as well as global
efforts at making aid effective. The recently launched UNDP African Human
Development Report (2012) provided statistical information and indicators for
understanding poverty levels and general development trends in Ghana.
4.6.2. Participant–Observation
Often seen as the main pillar of ethnography (see Senah 1997), participant–observation
(P–O) allowed time for observing and interacting with the CBRDP beneficiary
localities, as the pictures below show (Herbert 2000). This technique was used within
the spirit of what Bryman (2008, p. 376) outlined as ‘prolonged participation in the
social life of a [community] over a period of time allows the researcher to ensure a high
level of congruence between concepts and observation’. Meyer and Singh (1997) have
also endorsed P–O as an effective way of researching development program outcomes.
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See 1.4.1, Stages I & II.
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Drawing on an observation by Tesoriero (2010) that any community–based
development processes [or research] must begin with a long–term membership of the
‘community’; the researcher became immersed in the field for several months. While
general trends were observed, particular attention was paid to the social systems,
routines, spaces, events and cultural–norms and practices that underpinned the
behavioural pattern and perceptions of research subjects (Boudewinjse 1994; Patton
2002). The CBRDP stipulated that beneficiary localities consultatively choose and
implement projects that addressed their most important needs (CBRDP Implementation
Manual 2006). Accordingly, in all localities researched, such infrastructure elements as
the state of roads, school buildings; and basic necessities such as water, electricity,
public toilet facilities and so on were observed. The aim was to gain first–hand and
experiential knowledge of the ‘potential needs’ of the localities and to what degree they
matched the projects implemented.

Photo 4.2: The researcher interacting with pupils from the Agbetor Primary School (Volta Region).

Community–based programs, Tesoriero (2010) and Kenny (2010) argue, thrive on
social capital, an observable attribute of ‘communities’, and the glue that holds people
together (Woolcock 1998; Woolcock & Narayan 2000). As a result, during the
fieldwork, the observation of and participation in several social–cultural activities in the
research localities took place thereby gaining insight into the strength of their respective
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social capital or what Bhattacharyya (2004, p. 5, cited in Tesoriero 2010), referred to as
‘... [their] pursuit of solidarity and urgency’. Thus, religious services in both the church
and mosque were attended and observed, and local and Parents/Teachers Association
(PTA) meetings monitored, or some of the key informants accompanied to their farms.
In the meetings, who spoke, who did not and the general atmosphere were observed.
Apart from facilitating a better understanding of the localities and the projects, these
interactions also assisted in establishing further contacts with prospective interviewees
and key informants (Scheyvens & Storey 2003; Stone & Bonnie 2007).

Photo 4.3: The researcher on a farm in the Afram Plains, Eastern Region.

The entire P–O process enhanced the researcher’s understanding of the grounded
meanings and realities of the theories and concepts such as ‘community’ and
‘empowerment’, which were pivotal in the implementation of the CBRDP. It also
offered first–hand information, other than any prior conceptualisation of the projects
and the localities gathered through reading (Patton 2002). The technique also allowed
an appreciation of the forms of local knowledge and repetitive routines in the localities
that must have escaped the project implementers or been taken for granted (Mosse
2001; Tesoriero 2010). Through the P–O process, issues such as people’s political
affiliations, which many respondents were unwilling to reveal in formal interviews,
were discovered. To keep track of everything observed in the localities researched, field
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notes were written for review and analysis. Some of the insights gained through the P–
O technique influenced the framing of the questions for the formal interviews and focus
group discussions.
4.6.3. Interviews/ Focus Group Discussions
People’s thoughts, feelings, perceptions and intentions are not directly observable
(Patton 1992). It is only when they open up to talk that their worldview, experiences and
thoughts can be appreciated (Patton 1992; Liamputtong 2009). This explains why
interviews and focus group discussions formed a substantial part of the methodology.
As Tesoriero (2010, p. 129) points out, the “community worker [researcher] has to learn
to step back, watch, listen and ask questions rather than provide answers.”
In order to obtain comparative data and address a range of experiences (Travers 2010), a
total of fifty formal and in–depth individual interviews were conducted. Those included
in the individual interviews were key informants, local government officials (Assembly
Members, Area Council Executive or Unit Committee Members), Traditional Chiefs
and CBRDPs’ maintenance committee members. The questions, many of which were
based on what was observed in the localities or taken from the project documents, were
semi–structured and open–ended to allow the respondents the flexibility of expressing
themselves (Liamputtong 2009; Travers 2010). The interviews elicited information on
the processes leading to the selection and implementation and the state of the CBRDPs.
Key Informants were asked to identify issues that affect local organising tendencies in
their respective localities as well as the sustainability of the projects, most of them
being observed to lack maintenance.
Local government officials were asked to explain the motivation for doing the unpaid
job and issues affecting their work. Three sets of questions were posed to Traditional
Chiefs; the first sought information on the histories of the localities, while the second
touched on their roles in the selection and implementation of the CBRDPs. The final set
of questions related to their relationship with local government officials. Some of them
were aggrieved that by virtue of its design, the CBRDP sidelined them, and they bore
grudges with their local government representatives (see Chapter Seven).
All the interviews were held in venues that were convenient for the respondents.
Although, the questions tended to probe, the sessions were patterned on what
Liamputtong (2009, p. 44) described as the ‘Parisan Cafe Model’: [a relaxed
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atmosphere] that encourages shared experiences between the researcher and
respondents. Most of the interviews lasted approximately forty minutes and were
recorded with the consent of the interviewees.
To obtain a larger sample of respondents without having to interview them individually
(Liamputtong 2009; Tranter 2010), ten focus group discussions were held, one in each
locality, except Aboloo in the Greater Accra Region, whose circumstances warranted
two (see Table 4.1). As a research technique, many scholars have theoretically endorsed
focus group discussion (Krueger 1994; Punch 1998; Frith 2000; Sarantakos 2008;
Liamputtong 2009; Travers 2010). While the dynamics of each focus group differed,
they were all sampled purposively, participants having to be residents of the relevant
localities and to possess some knowledge of the projects. Depending on the project
type, each focus group was based on a core characteristic, such as profession,
parenthood or ethnicity. Other attributes such as gender, age, religion, and educational
levels were used to stratify focus group members (see Table 4.1) so as to establish
variations and representation of the relevant people in the localities (Liamputtong 2009;
Travers 2010). For example, as photo 4.4 below shows, the focus group in Agoe
(Greater Accra Region) centred on parents, the participants having been stratified by
gender, religion and profession. Key informants in conjunction with research assistants
facilitated the selection process, sometimes using both opportunistic and snowball108
sampling techniques (Patton 2002; Liamputtong 2009).
All the focus group sessions commenced with an introduction of the research team,
participants109, the purpose of the research and what they had to expect. The discussions
were designed from an interpretive perspective to obtain a wide range of opinions and
detailed insights from the sampled groups on the CBRDPs (Liamputtong 2009; Travers
2010). Thus, the questions, which were mainly open–ended to stimulate discussions,
related to the functions of the local government sub–structures and the commitment of
the participants to the development of the locality. Others questions probed the
participants’ understanding of ‘community’, and their sense of belonging and
obligations to their respective localities; and what they considered as the most important
needs of their respective localities vis–a–vis the projects implemented. The researcher
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Participants were asked to suggest others they knew who met the research criteria and might be willing
to participate.
109
First time some were interacting with each other.
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moderated all the focus group sessions, which were also recorded with the consent of
the participants.

Table 4.1 Focus Groups’ Sampling Structure per Project Type and Beneficiary
Group
Town/ Village

Project Type

Focus Group

Agbetor

Three–unit classroom block

Fulani People

Agoe

Culverts

Parents

Dedenu

Mechanised bore whole

Women

Lume

Ntoaso

Eight–seater toilet facility for the Farmers
local primary school
Renovation of Tashie primary
Parents
School
Sixteen–seater toilet facility
Traders

Pakro

Mechanised bore whole

Dagomba People

Tease

Market sheds

Traders

Aboloo

Community library block

Students/ Parents

Tashie

Source: CBRDP Implementation Manual (2006); Field notes (2011).

Photo 4.4: The researcher in a focus group discussion with parents in Agoe, Greater Accra Region.
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4.6.4. Open–Ended Questionnaires
Conventionally, questionnaires are considered as a quantitative or survey technique
(Patton 1992; Robson 2002). In recent times however, that narrow stance is giving way
to a contextualised usage of the technique, which allows for qualitative analysis.
Responses to open–ended questions, some methodologists aver, can provide details
about perceptions, opinions, personal experiences, and deeply held beliefs (Carpenter &
Suto 2008; Padgett 2008). As Liamputtong (2009, p.282) puts it, “qualitative
researchers need to know that we sometimes count too”. This implies that
questionnaires could be used quantitatively or qualitatively, depending on their design.
In this research questionnaires were used qualitatively for two reasons: 1) To reach out
to the residents of the CBRDP beneficiary localities who were not included in the
individual interviews and focus group discussions; and 2) To obtain some sense of
quantity of the emergent themes for contextualisation and triangulation (Carpenter &
Suto 2008; Padgett 2008; Liamputtong 2009).
Accordingly, twenty-five questionnaires were distributed in each of the nine CBRDP
beneficiary localities researched110. They were administered randomly to residents who
had intimate knowledge of the CBRDP implementation in the locality, but were not
included in the individual interviews and focus group discussions and willing to
participate in the research. All the questions were open–ended and required respondents
to explain their: 1) Commitments to the locality; 2) Participation in the identification
and implementation processes of the CBRDPs; and 3) Opinions on the functions of their
local government officials (see Appendix B). While some responded to the
questionnaires instantly, others retained them for up to seven days111. Some of the
respondents who were literate completed the questionnaires unassisted, while the
research assistants helped those who could either not express themselves on paper or in
the English language. In such instances, the respondents were debriefed about their
answers, after which they could deny the claims written on their behalf or accept them.

110
111

225 in total.
Almost 95% of them were retrieved.
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4.7 Data Analysis
Different analytical procedures were applied to make sense of and identify patterns and
emerging themes from the huge volumes of the secondary and primary data collected.
The secondary data, which were drawn mainly from academic literature, CBRDP
documents and reports from the Government of Ghana, World Bank, OECD, and
UNDP, were examined for their arguments, how they have evolved overtime and the
contexts within which made them relevant to the research topic. In some cases, the
literature was cited contrarily to identify gaps on the research topic (Liamputtong 2009;
Walter 2010). The literature also provided the tool for both data analysis and the
theoretical basis of the arguments advanced in the thesis (see Figure 4.2).
The analysis of the primary data – field notes, interviews, focus group and open–ended
questionnaires – commenced with immersing in and organisation of the data (Willis
2010). This involved manually reviewing the field notes, verbatim transcriptions of all
audio interviews and the interpretation of the questionnaires on a district basis. Another
round of organisational procedure involved coding the data. In order to simplify the
process, the data were broadly coded in accordance with the three Secondary Research
Questions drawn from the Primary Research Question as SRQ1, SRQ2 & SRQ3. The
third round involved organising for critical analysis each of the three categories to
identify recurring responses both thematically and inductively (Walter 2010; Willis
2010). For example, in the SRQ2 category, themes recurring most included: 1)
Residents’ dissociation with the Tease locality; 2) Allegations of corruption against
local government officials; 3) Lack of interest in local meetings; 4) The failure of
previous locally–initiated projects; and 5) Partisan politics.
When several themes had been identified for each category, their convergence (how
they hold together) and divergence (how they differ) was established (Patton 2002,
Willis 2010). This involved interpretation of the themes through writing them up into
complete stories guided by the conceptual and analytical framework (see Figure 4.2
below). Specifically, the emergent themes in SRQ1, SRQ2 and SRQ3 are discussed in
Chapters Five, Six, and Seven respectively.
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Figure 4.2 Conceptual/Analytical Frameworks
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The concluding chapter of the thesis binds the findings into one integrative format and
answers the Primary Research Question. However, because qualitative research
techniques are often vilified as lacking validity and reliability, as the interpretation of
the data tends to be biased by the researcher’s personal worldview (Angen 2000; Patton
2002; Padgett 2008); the drafts were subjected to several test mechanisms. Apart from
being reviewed by senior academics in the subject area (‘expert–checking’), the drafts
were also exposed to ‘member–checking’ for accuracy112 (Lincoln & Guba 1989;
Carpenter & Suto 2008), and an audit trail113 (Creswell 2007; Padgett 2008). These
processes elicited feedback and comments, some of which have been incorporated into
this thesis.
4.8 Conclusion
This chapter described the methods and tools employed in this study. It outlined the
research design and the questions the thesis sought to answer. The three reasons that
informed the use of ethno–methodology as the overarching design were also presented.
These included the: 1) Fact that the research is directly human–related; 2) Dearth of
ethnographic studies concerning aid in Ghana; and 3) Compatibility of case studies with
ethno–methodology. The chapter also outlined the fieldwork experiences, explaining the
negotiation of the researcher as an ‘outsider’. The limitations of the research and ethical
considerations were also outlined.
The genre of documents and literature reviewed to understand the CBRDP; the theories
of aid and CDD approaches were also discussed. The literature provided background
information that framed the theoretical and analytical frameworks of the research.
Explanation was given of how the Participant–Observation technique facilitated the
process of gaining useful insights into the real world experiences of the research
subjects. The interview and focus group discussion processes and the kind of
information elicited from them have also been outlined. The questionnaire protocols
sought information by reaching out to residents of the CBRDP beneficiary localities
who had not been included in the interviews and focus group discussions, and to obtain
some sense of quantities for data triangulation purposes.
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For example, a draft of the section of Chapter One which described the research case study project was
sent to the CBRDP Headquarters in Accra (Ghana) for comments.
113
Some of the drafts were reviewed by my network of academics internationally.
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Finally, the chapter explained the data analysis processes and mechanisms engaged to
mitigate against the biases and inaccuracies of qualitative research methods. All the data
were manually organised on a district basis and coded to the Secondary Research
Questions, which were drawn from the Primary Research Question. Subsequently, each
category was analysed for recurring responses and themes. When several themes had
been identified for each category, guided by the conceptual framework, drafts were
written of the findings that answered the respective secondary questions. ‘Member–
checking’ and audit trail mechanisms were employed to review and enhance the
credibility of the findings.
The next chapter examines, within the framework of Ghana’s CBRDP, one of the
pivotal decentralisation theories in Community–Driven Development operations. While
the theory appears to suggest that CDD programs do well in ‘highly’ decentralised
countries such as Ghana, the findings point to the contrary.
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CHAPTER FIVE
GHANA’S LOCAL GOVERNMENT:
A DECEPTIVE ‘HIGH–FUNCTIONING’ SYSTEM?
“Ghana’s decentralisation process could be best described as stagnated. Several
countries who understudied Ghana’s system have made significant strides”
(Kyei–Baffour 2009, p. 32).
Chapter Three established that the Community–Driven Development (CDD) program is
a popular aid delivery mechanism at the World Bank. Among other things, the
popularity of CDD stems from the assertion that the implementing country or locality
has control over the program, an essential recipe for achieving aid effectiveness
(Mansuri & Rao 2004; World Bank 2010). The chapter also showed that CDD programs
do not work in a vacuum, as their operations invariably depend on the level of the
implementing country’s inter–government, or decentralisation systems (Dongier et al.
2003; Binswanger et al. 2010). Accordingly, the World Bank distinguishes between
African countries with low and high–functioning decentralisation systems relative to the
existence of four indicators: 1) Decentralisation laws [that] create autonomous local
government structures in resource management; 2) Fiscal decentralisation; 3) Local
[government] elections114; and 4) Devolution of service delivery. Therefore, a CDD
operationalisation strategy (Leading, Conservative and Matching) is determined by the
implementing country’s relative attainment of the four indicators. The Matching
Strategy applies to countries with high–functioning decentralisation systems (Dongier et
al. 2003; Binswanger et al. 2010).
Interestingly, in lieu of Kyei–Baffour’s (2009) assertion, and others (Asante 2009;
Ahwoi 2010; Antwi–Boasiako 2010; Ghana Constitutional Review Commission Report
2011), that Ghana’s decentralisation process has stagnated and needs an overhaul; the
World Bank considers it as high–functioning and better placed to implement CDD
programs successfully (Binswanger et al. 2010). This projection, which has given
Ghana ‘an aid celebrity status’ as one of the preferred destinations for donor support in
Sub–Saharan Africa, does not paint the true picture or reflect the grounded realities, in
this case, the country’s inter–government systems (decentralisation). This chapter
challenges the World Bank’s classification of Ghana’s decentralisation system as being
highly functional. Three sections are presented to contextualise the arguments
114

Although the World Bank does not state explicitly about the type of election it refers to, from the
context it points to local government election (Binswanger et al. 2010 p. 123).
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advanced in the text: the first section provides a brief overview of Ghana’s local
government and decentralisation system. Drawing on secondary sources and within the
framework of the four indicators above, the second section examines and points out
many weaknesses in Ghana’s local government system, proving why it does not appear
to merit the label ‘high–functioning’. The final section of the chapter draws on
empirical data collected from the Eastern, Greater Accra and Volta Regions of Ghana in
2010/2011. The section discusses some of the weaknesses inherent in Ghana’s local
government system by unravelling the issues affecting the operations of Assembly
Members, who are key facilitators of developments at the local level. Among the issues
contributing to their dysfunction are partisan politics, the fact that the officials are not
paid any salaries, working with weak Unit Committees, and conflicts with Traditional
Chiefs. Through an analysis of how these challenges influenced the outcomes of
Ghana’s Community–Based Rural Development Projects (CBRDP), the section
provides empirical basis for appreciating the impact of contested theories on
development program outcomes.
5.1 Ghana’s Local Government System: A Brief Overview
Local government in Ghana dates as far back to the pre–independence era through what
was known as Indirect Rule, which centred on native authorities made up of Traditional
Chiefs or local royalty (Ayee 1999; Institute of Local Government Studies & Ministry
of Local Government & Rural Development and Environment 2006). Although both the
pre and post–independence (1957) periods have witnessed several local government
legal and constitutional amendments, the most significant was the 1988 Provisional
National Defence Council (PNDC) Local Government Law 207, Legislative Instrument
1589115. This was the landmark legislation that provided the legal framework for the
beginning of Ghana’s decentralised local government system of today. In the current
Constitution (1992), the PNDC Law 207 has been strengthened as an entrenched
provision in Chapter Twenty, while Article 240 specifically provides the broad
framework for the Ghana’s decentralisation. In the last decade, the passages of other
relevant laws have also augmented Article 240116.
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The law was a reflection of the wind of public sector reforms that was blowing in the late 1980s and
early 1990s for public accountability, transparency, efficiency, responsiveness to citizens’ input and
reducing state apparatus (Tettey 2006).
116
These include but are not limited to: the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462); the Local
Government Service Act 2003 (Act 656); the District Assemblies Common Fund Act 455, the National
Development Planning Systems Act 480 and the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies
Standing Orders (Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992; Kyei–Baffour 2009; Antwi–Boasiako
2010; Ahwoi 2010).
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Ghana’s local government structure consists of Regional Coordinating Councils and a
four–tier and three–tier Municipal/ District Assembly system (see Figure 5.1). Within
the structure, District/Municipal Assemblies (DAs) appear to be the most ‘influential’ as
they are entrusted with wide political and administrative authority at the local level
(Gyimah–Boadi 2009). For example, Section 10 (5) of the Local Government Act 462
stipulates that all programs and projects, including those approved under the District
Development Plan and other development programs by Government Ministries and
Departments and non–governmental organisations, are supposed to be coordinated and
executed by/or under the supervision of the DAs. They also have responsibility for
eighty-six functions, sole control over certain public services and the prerogative to
make decisions regarding some executive and policy issues (Tettey 2006; Gyimah–
Boadi 2009; Ofei–Aboagye 2009; Ahwoi 2010). Despite having these powers, in
reality, as argued below, DAs seem to be controlled and used for various political
manoeuvrings by the central government (Crawford 2004; Sumberg & Okali 2006).

Figure 5.1 Structure of Ghana’s Local Government System in the Fourth Republic
Regional Coordinating Councils

Metropolitan
Assemblies

Municipal
Assemblies

District
Assemblies

Zonal Councils

Urban/ Town/
Area Councils

Sub Metropolitan
District Assemblies
Town Councils

Unit Committees

Source: Adapted from Ahwoi (2010).
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While constitutionally mandated to be the hub of development at the local level, the
operations of Ghana’s DAs appear to offer many loopholes for political machinations.
Although Article 248 (2) of the Constitution requires that DAs be non–partisan, the
system seems to be highly politicised (Tettey 2006; Gyimah–Boadi 2009). Ahwoi
(2010, p. 62) argues that the politicisation of the system stems from the modelling of
Ghana’s local government structure on that of Canada: ‘partisan central government
superimposed on a non–partisan local government system’. Others blame the
politicisation of the DAs on the constitutional provision in Article 243 (2) that allows
the President to appoint District Chief Executives (DCEs) rather than being elected
(Tettey 2006; Antwi–Boasiako 2010). DCEs are responsible for the day–to–day
performance of the executive and administrative functions of the DAs. They are also the
chief representatives and the principal executors of the central government’s programs
in the district. Appointed for two terms of four years only, DCEs are nominated by the
President, but require approval of two–thirds of the Assembly Members present and
voting (Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992; ILGS & MLGDE 2006; Tettey
2006; Ahwoi 2010; Antwi–Boasiako 2010).
It has been suggested that the constitutional provision, which allows for the
appointment of DCEs, be amended so that they get into office through popular votes.
In the view of the pro–amendment scholars (see Tettey 2006; Gyimah–Boadi 2009;
Antwi–Boasiako 2010117), revising that constitutional provision will make DCEs
accountable to the local people. They argue further that the status quo allows DCEs to
be loyal only to the President rather than the local people they serve. However, Ahwoi
(2010) disagrees and argues that if DCEs were elected, the entire local government
structure would be politicised, as political party cronies with little or no administrative
experience would be voted to manage the system. While successive governments and
politicians have promised to amend the particular constitutional provision, they appear
to lack the political will to carry it out (New Patriotic Party Manifesto 2008; National
Democratic Congress Manifesto 2008; Ex–President J.E.A. Mills First Sectional
Address, cited in Asante 2009). The main reason, some scholars have observed, is that
the status quo offers politicians the convenience of political manoeuvrings at the local
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The current Deputy Minister of Local Government and Rural Development and Environment also
supports the idea (http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=244165,
retrieved 10 July 2009).
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level (Crawford 2004; Sumberg & Okali 2006; Tettey 2006; Gyimah–Boadi 2009;
Kyei–Baffour 2009; Antwi–Boasiako 2010).
5.2 Is Ghana’s Local Government System ‘High–Functioning’?
The discussions so far show that while there are constitutional provisions for a
decentralised local government in Ghana, the system appears to offer loopholes for
political machinations. Within this context, this section analyses the state of Ghana’s
local government system guided by the World Bank’s four indicators of a high–
functioning decentralised system: 1) Decentralisation laws [that] create local
government autonomous structures; 2) Fiscal decentralisation; 3) Local [government]
elections; and 4) Devolution of service delivery.
5.2.1 Decentralisation laws [that] create Autonomous Local Government Structures
According to Crawford (2004, p. 32), autonomy of local governments refers to their
ability to ‘initiate and coordinate local development [programs]’. Although Ghana’s
1992 Constitution (Article 240, 2b) and the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462)
provide for the autonomy of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (local
authorities), the statutes appear to be inherently contradictory. Several examples will
illustrate this. First, whereas the Local Government Act 462 stipulates that the District
Assemblies (DAs) are responsible for the development at the local level, Article 10 (3)
requires that their Medium Term Development Plans and budgets be approved by the
central government (Tettey 2006; Ahwoi 2010). Section 88 of Act 462 also limits the
amount of loans DAs can contract to only GHC 2000118; any amount above that requires
the approval of the central government in accordance with the Financial Administration
Act 2003 (Act 654). Given these ‘barrier statutes’, the ability [and autonomy] of DAs to
undertake independent and creative programs is apparently restricted (Ahwoi 2005;
Tettey 2006).
As earlier indicated, the autonomy of local authorities is further atrophied by the Local
Government Act 462119, which gives the President the authority to appoint 30% of its
membership. Gyimah–Boadi (2009) argues that the law invariably advances strong
partisan politics within the local authorities, as the appointments tend to be
characterised by political scheming and ethnocentrism, while little premium is placed
on technical competence and integrity of the officers (see also Democracy Watch 2005,
118
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Approximately USD 1100.
Reflects the dictates of Article 296 of the 1992 Constitution.
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cited in Gyimah–Boadi 2009). Others argue that Act 462 encourages allegiance of
Presidential appointees to the central government and their political parties, rather than
to the local people (Tettey 2006; Ahwoi 2005, 2010; Antwi–Boasiako 2010).
Interestingly, DAs also do not have the power to recruit and retain their own employees,
relying on the Head of the Civil Service and the Ministry of Local Government and
Rural Development and Environment (MLGRDE) to provide staff (Tettey 2006). While
the Local Government Service Act 2003 (Act 656) sought to address this by vesting
control of employees of DAs in the local authorities, the process, as Ofei–Aboagye
(2009) notes, has been hampered by various factors, including resistance to change.
Furthermore, whereas Act 462 stipulates that 70% of the DA membership be elected by
popular votes, the President [under the same Act] has the Power of Revocation to
dissolve those s/he deems ‘non–performing’, without consulting the electorates. In fact,
Gyimah–Boadi (2009) observed in 2005 that President Kufour (2001-2008) used the
Power of Revocation to summarily dismiss some DA officials across the country.
Therefore, a President could abuse the Power of Revocation to sack local government
officials who may be at loggerheads with him (Tettey 2006; Ahwoi 2010). Considered
critically, Ghana’s local government sub–structures seem to be constitutionally
subjected to the whims and mercies of the President and the central government.
The central government’s manipulation of DAs is further complicated by the fact that
all bye–laws enacted by local authorities are subject to the approval of the Ministry of
Local Government and Rural Development (Ahwoi 2010). This provision, Tettey
(2006) argues, weakens the autonomy of local authorities, while allowing politicians to
interfere in local governance. There have been many instances in which certain
decongestion and demolition exercises of local authorities [in the interest of the
country] have been halted by the central government because of their political
incorrectness or implications for the outcomes parliamentary elections120 (Tettey 2006;
Antwi Boasiako 2010).
The ensuing discussions show that the existence of decentralisation laws does not offer
enough ground to categorise a country’s inter-government as high–functioning. In the
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http://audio.peacefmonline.com/newsaudio/201201/444.php?pageNum_rsComments=1&totalRows_rs
Comments=17, retrieved February 9, 2012 (The audio attachment is the voice of Mr Yaw Boateng–Gyan,
who works at the Presidency. On Peacefm, a local radio station, he warned Dr Vandepuye the Mayor of
Accra, to stop the demolitions of illegal structures (See also Tettey 2006, p. 16;
http://www.atokd.com/blog Content.aspx? blogID=275, http://www.wakeupghana.com
/2009/12/22/president-orders-suspension-of-ama-decongestion.htmlall retrieved February 10, 2012.
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case of Ghana, while the country’s Constitution and the Local Government 462 Act
provide for the autonomy of local authorities, the same statutes advance certain
centralising and contradictory tendencies as well as politically exploitable loopholes,
which compromise the independence of the local government sub–structures. This is
consistent with Ahwoi’s (2005) description of Ghana’s local government system as
‘recentralisation within decentralisation’ (see also Sumberg & Okali 2006; Antwi–
Boasiako 2010).
5.2.2 Fiscal Decentralisation
Fiscal decentralisation deals with how public expenditure is organised and financed
between different levels of government (Owusu 2009). According to Ahwoi (2010), the
indicators of a strong local government financial framework include: 1) Clear
assignment of responsibilities; 2) Authority to adjust revenues to needed expenditures;
3) Authority to generate sufficient local government’s own revenue sources and to
develop strong positive incentives to strengthen this; 4) Developing an appropriate mix
in expenditures and in revenues; 5) Efficient democratic and accountable budget
procedures; 6) Appropriate financial relationship between central and local government;
7) Appropriate level of redistribution; 8) Efficient and timely transfers from central to
local governments; and 9) Effective revenue collections. The underlying principle of
these indicators is the ability of local governments to generate and control its revenues
(Tettey 2006; Owusu 2009).
Ghana’s 1992 Constitution makes provision for financial directions for local
governments in Articles 245 and 252121. Despite these legislative provisions, in lieu of
the nine indicators above, fiscal decentralisation appears not to have been achieved in
Ghana, a fact widely acknowledged. For example, the Ghana Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper, which was drawn up to free the country from its indebtedness, identified
the lack of progress with fiscal decentralisation as a barrier to local development
(Government of Ghana 2004). Owusu (2009) also argues that fiscal decentralisation
lags far behind administrative and political decentralisations in Ghana, and that there is
a ‘vertical imbalance’ between the functions of local authorities and the financial
resources available to them. Ghana’s Minister of Finance and Economic Planning also
acknowledged this in his 2012 budget statement to the Parliament of the Republic
(Government of Ghana Budget Statement 2012, p. 6). The literature identifies three
121

The same are also catered for in Sections 43, Parts VII, VIII, IX and X of Local Government Act 462.
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factors as being responsible for the lack of fiscal decentralisation in Ghana: 1) Weak
revenue base of DAs; 2) Laws, which limit the financial independence of the local
government structures; and 3) Seeming unwillingness of the central government to
undertake true fiscal decentralisation (Tettey 2006; Gyimah–Boadi 2009; Owusu 2009;
Ahwoi 2010).
District Assemblies in Ghana seem to have a weak financial base. Available figures
indicate that 81% of their revenues come from the central government funding through
the District Assembly Common Funds (DACF)122. According to Ahwoi (2010),
although the law123, which established the DACF requires that the central government
transfers a minimum 5% of the total national revenue to the DACF; successive
governments base this percentage on the total national tax revenue instead. Commenting
on the DACF, a DCE is quoted by Owusu (2009, p. 36) as saying: “what comes is so
small that the Assembly can’t carry out any meaningful activity or undertake a physical
project ... for the whole year you just have only one or two projects”.
Ghanaian local government authorities appear not to determine how and where to utilise
their DACF. For example, Ahwoi (2010) reveals that in 2007, 41% of the DACF was
pre–determined by the central government, and that while local authorities had the
flexibility of determining the proportions of the use of the remaining 59%, they were
limited to specific sectors. Research by Inanga and Osei–Wusu (2004) also showed that
not all the ceded sums to local authorities get paid. These challenges have raised
concerns among some local scholars who argue that the dependence of local authorities
on central government funding limits them from taking independent, timely and
responsive initiatives that address on–the–ground needs of the localities, apart from
allowing for political machinations (Tettey 2006; Asante 2009; Ofei–Aboagye 2009;
Kyei–Baffour 2009; Ahwoi 2010; Antwi–Boasiako 2010). While local authorities are
legally allowed to levy and collect taxes, the reality is that they lack the capacity to do
so effectively (Gyimah–Boadi 2009; Ahwoi 2010). Owusu (2009) and Mahama and
Otten (2008) attribute the weak tax collection tendency at the local level to the
inadequate services in local government areas of jurisdiction, poverty and the reluctance
of local people to pay taxes because of a perception that local authorities do very little
to address their needs.
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In the three Northern Regions it is 95% (Gyimah–Boadi 2009).
District Assembly Common Fund Act 1993 (Act 455).
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Furthermore, fiscal decentralisation in Ghana seems to be hampered by the existence of
certain laws, which subject the financial transactions of local authorities to the approval
of the central government. The 2003 Financial Administration Act 654 is an example.
The law, which regulates the financial management of the public sector, makes the
Ministry of Finance the primary authority for the preparation, publication and control of
the national budget. Other controlling interests include the Financial Administration
Regulation, 2004; the Internal Audit Agency Act, 2003, Act, (Act 655); the Public
Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663); and Section 88 of the Local Government Act 462,
which caps the amount of loan a DA can contract to only GHC 2000. These statutes
appear to centralise financial administration, while denying local governments the
needed fiscal autonomy to operate effectively (Kyei–Baffour 2006; Gyimah–Boadi
2009; Ahwoi 2010). This is further confirmed by the unwillingness of the Ministry of
Finance and Economic Planning to implement composite budgeting to allow the
separation of DAs from central government budgets, although Section 10 (3) of the
Local Government Act 462 enjoins them to do so. The attitude seems to indicate a clear
reluctance on the part of Ghana’s central government to undertake true fiscal
decentralisation (Owusu 2009).
It is important to acknowledge though that Ghana has seen some progress in fiscal
decentralisation, including: 1) The merger of central and local government treasuries at
the District level into one District Finance Office; 2) Decentralisation of awarding and
payment for contracts up to limits set by the Minister of Finance; and 3) Establishment
of District Tender Boards (Ahwoi 2010). Even so, fiscal decentralisation is yet to be
achieved in Ghana as local authorities rely heavily on central government funding,
while ‘tied’ by several constitutional barriers and weak revenue mobilisation abilities.
Based on these revelations, it appears that Ghana does not measure–up to the second
indicator of a high–functioning decentralised system either.
5.2.3 Local Government Elections
The World Bank’s third indicator of a high–functioning local government system relates
to local elections. It is argued here that local government election is not a robust
indicator for measuring the level of decentralisation. The reason is that while local
government elections have been held in Ghana since 1978, the process appears not to be
taken seriously at the central government and local levels. As illustrated in Figure 5.2
below, Voter turnout to local government elections from 1994–2010 has averaged
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nearly 36%; significantly lower than the almost 70% patronage of presidential elections
for the1992–2008 periods (see Figure 5.3).
Figure 5.2 Percentage of National Average of Voter Turnouts in District
Assembly Elections 1978–2010

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana (2010).

Figure 5.3 Percentages of Voter Turnouts to Presidential Elections 1992–2008

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana (2010). 2000 & 2008 are averages of the first and second round
voting.
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Before the 2010 DA elections, which coincided with the fieldwork, there were concerns
about the level of preparation and readiness of the electoral commission for the polls;
some even called for its postponement. For instance, Aborampah–Mensah (2010, p. 1)
of the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD–Ghana) argued:
We appreciate the chain of avoidable and unavoidable circumstances leading to
the unfortunate delays in getting the nation adequately prepared for the 2010
edition of the District level elections. We do recognize the harm being done to
decentralised local government in Ghana with the District... [CDD–Ghana] is
also deeply disturbed by the implications of going into an election with so little
visible preparation...The entire local government election process appears to
have received very little attention from key election stakeholders such as the
media and the public at large….We recommend that the electoral commission
and stakeholders consider the possibility of postponing the polls.

Figure 5.4 Number of Unit Committees with Zero Nominations per Region in 2010

Source: Ghana Electoral Commission (2010).

The elections were not postponed and were so poorly organised that they were ridiculed
locally as being held in ‘tots’124 (batches). The report of a Special Parliamentary Select
Committee to investigate the poor organisation and the low turnout of the 2010 DA
polls indicated that public trust and respect for local government institutions, as a source
of information and service is low, while central government’s commitment to the entire
124

Local expression of ridicule.
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process is also weak (Parliament of the Republic of Ghana 2011). Many of the issues
raised by the report were not new, as others had expressed similar concerns (see CDD–
Ghana 2003; Crawford 2004; Commonwealth Local Government Forum cited in Tettey
2006, Asante 2009).
Ghana’s local government elections are also characterised by low involvement of
women, although they constitute 51.2% percent of the population (Ghana Statistical
Service 2012). Although women’s participation in parliamentary elections as candidates
is also significantly lower, it is better than their involvement in District Assembly and
Unit Committee elections. For example, in the 2010 DA elections, only 7.3 % and 6.8%
of women were elected as Assembly and Unit Committee Members respectively; nearly
two hundred Unit Committee positions were uncontested nationally (see Figure 5.4;
Electoral Commission 2010). While these figures show an improvement on the
representation of women in previous DA elections, together with the voter turns as
illustrated in Figure 5.2, it is evident that Ghanaians seem not to take the process
seriously. People’s indifference to the political exercise, some have argued, stems from
the lack of confidence in local governments to fulfil their needs (Tettey 2006; Asante
2009; Gyimah–Boadi 2009; Ahwoi 2010; Government of Ghana 2011).
5.2.4 Devolution of Service Delivery
Devolution is the third form of administrative decentralisation125. The notion of
devolution stems from the principle of subsidiarity, and aims at shortening the distance
between citizens and policymakers, while ensuring that critical services are available at
the local level (Tettey 2006; Ahwoi 2010). Accordingly, the Local Government Act 462
and others126 provide for the establishment of several Government Departments in
Metropolitan (sixteen), Municipal (thirteen) and District (eleven) Assemblies. Despite
these provisions, which make administrative decentralisation obligatory for key social
sector ministries, Gyimah–Boadi (2009) argues that many of them are reluctant to
decentralise and devolve authority. Consequently, Ahwoi (2010) notes that five critical
services and departments (Health, Fire, Forestry and Game and Wildlife, and
Education) are not decentralised in Ghana. Two factors explain this.
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The other two include: Deconcentration and Delegation.
The Civil Service Law, 1993, PNDCL 327; Local Government Service Act, 2003, Act 656; and
National Development Planning Act, 1994, Act 480.
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First, as discussed above, the Local Government Acts 462 and 656, appear to promote
centralisation. As a result, most Government Departments in the local authorities tend to
operate as de–concentrated offices of their parent Ministries in Accra, the capital
(Sumberg & Okali 2006; Ahwoi 2010). Crawford (2004, p. 33) puts it succinctly: “there
is little to suggest that District Assemblies have [any] authority ... [as they] merely act
as agencies for the central government with little or no discretionary powers”.
Administrative decentralisation in Ghana is also challenged by the lack of infrastructure
and human resources. Owing to the paucity of infrastructure in some parts of the
country, many public servants and national service personnel127 continue to refuse
postings to the northern and other ‘infrastructurally–deprived’ regions of the country, as
they consider it as a punishment (Gyimah–Boadi 2009). As the Ghana Medical
Association revealed, for three years running [2007-2009] no medical doctor accepted
posting to the Upper East Region128 (Ghana Medical Association 2009129).
The stalled nature of administrative decentralisation in Ghana has been described by
Asante (2009) and Gyimah–Boadi (2009) as contributing to the stagnation in rural
development, continued rural–urban drift, the worsening of the north–south divide, and
congestion in Accra. As of March 2011, when the researcher departed from Ghana,
having collected the data, people were still queuing at the offices of the former Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in Accra to have their passports issued; the regional passport offices
were not functioning. As Ahwoi (2010, p. 145), Ghana’s longest–serving Minister of
Local Government since 1951, observed: “there has been no administrative
decentralisation [devolution] in the real sense of the term”.
5.3 Summary
Based on the facts presented above, one wonders if Ghana’s local government system is
highly functional as claimed by the World Bank. While the country’s constitution and
various Local Government Acts make provision for a decentralised local government
system, the same statutes appear to promote centralisation, which hinders the autonomy
of the local authorities, and effective fiscal and administrative decentralisation. As the
figures from the electoral commission also suggested, Ghanaians appear not to take
127

Ghanaian students who graduate from accredited tertiary institutions are required under law to do a one
year national service to the country.
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The doctor–patient ratio in the three Northern Regions in 2009 was 1:57, 333. The national average in
2009 was 1: 13,000.
129
See also http://www.modernghana.com/news/223247/1/doctors-refuse-posting-to-upper-eastregion.htmlm retrieved June 15, 2012.
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local government elections as an important political exercise compared with their
patronage of presidential elections. Despite the facts presented above, the World Bank
and many development agencies have long presented Ghana’s inter-government system
as high functioning, a projection that has influenced the choice of the country as one of
the preferred destinations for donor support and foreign aid in Sub-Saharan Africa.
However, the grounded-realities of Ghana, as the above discussion revealed, appear to
contradict the picture ‘development experts’ tend to paint of the country.
It is also important to point out that some of the World Bank’s indicators for measuring
developing countries’ inter–government systems seems imprecise. Considered carefully,
they appear to concentrate on the mere existence of the benchmarks rather than the
ground realities. For example, it is not enough to cite local government elections as a
yardstick for measuring the level of a country’s decentralisation system without stating
the percentage of patronage indicative of its success or otherwise. Additionally, as
Ghana’s example has shown, the fact that a country’s constitution and legal framework
makes provision for decentralised local governance does not make it high functioning.
The indicators should move beyond constitutional provisions, be precise and include a
specific focus on issues affecting the functioning of local government institutions. The
next section, which draws on the empirical data, provides a more realistic analysis of
some of the issues impacting on the operations of Ghana’s local government
substructures, specifically, the functions of Assembly Members.
5.4 The Plight of Assembly Members in Ghana
Assembly Members are key facilitators of developments at the local level in Ghana.
They are elected for four–year re–electable twice terms (twelve years in all), and are not
to be identified with any political party. They do not receive salaries, but receive
transport allowances when they attend the Municipal/District Assembly (MDA)
meetings (ILGS & MLGDE 2006). While the current government has promised to pay
all Assembly Members, this payment has not yet materialised (NDC 2008 Manifesto, p.
86). Because of the dearth of empirical research on the functions of Assembly Members
in Ghana, many challenges and issues they face appear to be unknown. As this research
reveals, the challenges include, but are not limited to: 1) Managing their personal lives
and people’s expectations in an unpaid job; 2) Relating to their DCE; 3) Working with
weak Unit Committees; and 4) Relating to Traditional Chiefs. These challenges, which
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corroborate the lapses inherent in Ghana’s local government system, are discussed in
turn.
5.4.1 Managing Personal Life and People’s Expectations in an Unpaid Job
The personal lifestyles of Assembly Members as well as their electorates’ expectations
are a source of interesting insights for discussions. A total of nine male Assembly
Members were interviewed for this research; the oldest was over sixty and the youngest
was in his ‘mid–thirties’. They all listed their main occupation as either civil servant or
self–employed being a part-time Assembly Member. Eight of the Assembly Members
had at least completed basic education and could read, write and speak English with
varied fluency130. Almost all the Assembly Members interviewed were married with
children; some with two or more wives. While most of them lived in the localities they
served, two lived and worked elsewhere and visited their Electoral Areas occasionally.
Asked how they combined their city jobs with their roles as Assembly Members, the
general responds was that, while it was difficult, they could not step down because their
families would be disappointed; being in the position was considered prestigious and an
honour for the family. Two of the Assembly Members had served only once and were
seeking re–election, while the others were stepping down voluntarily – for reasons
discussed subsequently.
Various reasons, which are categorised into political ambitions, volunteerism and
family/friends’ pressures, influenced many Assembly Members to take up the role.
Those with political ambitions explained that the role was a first step into public
service. Although the underlying principle was to serve the people, they considered it a
foundation upon which they would build their political careers. The analysis revealed
that sixty percent of the Assembly Members interviewed considered the position as a
stepping-stone into a political career. As Kofi Dogbe, a 35-year-old Assembly Member
from the Volta Region put it, “It’s hard to rise into the political limelight overnight. You
need a reference and starting point.” Interestingly, while some of these prospective
politicians claimed to have no political affiliations, others indicated their leanings.
Nearly twenty percent of the Assembly Members had also taken up the role voluntarily
as an act of service to the local people. Such Assembly Members claimed having no
political affiliations or ambitions, and that they were in the role to serve their people.
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Others could only manage ‘broken’ English or could not express themselves in English at all.
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The final category of Assembly Members interviewed consisted of those whose friends
or family members asked or influenced them to take up the job. One of them stated that:
When your people recognise that you can represent them in the District
Assembly, it’s an honour. If you say no, it will create displeasure and
disappointment and may even be interpreted to mean disrespecting them. You
need to honour the recognition given to you … after all, some of them
contributed to your education.
The Assembly Members interviewed were averagely in charge of twenty or more
localities, some several kilometres away and accessible only by footpaths and bicycles.
Interestingly, Section 16 of the Local Government Act, 1993, Act 462 (see ILGS &
MLGRD 2006) expects an Assembly Member to:
a) Maintain close contact with his Electoral Area, consult his/her people on
issues to be discussed in the District Assembly and collate their views,
opinions and proposals;
b) Present the views, opinions and proposals to the District Assembly;
c) Attend meetings of the District Assembly and meetings of the subcommittees of which he is a member;
d) Meet his/her electorates before each meeting of the Assembly;
e) Report to his electorate the general decisions of the Assembly and its
Executive Committee and the actions s/he has taken to solve the problems
raised by residents in his Electoral Area;
f) Draw attention in general debate to national policies which are relevant to
the subject under discussion;
g) Actively participate in the work of the sub–committees of the Executive
Committee [of the District Assembly];
h) Bring to bear on any discussion in the Assembly the benefit of his skill,
profession, experience or specialised knowledge;
i) Maintain frequent liaison with productive economic groupings and other
persons in the District; and
j) Take part in communal and development activities in the district.
Confronted with such a realistically impossible task in an unpaid job, most of the
Assembly Members seemed frustrated. Asked how they managed the situation, five
explained that they visited each of the localities under their jurisdiction once in a month,
while four did so only when an emergency ensued. Assembly Members who lived
outside their localities explained that their Unit Committee Members visited in their
stead and attended to urgent issues in their absence. Almost all the Assembly Members
interviewed were not just worried about being unpaid, but the fact that their electorates
expected so much from them.
The expectation of many local people from their Assembly Members seemed utopian.
Some expected them to pay school fees, provide business capital, and initiate income–
generating or employment–oriented projects. Thus, while almost 80% percentage of
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questionnaire respondents admitted knowing their Assembly Members, they always
remarked, “I know him … but he does nothing for me”. The high expectations from
Assembly Members may be attributable to the general high poverty levels across the
country; the lack of public education on local government functions; and particularly,
the many election campaign promises of the Assembly Members.
Because the position of an Assembly Member is electable, candidates are expected to
visit their Electoral Areas individually to canvass for votes. During these campaigning
times, many of them tend to raise the hopes of the people by promising things they
cannot deliver. During the fieldwork, which coincided with the Ghana’s 2010 local
government elections, the researcher encountered many potential Assembly Members
who were promising to construct bridges, roads and schools. Tellingly, many Assembly
Members disposed redeemable tokens, and doing favours or handing out gifts in
electorates to win the constituents’ votes. Some revealed that they spent almost 5000
GHC131 on their campaigns. One was asked why such a huge amount of money was
spent to get into an unpaid job. He replied:
This is Ghana. Money is powerful. You can have a great vision or a manifesto;
if it is not backed with ‘action’ [cash, gifts] people will not have confidence in
you. For me it’s not a big deal because I’m preparing myself for a bigger
political future and there I will recoup all my investment.
Another explained:
It is very difficult to win elections in this place empty–handed. It is a survival of
the rich or the one who can pay more. Here, votes are for sale … even if you
don’t want to do it, you will be compelled to do the same, as your opponents
will be doing it.
The fact that Assembly Members are not paid, but expected to do so much, tend to lead
to their misappropriation of funds earmarked for local development, one instance being
the Community–Based Rural Development Projects (CBRDP). Because of the
‘investment’ some Assembly Members made to their work, they appeared to see the
CBRDP as an opportunity to recoup dividends. As a result, in some localities, the Area
Council Chairmen and project officials disclosed that some Assembly Members
awarded the procurement of the project’s materials to themselves and/or inflated the
prices.

131

Almost USD 4000.
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5.4.2 Relating to ‘Partisan’ Municipal/District Chief Executives
As explained in Chapter One, the Community-Based Rural Development Project
(CBRDP) was designed to strengthen the country’s local government sub–structures
ultimately, the Area Councils132. Although the Area Councils were expected to be the
implementers of CBRDP, they relied heavily on the MDAs, because they lacked the
technical capacities required. As DCEs are the most powerful figures at the MDA level,
they supervised the selection of the beneficiary Area Councils. DCEs also oversaw the
MDAs facilitation of the projects, particularly the technical aspects: planning,
engineering, and accounting, among others. It is therefore important to explain briefly
how the politicisation of the operations of MDAs in Ghana impacted on the CBRDPs;
this will clarify the context for understanding how the ‘power’ of DCEs impact on
Assembly Members.
As DCEs determined which Area Council would benefit from the CBRDP, the
researcher found that some of the projects were politicised and given to unqualified
localities133. In Ghana, DCEs are eligible to contest parliamentary elections. As a result,
some of them used the CBRDPs as the political machines to launch their campaigns or
win favours for votes. Whitfield (2008) attests to this practice, observing that some
Ghanaian politicians streamline aid–funded projects so as to get themselves elected or
for fulfilling their election promises in locations where there is no need. Therefore,
while the CBRDP required that the projects be implemented in Area Councils having
functioning offices, the researcher found that some had no offices, although they had
been given projects. Many sources reported that, whereas the projects were supposed to
be managed by the Area Councils under the facilitation of professionals at the
respective Municipal/District Assemblies’ engineers, planning officers and accountants,
DCEs who were aspiring to be elected as parliamentarians, aberrantly became the
managers of the projects as a ploy to win political favour from the electorates. An
Assembly Member whose locality benefitted from the project observed:
Although I was the Presiding Member and was supposed to be in charge of the
project, the DCE sidelined me and took charge, working with his party cronies.
He did this because he labelled me as a member of the opposition party and was
also contesting one of the parliamentary seats in the district … I’m happy he
lost.
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This consists of Assembly Members, Unit Committee Member and Government Appointees.
The CBRDP secretariat relied on the DAs to choose deserving Area Councils to pilot the projects.
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An Area Council Chairman from the Eastern Region also related:
The only project our Area Council got under my chairmanship was the public
toilet facility the CBRDP brought. But the DCE had a political agenda … but I
was powerless and could not challenge him. According to the CBRDP officials,
we were supposed to build a sixteen–seater toilet facility, but the DCE divided
the project sum of GHC15, 000 and took part to another locality without
consulting us.
Because DCEs wield so much power in determining which locality does or does not get
projects, Assembly Members are forced to be obsequious at all cost, including lobbying
them. According to the Collins Concise Dictionary (2001), lobbying is defined as “an
attempt to influence [mainly politicians] on behalf of a particular interest”. Therefore
lobbying involves putting forward arguments in support of a notion; however,
‘lobbying’ DCEs as used by Assembly Members presents interesting points for
discussion. While each Assembly Member admitted that lobbying was a necessary skill
required for success, they all had different ways of getting into the hearts of their
respective DCEs or other influential officials at the DAs. This ranged from using gifts
to providing party political contacts. In a discussion with the researcher, an Assembly
Member revealed his manner of lobbying:
Assembly Member: Lobbying depends on so many factors. For example if I
need something like a local school … I will contact the one in–charge of
education at the District Assembly. Sometimes, I will bring them here to see
things for themselves … But you don’t bring down ‘big men’ just like that. You
need to give them something or foodstuff … so that s/he can push your agenda.
Researcher: Why do you have to do this? The person is doing his job. Is this not
bribery?
Assembly Member: My brother, this is Ghana…wheels must always be put
under files so they move faster.
An Assembly Member from the Eastern Region presented another angle to the lobbying
discourse. He pontificated:
Assembly Member: When I was at … Electoral Area I was able to lobby for the
District Assembly to build a public toilet at the Zongo community. Also the road
between … was a big problem for the people so I was able to lobby to get the
road constructed before my term of office ended. Through my lobbying abilities,
I was able to provide streetlight for the people of ... and also extend electricity
to…
After commending him for his achievements, the researcher enquired of his lobbying
skills that enabled him to attain all these projects for his Electoral Area. He said:
As an Assembly Member you need to play your cards well to win projects to
meet the needs of your community. Although the [District] Assemblies are
supposed to be non–partisan, they are in disguise…. In the last eight years my
government has been in office and that has helped me because the DCE knows
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that we belong to ‘one family’ [political party]. Because the DCE is my man he
helps me to win projects for my communities as I have listed. Although some
Assembly Members would claim that they do not belong to any political party,
we know each other’s political leanings. Political climates change so I try to
convince the DCE to help some of my opposition Assembly Members friends
with projects also so that when their government comes into office they can also
help me if I’m still in office.
The researcher asked him how he manages to convince the DCE, as there are obviously
other Assembly Members who may belong to the same political party. He answered
with an Akan proverb interpreted as: “if you don’t help others to achieve their dreams
you cannot see your dream come true”. The DCE in question was in a contest to be a
parliamentarian in a constituency that included the Electoral Area of the Assembly
Member. Thus there was a certain understanding of reciprocity between the two men.
This implied that the DCE sent projects (including the CBRDP) to that Electoral Area
so that the Assembly Member could cite them as evidence of the DCEs generosity and
therefore competence as a prospective parliamentarian.
However, not all Assembly Members had good relations with the DCEs. This meant
such Assembly Members were denied such development projects as CBRDP. The
causes of the strained relations ranged from political rivalry to personality clashes. The
situation could be so bad that DCEs curse Assembly Members, evidenced in the
November 13, 2011 headline of the Ghanaian Chronicle newspaper: “Antoa Nyamaa’134
Will Kill You … District Chief Executive Invokes Local Deity on Assembly
Members”. The researcher also encountered some Assembly Members whose perceived
affinity with the opposition party meant that their Electoral Areas received no projects
during the eight years rule of the opposition New Patriotic Party. One of them shared
his experiences in the Volta Region:
I have really suffered under the New Patriotic Party. The DCE perceived me to
be a member of the opposition [National Democratic Congress]. For eight years
I only had one project for my Electoral Area. We got that project because it was
so crucial that he could not overlook it. During the implementation of the project
he relied on his party faithful and neglected me. Because of this hurdle I have
lost favour with my electorate and doubt if they would vote for me again if I
contested.
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A dreaded local deity
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5.4.3 Working with weak Unit Committees
Unit Committees form the base of Ghana’s local government structure. A Unit consists
of settlements with a population of between five hundred and one thousand of ten
elected persons in the Unit and not more than five other persons resident in the Unit to
be nominated by the District Chief Executive. Following criticisms of there being too
many Unit Committees in the country135, the membership of fifteen (15) considered too
large, and the general disinterest in them, the membership has been reduced to five (5)
elected persons who hold office for four years (L.I. 1967, section 24(1) 2010; Ahwoi,
2010).
Unit Committees represent their respective Electoral Areas in the Town/Area Council
(see Figure 1). They are also expected to work closely with the Assembly Members so
as to be in touch with the people; play important roles in public education; organising
communal labour; raising revenue; ensuring environmental cleanliness; registering
births and deaths; enforcing settlement planning; laying out and supervising District
Assembly bye–laws; implementing taxation; and monitoring of self–help or
community–based projects (Local Government Act, 1993, Act 462, Section 24 (1).
Consequently, if the Unit Committee of an Electoral Area is weak, the work of the
respective Assembly Member would be very daunting.
Nationally, there seems to be a strong case in favour of the abolition of Unit
Committees, as they appear to be dysfunctional, in spite of their election processes
being expensive (Ahwoi 2010). In all nine localities researched, almost 85% of
respondents to the questionnaires indicated they did not know who their Unit
Committee Members were and their functions. Explaining why the Unit Committees are
weak, Ahwoi (2010) argues there being a perception among Ghanaians that, considering
the numbers involved, the cost of Unit Committee elections are not worth the doubtful
benefits derived from them. He argues further in favour of the suggestion that the
country should save on costs by revisiting the original plan of holding Unit Committee
elections by show of hands, as established under the Electoral Commission’s Public
Elections Regulations, 1995 Constitutional Instrument 10, paragraph 6 (1)136. Another
explanation for their ineffectiveness is that Unit Committees are not allowed to perform
their decentralised functions. For instance, while there have been five Unit Committee
135

16,000
Ahwoi (2010) explains that because the Constitutional Instrument 10 contradicted Article 49 (1) of the
1992 Constitution, which requires all public elections to be by secret ballot, it was never implemented.
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elections have been conducted so far during the era of the Fourth Republic (1992, 1996,
2000, 2004 and 2008). Kyei–Baffour (2009) and Ahwoi (2010) argue these Committees
have never performed any visible functions. While legitimate, the weaknesses of the
Unit Committees go beyond the explanations already given. As the data below will
show, they are weak because: 1) Partisan politics interfere with their roles; 2) Their
members are not paid a salary; and 3) Some members do not understand their role.
Ten Unit Committee Members were interviewed, consisting of seven males and three
females. Interestingly, nine of them expressed frustration about the interference of party
politics in their work. Unit Committees, form an integral part of Area Councils, which
also consists of Assembly Members, ordinary residents appointed by the District
Assemblies and the Government Appointees. Interestingly, in some of the CBRDP
beneficiary localities researched, Government Appointees were found to be either
constituency members or local executives of the then ruling political party, the New
Political Party (NPP). Referred to as ‘foot–soldiers’137 in the media, the Government
Appointees and other political party faithful tended to hijack the CBRDP: literally
demanding the sole right to supply project materials, thus compromising the tendering
process and in some cases inflating the prices of the project materials. As one Unit
Committee Member from the Eastern Region put it:
We were elected for nothing. Government Appointees, many of who are staunch
members of the NPP government, control virtually everything in the Area
Council. It looks like we are only ceremonial officials. It is very frustrating
when the Constitution, which spells out our roles, is set aside for partisan
politics machinations.
Additionally, the analysis indicated that the frustrated Unit Committee Members
seemed disappointed with the fact that they received no salary, although the role was
very demanding. The general mood of these Unit Committee Members was that because
they were in public life, people perceived making a lot of money from implementing
projects. This perception, they contended, brought pressure on them as people flooded
them with requests for financial assistance. These requests were complicated by the
condition that if they did not meet these needs they would not receive constituents’
votes at the next elections. These Unit Committee Members, who were either petty
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All political parties in Ghana have ‘foot soldiers’. ‘Foot–soldiers’ supposedly are the men and women
who work hard for their political party at the grassroots level to win elections. There are always stories in
the local media on the threats disgruntled ‘foot–soldiers’ issue to their National Party Executive if their
demands are met. They are able to seize government properties or even demand the dismissal of Ministers
of State and Members of Parliament (see http://elections.peacefmonline.com/politics;
http://www.modernghana.com/news retrieved November 25, 2011.
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traders or unemployed, had hoped that the role would come with respect and some
financial benefits. When they realised that the role did not meet their expectations and
would even be a drain their limited resources, they became disillusioned and retreated
from the position.
The data revealed that the frustrated Unit Committee Members did not know what the
role entailed, although they had received the constituents’ votes. They had contested the
position because their friends and families had asked them to do so or that there was not
much competition. When asked what their roles entailed, some of these Unit Committee
Members managed to state that their essential responsibility was to assist the Assembly
Member. Apparently, ignorant of their roles when elected, and realising how demanding
were the tasks, many would not resign, but give excuses for non-performance. Almost
90% of Assembly Members interviewed explained that their Unit Committee Members
were inactive, thus giving no support in organising local initiatives. Interestingly,
because Local Government Act 462 does not bind Unit Committee Members with any
oath to remain active, it is easy for them to relinquish their roles without fear of any
consequence.
The only Unit Committee Members who appeared to be enjoying the role was a 40-year
old lady from the Volta Region. “Action Woman”, as popular called in the locality, the
lady considered herself as the future Assembly Member of her Electoral Area. Thus,
while supporting her Assembly Member who did not reside in the locality, the lady
regarded the role as a marketing strategy for her political ambition. Asked if she was not
bothered about the sacrificial nature of the job, “Action Woman” remarked that “no
sweat no gain…those who take up this role must be aware of the consequences.”
During the fieldwork, I observed that because “Action Woman” and her colleague Unit
Committees Members were comparatively active, efforts were being made to maintain
the Community–Based Rural Development Projects (CBRDP); however, not without
challenges. The Assembly Member of the Electoral Area remarked: “Because I’m do
not reside here … most of the time my Unit Committee Members do the job in my
absence and send me verbal reports and feedback.” Apart from this Assembly Member,
the others described their Unit Committees Members variously being as being ‘dormant,
useless, lazy, unhelpful and betrayers’.
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5.4.4 Relating to Traditional Chiefs
Ghana’s local government system is such that Assembly Members would not succeed if
they are not in league with the Traditional Chiefs of the Electoral Areas they serve. The
influence of Ghanaian Traditional Chiefs and how it impacted on the outcomes of the
CBRDP are extensively discussed in Chapter Seven. Analysis of the two case studies
presented in the chapter shows that, because Ghanaian Traditional Chiefs are
constitutionally recognised as the custodians of all lands in the country, they tend to
demand right of control over development projects that fall within their traditional
areas. Many of the Traditional Chiefs interviewed asserted, “The Assembly Member
does not own the gong–gong of this village … I do!” This meant that so long as the
Assembly Member did not submit to the Chiefs’ whims, they could not organise
anything successfully in the locality.
Relative to the CBRDP, some Traditional Chiefs in the localities researched felt
sidelined and clashed with Assembly Members, resulting in protracted legal battles and
abandonment of the projects. This happened because those who designed the CBRDP
failed to inform the chiefs clearly about the project’s intention to strengthen the local
government structures - Assembly Members and Area Councils. Frustrated by having to
act in accordance with the bidding of Traditional Chiefs, some Assembly Members
indicated that they were voluntarily stepping down and would not encourage others to
take challenge for the position.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter set out to refute the World Bank’s classification of Ghana’s local
government system as being highly functional. Ghana’s local government system was
examined within the framework of the World Bank’s four indicators of a high–
functioning decentralised system. Based on the evidence provided it appears that
Ghana’s inter–governmental system does not seem to qualify for the ‘highly functional’
label. Although the Constitution and other local government statues provide for a
decentralised system, the principle of subsidiarity appears to be compromised by the
existence of centralising tendencies in the same statutes. These constitutional
contradictions weaken the autonomy of local authorities, while posing challenges to the
realisation of true fiscal and administrative decentralisation in the country. The chapter
also criticised some of the World Bank’s indicators for measuring the inter-government
systems of developing countries as being imprecise and lacking robustness. It emerged
that the indicators appear to focus on mere existence of the benchmarks and not the
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ground realities of the respective countries. In the case of Ghana, as the last section of
the chapter showed, such ground realities would, for example, relate to issues that are
impacting on the functions of Assembly Members: the non-payment of salaries, the
politicisation of the system, conflicts with Traditional Chiefs and dysfunctional Unit
Committees.
Because the World Bank considered Ghana’s local government system as being high–
functioning, during the implementation of the CBRDP, the Matching Strategy seem to
have been applied, meaning that no adjustment was necessary to the country’s
established decentralisation setup. However, as the above discussions have shown, the
country’s local government system does not reflect the ‘high-functioning’ label and
should have been modified to accommodate the CBRDP. This seemed to have been
ignored, leading to the implementation of a ‘community-driven’ program in localities
where ‘communities’ technically did not exist, a finding the next chapter discusses. This
chapter has shown that while Ghana may be benefitting from massive aid money due to
its ‘misrepresentation’ as a ‘development celebrity’ and having a highly functional
decentralisation system, the long-term sustainability of development programs are at
risk of failing, as the country’s grounded realities do not always reflect the ‘experts’’
views.
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CHAPTER SIX
COMMUNITY: CONTESTED CONCEPTS AND
MISINTERPRETATIONS
Community is more than simply a group established for administrative
convenience (for example an electorate, a school class or a work place group),
but [an entity] to which people belong as members and where this sense of
belonging is significant and positively regarded.
Tesoriero (2010, p. 96)

The preceding chapter challenged a view held by the World Bank that Community–
Driven Development programs have a greater chance of succeeding if the implementing
country’s inter–governmental (or decentralisation) system is ‘highly functional’.
Despite the stagnated picture painted of Ghana’s decentralisation system in the last
chapter, because the World Bank classified it as ‘high–functioning’, the designers of the
Community–Based Rural Development (CBRDP) fashioned and implemented the
projects on the country’s local government structures. Thus, although labelled
‘community–based’, the implementers did not build or consider the ‘communities’
within which to base the projects, expecting these projects to be endorsed, implemented
and maintained by the said ‘communities’. The poor state of most of the projects
studied (see Chapter One) and as argued below, suggests that ‘communities’ barely
existed in many of the CBRDP beneficiary localities.
‘Community’ is a contested concept and often misused; this chapter portrays what
becomes of programs that apply it inappropriately. The first part of the chapter will
briefly explore the literature to show the conceptual controversies around the term. An
analytical framework for examining what ‘community’ is and what it is not will be
established in the second part of the chapter. The last section of the chapter discusses
three empirical case studies from the CBRDP beneficiary localities. An analysis of the
dynamics of each of the localities in relation to the CBRDP will indicate that
‘community’ is such a complex term requiring all its key features to be fully operational
(see Table 6.1). The case studies also show that ‘community’ must be contextually
conceptualised as its inappropriate application can lead to dire project outcomes.
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6.1 Community: Conceptual Controversies
Community tends to generate a great deal of discussion and debate. As discussed in
Chapter Three, some scholars argue that it is a political term, and that its recent
romanticisation is a return to ‘local organising’ after it was jettisoned for Neoliberalism
in the 1980s. In the wake of the obvious failures of the neoliberal market economy to
deliver what it promised (trickle down growth), community organising
(‘Communitisation’), they argue further, has been revived and repackaged as the ‘Third
Way’ to reduce public spending by complementing government efforts in meeting
citizens’ needs (Amin 2005; Marion 2007; Defillippis & Saegert 2008; Defillippis et al.
2010; Pandey 2010). The other issue that makes community a complex term relates to
its definition (what it is and what it is not).
Etymologically, ‘community’ comes from the Latin ‘cum’, which means ‘together or
among each other’ and ‘munus’, which means ‘the gift’138. From its roots therefore, the
term connotes the sharing of ‘something’ usually among small [human] groups, what
Ferdinand Tönnies referred to as ‘gemeinschaft’ (Tesoriero 2010). Even so, the
Internet, new technologies and urbanisation have given the term a ‘new seductive
appeal’ (Delanty 2003, p. 2) by stretching its connotation beyond group sizes,
territoriality and even as a form of manageable human organisation. Consequently,
many people now live in small localities they do not consider as their ‘community’, but
claim ‘communitiship’ with such larger entities encompassed as a university or country
or their workplace, some of which have no geographical boundaries. It is also not
uncommon to read about a ‘community’ of animals or even plant species (Hall &
Cooper 1970; Gotelli 1996). Thus, the concerns of scholars such as Marx, Weber,
Spencer and Compte that modernity has eroded the importance of ‘community’ (Piot
1999) must be seen in the spatial sense, as new forms of ‘communities’ have emerged
recently, many of which transcend space, time and geography (Appadurai 1995; Bartle
2007; Tesoriero 2010, Kenny 2010).
Owing to the complexity of the concept of ‘community’, some scholars argue that the
term can be inappropriately applied, giving rise to three situations (see Appadurai 1995;
Guilt & Shah 1998; Botchway 2001; Cleaver 2001; Moncrieff & Eyben 2007; Tesoriero
2010). The first is the labelling of localities and groups as ‘communities’, where in
reality ‘community’ does not exist, or exists but not in the traditional and romantic
138

See http://www.seek2know.net/word.html, retrieved 23 March, 2012.
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sense. In most cases, the ground settlement and mobility patterns of people in localities
labelled as ‘communities’ may not support interaction to the levels required for a
coherent ‘community’ to exist. Because interaction and membership is a choice,
‘community’ cannot be forced on people, even if they share spaces or interests (Khwaja
2001; Platteau 2004; Alesina & Ferrara 2005; Cornish 2006). Tellingly, some scholars
have observed that the labelling of ‘community’ is sometimes a deliberate policy action
to direct attention away from the internal politics and from questions of the nature of
actual social relations in a locality (Fergusson 1995; Scrimgeour 1997; Botchway 2001;
Cleaver 2001; Moncrieff & Eyben 2007; Tesoriero 2010).
Second, there is also the tendency, as Mansuri and Rao (2004, p. 11) observed, to
conceptualise the term to denote “a culturally and politically homogeneous social
system, or one which is, at least implicitly, an internally cohesive and more or less
harmonious entity”. Referred to as ‘spatialisation’ by Amin (2005), the homogenisation
inclination presents two challenges. On the one hand, it assumes that everyone within a
geographic entity (village, town) shares similar values and interests with those therein,
thereby burying internal differences (Scrimgeour 1997; Shah 1998; Botchway 2001;
Platteau 2004). On the other, it fails to acknowledge the reality that ‘communities’ can
and do exist within a ‘community’ (Etzioni 1996; Bartle 2007; Minar & Greer 2007).
Thus, Mosimane & Aribeb (2005) caution community ideologues and practitioners to
be aware of the difference between community of ‘place’, which denotes people living
together in a spatially bounded locality; and community of ‘use’, which refers to a
scenario where people share a certain resource or identity. As this chapter argues, the
‘technocrats’ who designed and implemented Ghana’s CBRDP tended to rely on the
homogenisation and spatialisation of the localities in which they worked, failing to
acknowledge their complexities (see Table 6.1).
Third, it is possible for identifiable groups or ‘communities’ to be misrepresented on
matters that may concern them. The literature enumerates a number of instances where
a few influential people, due to their wealth, political contacts or educational
backgrounds [termed the elite], have dominated and ‘forcefully’ represented the rest.
The opposite is also possible, where the voice or representation of a minority group can
be relegated (Mehmet 1978; Scrimgeour 1997; Zakus & Lysack 1998; Cleaver 2001;
Cornish 2006; Labonne & Chase 2007; Platteau 2004; 2009).
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In lieu of the complexity of the term, some scholars concede that an attempt to
universalise a particular definition of community is impossible. For example, Bell and
Newby (1971) found ninety-eight different definitions that hardly shared any
commonalities. Drawing on Plant’s (1974) ideas therefore, Tesoriero (2010) argues that
community should not be considered a description of something that exists, as it is
almost impossible arriving at one definition (see Table 6.1). This argument resonates
with Bartle’s (2007139) assertion that community is a
Sociological construct and model...we cannot see a whole community, we
cannot touch it, and we cannot directly experience it. It is a set of interactions,
human behaviours that have meaning and expectations between its members.
Not just action, but actions based on shared expectations, values, beliefs and
meanings between individuals...it may not even have physical location, but be
demarcated by being a group of people with a common interest.
Community is also regarded as both evaluative and normative. By evaluative, it is
considered as value–driven and its meaning is contested and open to diverse meanings,
depending on the ideological leanings of the person using it (Amin 2005; Defillippis et
al. 2010; Tesoriero 2010). Normative community implies that there exist norms and
rules, which could be developed and used positively to organise people to achieve a
‘good cause’ or negatively to persecute and exclude ‘the outsider’ (Mosimane & Aribeb
2005). This assertion is supported by Fisher and Shragge (2007, p. 193), who argues
that “community has become the dominant form of resistance and social change ...
around the world.”
Notwithstanding the difficulty of defining what community is and what it is not,
theoreticians seem to agree on three issues. First, that the term should be appreciated for
its complexity and that it may be futile attempting to find a universal definition
(Tesoriero 2010; Kenny 2010). As a result many scholars circumvent defining the
concept by describing its core features instead. For example, as Table 6.1 shows below,
Goode (1957) outlined eight characteristics; McMillan and Chavis (1986) also
presented four elements; Bartle (2007) discusses four features; while Tesoriero (2010)
outlines five. Second, that the meaning of ‘community’ should go beyond
‘spatialisation’ to include ‘functionalisation’. Community as a function relates to people
having a sense of belonging, solidarity and identity (McMillan & Chavis 1986;
Appadurai 1995; Delanty 2003; Tesoriero 2010). It is also about common interest or
understanding between people; a form of social organisation where members share
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spaces, including the virtual, interactions and a resource (Puddiffot 1996; Mosimane &
Aribeb 2005; Tesoriero 2010). Third, that whoever (scholars and policymakers) applies
the term must clarify the meaning they ascribe to it (Botchway 2001; Bartle 2007;
Tesoriero 2010; Kenny 2010).
Table 6.1 Characteristics of a ‘Community’
Goode’s 8 characteristics of a community

McMillan and Chavis’ 4 characteristics of a
community

A social organisation:
1.Whose members are bound by a sense of
identity
2. Where few leave, so that it is a terminal or
continuing status for the most part
3. Whose members share values in common
4.Whose role definitions vis–a–vis both
members and non–members are agreed upon
and are the same for all members
5.Who have a common language, which is
understood only partially by outsiders
6.That has power over its members
7.Whose limits are reasonably clear, though
they are not physical and geo–graphical, but
social
8. Whose members encourage others to join
them (social reproduction) for generational
continuity. 	
  

a. Membership (the feeling of belonging)
b. Influence (a sense of mattering)
c. Integration and fulfilment of needs members
d. Shared emotional connections
Bartle’s 4 characteristics of a community
i. Boundaries of communities are fuzzy
ii. Communities can be within communities
iii. Communities may move (not static)
iv. Urban communities are special
Tesoriero’s 5 characteristics of a community
I. Human Scale
II. Identity and Belonging
III. Obligation
IV. Gemeinshaft
V. Culture

Sources: Goode (1957); McMillan & Chavis (1986); Bartle (2007); Tesoriero (2010).

As community was a key component of Ghana’s CBRDP, many of the project’s
documents were systematically reviewed to establish how the term was conceptualised.
When no official definition was found, the researcher informally interviewed one of the
Senior Managers for clarification as follows:
Researcher: It’s been difficult to pin point how the project defines community.
Could you please provide me with any relevant documentation that defines the
concept as used in the project?
Manager: CBRDP has no special definition for a community. Our use of the
word ‘community’ agrees with any dictionary definitions. A working definition
of a community could refer to a group of people living in the same vicinity and
bound by same culture, beliefs and practices. You may adopt any of the known
definitions as offered by dictionaries or development practitioners
(Field notes 2011).
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The fact that the CBRDP did not have a definition for community illustrates the
disregard that some development pundits and technocrats tend to have for concepts and
their contextual relevance in project designs (see also Chapter Seven, 7.2). While this
tendency has been noted by many scholars as causing project failures, many
development ‘experts’ appear not to be learning (Mehmet 1978; Botchway 2001; Mosse
2005; Easterly 2007; Collier 2007; Riddell 2007; Mavrotas 2010; Hancock et al. 2011).
As the Manager’s response did not provide meaningful clarification of the concept as
used in the project, it is crucial to establish an analytical framework for what
community is and what it is not. Meaningful clarification is necessary for the purposes
of use in this thesis so as to capture, to a greater extent, the complexities of the localities
researched and the relevant groups therein.
6.2 Community Conceptualised
A critical review of the characteristics of ‘community’ in Table 6.1 above reveals that
while the concept is contextually variable, that is, every community is different, it
seems to relate primarily to relationships (sharing, belonging, solidarity, and collective
identities) which transcend territoriality, as conceptualised as follows. First, while it
could be organised around spaces and territories, as used in the thesis, community is
conceptualised mainly in functional terms. Thus, residents of a given locality are not
regarded as a community for the mere reason that they share that space, considering that
not all of them may identify with it. However, as Lavarack and Wallenstein argued
(2001, p. 180), “heterogeneous groups and individual [who share a given space] can
actually become a community … [if] programs reflect their shared interests and needs.”
Consequently, members of a given locality may be referred to as a community if there is
a function they are committed to or identify with. By implication, communities can be
developed, if built around functions that relevant people are committed to either
temporarily or permanently (Tesoriero 2010; Kenny 2010).
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Figure 6.1 Conceptual Framework of a ‘Community’

Sources: Goode (1957); McMillan & Chavis (1986); Bartle (2007); Tesoriero (2010).

Second, because ‘community’ as a function relates to an idea of belonging, solidarity,
and shared identities (Appadurai 1995; Delanty 2003), membership is crucial. A
community may require a leader(s) who perform the rites of initiation and define the
roles of members and their ethical boundaries (Amin 2005; Bartle 2007; Tesoriero
2010). While members could belong to other groups (Lavarack and Wallerstein 2001;
Minar and Greer 2007), they are expected to be conscious of and have a sense of
belonging to each of the communities they are a part of. Members are also expected to
be loyal and committed to the community through their willing to contribute time,
talents and abilities as well as material objects to maintaining the group (McMillan &
Chavis 1986; Bartle 2007; Tesoriero 2010).
Third, a community should offer members structures and avenues for interaction and
contact, as a ‘people’ and where ‘non–members’ come in as visitors or invited guests.
Whether formal or informal, the interaction may have to be small enough for most
members to know each other, what Ferdinand Tonnies calls ‘gemeinshaft’, which is
interaction in a small group, as opposed to ‘gessellschaft’, or relationship of mass
society (Bartle 2007; Tesoriero 2010). Finally, a ‘community’ may have to produce a
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culture, which differentiates it from others. The culture may be a language or a jargon;
or the group’s philosophy and ideological leanings. In addition, it is expected that the
culture is known, accepted, and practised by all members; non–members may have to
identify it as a unique trait of the community (Tesoriero2010; Kenny 2010). As
members of a family or a church identify with each other, so should members of a
community be willing to claim, “This is my community”.
6.3 Research Findings
Thus far, an attempt has been made to conceptualise community as a functional entity,
small enough for interaction, where members submit to the group’s tenets voluntarily
and having a distinct culture, which is obvious to ‘outsiders’. Within this framework,
this section of the thesis draws on the empirical data to examine the extent to which
three CBRDP beneficiary towns, which shared overarching characteristics with the
other localities140, qualified as communities.
6.3.1 Case Study I: Tease, Kwawu North District
Tease benefitted from a forty–shed market structure under the CBRDP, which was
completed in 2009. During the fieldwork, the market was not in use and traders were
seen selling in the sun or under trees (see Photos 6.1 & 6.2 below). Due to the lack of
maintenance, the aid–funded sheds were deteriorating. This shed had become a home
for squatters who also used it as a toilet facility. While the failed state of the Tease
project, in some respects, is attributable to partisan politics as discussed in the preceding
chapter, it is also because many residents of the locality tended to treat it with ‘a sense
of temporality’. This attitude, as the paragraphs below highlight, raises doubts about
why a community–based project was implemented in Tease.
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In terms of ethnic heterogeneity, traditional governance et cetera.
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Figure 6.1 Eastern Region: Locating Afram Plains and Kwawu South

Source: Kwawu North Medium Term Development Plan

Figure 6.2 Afram Plains: Locating Tease Township

Tease

Source: Kwawu North Medium Term Development Plan. Location of Tease by author.
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Located in the Kwawu North District of the Eastern Region, Tease is a part of a 5,040
sq. km vast island, called the Afram Plains, one of the most remote, deprived and
poverty–stricken parts of Ghana (Ghana Living Standards Survey 2008; Kwawu North
MTDP 2010). According to the District’s Medium Term Development Plan, the
population of Tease was estimated to be 4,865. Residents of Tease are predominantly
farmers and petty traders. In terms of religion, Christians are in the majority, but some
20% of the residents are Muslims (Kwawu North MTDP 2010). Although the ruling
National Democratic Congress (NDC) occupies all two electoral constituency seats of
the district, many Tease residents claimed that the New Patriotic Party, in whose term of
office the project was implemented, have always won in their electorate.
Three ethnic groups dominate Tease. The Kwawus traditionally own most of the Afram
Plains. They are an Akan ethnic group from the Kwawu South District (see Figure 6.1).
Many of them are traders and farmers, some of whom commute to and from Tease at
least three times in a week, while others have settled, but still maintain ties with their
extended families in Kwawu South, where they also invest most of their capital.
Depending on the direction one uses, the distance between the Kwawu South towns and
the Afram Plains is less than four hours, including the time spent on the ferry. Apart
from the Kwawus, significant numbers of Ewes and ethnic groups from the northern
part of Ghana have a presence in Tease and most parts of the Afram plains.141 The Ewes
are largely from the Volta Region, and enter the Afram Plains through the eastern
corridor by crossing the largest and longest river in the country, the Volta. A sizable
number of people from different ethnic groups in the northern parts of the country,
many of who are Muslims also live in Tease. Like the Kwawu and the Ewe, most are
petty traders and animal farmers.
Because of its rural isolation, residents of Tease (and the Afram Plains) I interviewed,
appeared not to associate with the locality as their hometown or a place worthy of any
meaningful investments. Interestingly, such residents were either born or had lived there
for over thirty years. The common maxim in the locality is that “Obiaa enfi Tease”,
translated “no one hails from Tease”. The Director of the oldest and most influential
NGO in the District, the Afram Plains Development Organisation (APDO), explained
that, “Afram Plains will never develop until the residents change their attitude towards
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No statistical data exist on the ethnic distribution of Tease.
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the place and treat it with some sense of permanence”. Because of this attitude of
temporality, Anyidoho (forthcoming, pp.1 & 2) describes the Afram Plains as:
A fascinating reference point for thinking about development in Ghana. They
are a recurrent site of experimentation in development programming, and yet
remain persistently ‘undeveloped’ by all accounts ... The paradox of the Afram
Plains is that while the district, with its agricultural and marine potential, has
been targeted for development by various governments, it has not met its own
potential or the expectation of policymakers. The Afram Plains District has a
dual identity: it attracts migrants from the north and south with its promise of
abundant yield from land and sea, but it also has an unwelcoming reputation as a
remote and inaccessible region.
The perception of temporality is further corroborated by the fact that the Assembly
Member of the town, at the time of implementing the project, is currently not serving in
Tease. When asked why, he said, “Im not a native of Tease. Nkwatia is my traditional
home and I would rather serve the people in that traditional area...”
The Area Council Chairman at that time also alluded to that assertion when he said:
My family lives in Accra and I work here. I visit them often. Afram Plains is
more of a resettlement area, people move in and out. ... It is therefore difficult to
build a school [for a locality] as it can be a white elephant in the future. I can
even cite three places where schools were built: Eduanum, Asikam and Nkubeta,
but are now of no use”.
The seeming disassociation with the town tends to impact negatively on local
organising initiatives. While the size of Tease is small enough to allow for face–to–face
interaction on local development issues, the residents tend to place more emphasis on
religious and political meetings. When asked by questionnaire if they attended local
meetings, over 85% answered, “No!” Three reasons emerged. The first related to the
usual ‘no one hails from Tease’ mantra, while the second was associated with a concern
that if people expressed dissent with local leaders at meetings, they were persecuted
afterwards. In a mixed–gender focus group discussion with some Tease traders, many of
whom were disappointed with the state of the market project, a youngman explained
that:
The chief and his elders chair the meetings so you must be careful the way you
talk ... during meetings you might offend someone and this would bring
problems. I would rather stay at home and work instead of going for meetings.
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Photo 6.1: The deteriorating Tease CBRDP Market

Photo 6.2: Tease traders selling the wares in the sun, while the Market Project is empty.
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A 53–year–old woman also remarked,
The town is small ... so we are careful of what to say ... if not you are targeted ...
I remember sometime ago, a senior medical doctor held a meeting with us and
asked us to tell him about the problems we face at the clinic; one man told him
that the medical staff did not respect the sick people ... because they always
shouted on them. One evening this man fell sick and went to the clinic but he
was sacked because of the point he raised during the meeting. He is now on
pension and has left Tease for his hometown.
The lack of interest in local meetings also stemmed from failure of previous projects
that involved the collection of residents’ monies. Residents I interviewed made
references to a failed water project in 2002. One of the Members of Parliament of the
area initiated a local self–help project to raise money to construct a borehole for the
town. It was alleged that the Member of Parliament provided the seed money and the
local leaders also levied residents to raise the remaining sum. While most residents I
interacted with claimed to have paid, the project did not eventuate; the residents’
monies were also not refunded. A male farmer who had lived in Tease for ten years
remarked:
When you ask question about the water project in meetings ... you will see that
the faces of the leaders have changed ... why worry about projects again? I’m a
native of Tease?
A female trader confirmed that:
We paid the money because we wanted access to good drinking water. They
made it serious to the extent that you would be arrested if you did not pay. Some
people were arrested for refusing to pay. Most of us paid, but we have not seen
any good use of the money ... Since then, I decided not to go for local meetings
any more.
These precedents, many of which tended to be allegations, did impact significantly on
the implementation and the maintenance of the Tease CBRDP. While the local CBRDP
officials claimed that they met and discussed the project with the local people, the
residents maintained they were not consulted about it; all they saw was that a market
was being built. While the local people, particularly women, admitted taking part in the
communal labour later on, because the chief called for it, the local officials explained
that it was initially difficult because of mistrust, the fact that many people tend not
regard Tease as their hometown, and a mentality of the people that government should
solve all local problems. Consequently, although the market project was meant for the
entire community, they had to raise the project’s additional money from among the
traders who, against the policy of the CBRDP, were each promised a space.
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Incidentally, while this promise led to the eventual completion of the project, the same
appears to have bedevilled it.
Before Tease received the market sheds, traders sold their wares or produce under trees
or straw structures. These trees and structures were broken down to make way for the
CBRDP market sheds project. The officials assured the traders of spaces in the new
sheds only if they contributed monies, which the latter did. However, the officials
realised that they could not allocate the shed as promised because the forty sheds were
not enough to accommodate the almost two hundred traders who had paid money in
advance. The situation was further complicated by a directive from the Zone IV
CBRDP manager who stated that the sheds belonged to the entire Area Council, made
up of twenty localities, and that they could not be allocated to only the Tease traders
who had contributed labour and money142. One aggrieved trader said:
Before they started the project, we were asked to pay some money if you wanted
a space in the new market. We paid but when the market was completed and we
asked for our space, they told us to wait ... we have been waiting for three years
... so we sell outside the market in the sun, while the sheds are empty.
During fieldwork, the project’s officials were embarrassed by the situation and admitted
that they had made a mistake by over collecting the monies. Even so, they argued that
because of the attitudes of most of the residents towards the locality, and the mistrust
that the failed water project had generated in the local leaders, there was no other way
they could have raised the project’s additional monies. The local officials blamed the
state of the market on the CBRDP manager’s insistence that the sheds could not be
allocated to only the Tease traders. The puzzle now was who gets the shed and who gets
the refund after their traditional structures has been broken down? As of March 2012,
twelve months after the fieldwork, key informants in Tease confirmed that the market
was still not being used and the monies of the traders had also not been refunded.
The Tease CBRDP market may best be described as a white elephant. The problem was
that, like many towns in the Afram Plains, residents of Tease do not associate with the
town. Analysed within the framework of what is a ‘community’, Tease barely qualified
as one, as its residents do not regard themselves as members of the town, so do not
interact, have no obligation to it, or show any culture worthy of commonality. The sense
of having temporary tendencies, coupled with mistrust of local leaders seemed to have
made it difficult for the local project’s leaders to organise support for the project. In
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their bid to raise additional monies to complete the project, the local officials overcollected monetary contributions from traders, who apparently outnumbered the sheds
available. Tease’s example epitomises the nature of many aid–funded projects in
developing countries where, in the words of Easterly (2002a), ‘a cartel of good
intentions’ result in failures’. The Tashie locality of the Greater Accra Region is another
case in point.
6.3.2 Case Study II: Tashie, Tema Municipality143
Tashie, a semi–urban locality in the Tema Municipality of the Greater Accra Region,
benefitted from the CBRDP. Their project was the renovation of the Tashie Presby
Basic School, whose roof was ripped off by a storm. According to the Head Teacher of
the school, while the renovation was in the offing, it was not planned to happen under
the CBRDP. However, the CBRDP coincided with the disaster, which disrupted their
activities for several weeks and compelled the relocation to church buildings.
Although important, the renovation of the school was not the topmost priority of the
residents and the Area Council (Tashie Action Plan 2010). Many residents explained in
interviews that their topmost priority was and still is a public toilet facility. Owing to
the urgency of the school’s renovation however, the Municipal Assembly impressed
upon the Area Council to use the CBRDP funds to renovate the school. As explained
below, while the project solved a major problem, the residents did not support it during
and after the renovation. As of June 2012, fifteen months after the fieldwork, the school
was still in crises, which in principle, the CBRDP intended that an entity called
‘community’ would maintain.
Before examining the reasons for the residents’ neglect of the school, the circumstances
leading to the renovation of the school require more explanation. The Tashie Presby
Basic School, the only school in the town, houses the Pre–primary, Primary and Junior
High Schools (JHS) pupils. The school children were largely from the surrounding
villages. The introduction of the government School Feeding Program in the school led
to increased enrolments and exacerbated the already overcrowded classrooms (see
Figure 6.4). This was against the country’s Ministry of Education stipulation that each
class should be not more than forty pupils (Ministry of Education 2008/2009). The
Head Teacher recounted that his teachers were always stressed, as they could not keep
up with the influx. Thus, after consulting with the Parents and Teachers’ Association of
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the school, he decided to divide the Upper Primary (Classes Four, Five & Six) and JHS
(One, Two & Three) to be run on a shift basis, 7:30–12:30 and 12:30–5:00pm
respectively. The shift system, teachers explained, helped to some extent. Yet, because
of the ever–growing population of Tashie, it did not solve the overcrowding problem
and also exerted pressure on the limited resources of the school.

Figure 6.3 Greater Accra Region: Locating Tema Municipal Assembly/Tashie

Tashie

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Greater_Accra_districts.png. Tashie location: by author

Photo 6.3: The renovated Tashie Presby School
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Photo 6.4: The deteriorating state of the Tashie Presby School.

Importantly, the shift system resulted in the loss of two hours of the teaching contact
time. Moreover, the integrity of the school’s examinations was also compromised as
pupils sat close to each other. This was the state of the school until the storm blew the
school’s roof off. While the government has currently abolished the shift system in all
schools in the country, the Tashie Presby Basic School still operates the scheme for
their Upper Primary. Only the JHS has been moved to an uncomplicated structure,
where pupils had to buy their own furniture. Asked why he continued to admit more
pupils, the Head Teacher said:
We cannot deny the kids their right to education. But we have had to repeat
some of the class six pupils who were due to go to JHS one, not because they are
not brilliant but because the numbers are just too much and there are not spaces
for them.
As of the fieldwork, none of the overcrowded classrooms had electricity or fans, and as
there were not enough textbooks, three or four pupils in some classes shared one.
Because of the high temperatures, many of the students used the textbooks to fan
themselves, resulting in many tattered books (see Photos 6.5). There were also visible
cracks on the floor and on some parts of the structure.
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Figure 6.4 Tashie Presby Basic School Population by Class 2010
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Photo 6.5: The state of textbooks at the Tashie Presby School.
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The Area Council Chairman and the Assembly Member were concerned about the
indifferent attitudes of the residents to the school and the general welfare of the locality.
They expected the residents to rally behind the CBRDP and even initiate others to build
more classrooms for the school. However, as it turned out, the residents appeared not to
care much about the school. The local leaders had hoped that the successful
implementation and maintenance of the CBRDP would attract more community–based
initiatives from the Municipal Assembly. Of great significance to this thesis was the fact
that the residents who contributed neither labour nor monies greeted the project with
apathy. Tellingly, some Tashie residents used the school’s toilet facility and/or
defecated on the compound. The challenged state of the Tashie CBRDP was attributable
to the fact that the dynamics of the town hardly qualified it as a ‘community’.
The implementers of the Tashie CBRDP seemed to have underestimated the
demographic complexities of the town. A community, as established above, goes
beyond people sharing geographical spaces. With a population of almost 6,000, the
Tashie Township is one of the fastest growing localities in the region because of its
proximity to the nation’s capital, approximately twenty minute’s drive away. Thus
while the GA, who are the traditional owners of the land, have some presence in the
town, the majority of the residents are from other regions of the country, who either
work in the capital or in local factories. Not only are many of these residents busy, they
hardly have time for local meetings and activities. The Area Council Chairman
explained the difficulty they had in organising the residents to provide labour during the
implementation of the project. He said:
Participation in the communal was very poor. So we had to use the project funds
to hire masons and other building professionals to finish the work. The project
was supposed to be for the ‘community’ but they did not come. People gave
excuses that they were going to find work and money.
Because the residents would not lend a hand to the project, the Head Teacher said:
During the renovation, sometimes the pupils had to spend time of school time to
fetch water for the project. Although the ‘community’ was supposed to
contribute labour, they did not. Thus a large percentage of the project sum went
into hiring labour.
The Assembly Member condemned the apathetic attitude of the town residents when he
said: “The disease in this town is that when you call for meeting they don’t come ... so I
have formed an elders’ council who help me to plan for the community with.”
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Asked why they do not participate in local development activities, the residents raised
many issues, which may be classified into: 1) Perception of corruption of local leaders;
2) Political factionalism; and 3) A concern that the project did not solve the major
problem of the town, a public toilet facility.
Many Tashie residents interviewed perceived the local leaders (Assembly and Area
Council officials) as corrupt. Apart from alleging that the leaders had failed to render
proper accounts for monies collected for previous projects, the residents tended to label
them as agents of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) government of the time.
Relative to the CBRDP, the Head Teacher corroborated the perception of corruption
when he explained that the local officials awarded the purchasing contracts of the
project to ‘themselves’ and inflated the figures for some of the project materials. Thus,
the project suffered not only from labour cost but also over invoicing. These perceptions
seemed to have affected local collective tendencies, as they generated mistrust in the
local leaders and broke down the town’s social capital, an important ingredient for
community–based initiative (Woolcock 1998; Woolcock & Narayan 2000; Labonne
&Chase 2008; Tesoriero 2010; Kenny 2010).
There was strong sense of political factionalism in Tashie. The town seemed to have
been divided along the lines of the two major political parties, the National Democratic
Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). The division was so intense that
certain areas of the town were noted as the strongholds of both parties. As a result, the
Assembly Member, who was perceived to belong to the NPP, did not control the entire
town. While he denied affinity with the NPP, he confirmed the factionalism in the town
and indicated how the situation was frustrating his ‘unpaid’ work (see Chapter Five,
5.4.1). Speaking in the English language, he said:
Those boys have threatened me several times … they are hooligans and are
being incited by my political opponents. To counter their mischief, I also formed
a youth group that I use to champion local developments and spread the good
news about my achievements.
Members of the ‘opposition youth group’ interviewed alleged that the Assembly
Member was only in power to execute the agenda of the NPP, and not the interests of
the local people. They added that he did not consult with anyone in the town except his
youth group and some elderly people, whom they also tagged as members of the NPP.
The ‘opposition youth’ vowed to unseat the Assembly in the 2010 local government
elections. However, they did not succeed, as the Assembly Member retained his job.
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Despite his victory, he will still be representing a politically factionalised town in the
Municipal Assembly. Tashie’s factionalism is complicated by the fact that the town had
no Traditional Chief who could have been a neutral force to organise the local people
for development activities.
Finally, there was a strong concern by Tashie residents that the CBRDP did not solve
the topmost problem in the town, which is the lack of public toilet facilities. While
contemporary houses in Tashie had toilet facilities, many of the old houses (which are
in the majority) did not. Residents explained that although some old houses did have
toilet facilities, because the house owners have many rigid rules regarding their use,
they preferred paying to use the only and poorly maintained public toilet facility in the
town. Tashie had only one public toilet facility, and apparently could not support the
growing population. A new one was being built, but since the NDC government took
over in 2009, the project has been stalled for almost two years. When asked in the
questionnaire to state the needs of the locality, 80% of the respondents mentioned a
public toilet facility as the topmost need followed by others needs such as poor drainage
system and the lack of pipe–borne water. These needs were also captured in the Area
Council’s list of social services needs in Tashie (Tashie Action Plan 2010). The
respondents also indicated that a willingness to support wholly any project that would
meet their needs.
Owing to the absence of adequate public toilets facilities in Tashie, some residents used
the Tashie Presby Basic School’s toilet facility. One of the teachers of the school
complained that on most mornings when they reported to school, the students had to use
some of the class hours to clean up the toilets. Frustrated by the incidents, the Head
Teacher started locking the toilet after school and reopened it when reporting each
morning. This did not help that much, as the perpetrators resorted to defecating on the
school’s compound and under verandas. During the fieldwork the researcher sighted
some of the toilet residues on the school’s compound. While many residents would not
openly admit using the schools’ toilet, they were aware of it and condemned it.
However, they gave responses alluding to the fact that the perpetrators had no
alternative. Many of these residents explained that, while they did not disregard the
importance of education, the project officials should have implemented what the
residents wanted: a public toilet, if they wanted their full cooperation.
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The Tashie CBRDP has shown the importance of tailoring community–based projects
to meet the local people’s needs if their participation is to be guaranteed. Tashie lacked
most of the characteristics of a community, although the local people shared the same
space: 1) Tashie is a town and not a rural locality; 2) Most of its residents were busy
city or local factory workers and hardly interacted on local development issues; 3) The
existence of political factionalism in the town, complicated by the absence of a
Traditional Chief, meant that organising would always be difficult; and 4) Because
many of the local people wanted a public toilet facility, the renovation of Tashie Presby
Basic School was not a ‘function’ strong enough to rally them. If the implementers of
the project had studied Tashie’s demographics carefully, they might not have
implemented it as a community–based initiative. While the renovation of the school was
important, the discussions above have shown that the ‘community’, which was needed
to maintain and improve the school, did not exist. Agbetor presents other fascinating
insights into the concept of ‘community’.
6.3.3 Case Study III: Agbetor, Ketu Northwest District, Volta Region144
Agbetor is an old, but a small town in Volta Region of Ghana. Agbetor is inhabited by
the Ewes ethnic group, many of whom are farmers, and a small herdsmen population,
who hail from the northern parts of the country. Together, the population is almost one
thousand. As of the time of fieldwork, the inhabitants of Agbetor had neither a
pharmaceutical shop nor a health facility. Until recently, the entire population relied on
surface water and hand–dug wells for their water needs (Agbetor Area Council Action
Plan 2006).
Agbetor received a three–classroom school block under the CBRDP. Before this time,
pupils in the town had to walk four kilometres to school at Gorbeh, which is about four
kilometres away. Attempts had been made by the leaders of the town to establish a
school in tents and under trees, but parents would usually avoid the school and still send
their children to Gorbeh, as the local school lacked teachers and could not function
anytime it rained. According to the Assembly Member of Agbetor, the fact that the
children travelled long distances to school became a disincentive for school attendance.
It was under these circumstances that the Traditional Chief of the town lobbied the
District Assembly for a primary school.
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Figure 6.6 Ketu Northwest District Locating Agbetor

Source: Ketu Northwest Medium Term Development Plan (2010).

Agbetor

Photo 6.6: The Agbetor CBRDP Three-Unit Classroom Block.
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If there was anything special about Agbetor’s CBRDP, it was the role that their Chief,
Nana Tagboto played in the entire project. While the efforts of Nana Tagboto were
laudable, the researcher found that community-based projects are likely to have
sustainability challenges, if Traditional Chiefs remain centre stage in the
implementation process. Because of the influence they wield constitutionally and the
fact that they oversee the finances of their respective traditional areas, culturally, it is
the norm that they initiate and sometimes fund development projects. Having been a
Chief for over fifteen years, Nana Tagboto typifies the influence of many contemporary
educated Traditional Chiefs in Ghana145. Officials in the CBRDP National Headquarters
office would often refer to him as one of the project’s success stories. For example,
when Agbetor was selected as a beneficiary of the CBRDP, Nana Tagboto requested
that the project be implemented under the Rapid Response Initiative146. The project’s
seed money, which was expected in over three months, could only fund a three–
classroom block and one veranda. Nana Tagboto single–handedly pre–financed the
entire project and also offered to sponsor the construction of an additional veranda,
which the school critically needed.
When the project was completed, Nana Tagboto bought books, furniture and other
educational materials for the school and paid the salaries of the teachers for over two
years until the Ghana Education Service adopted the school. Moreover, because the
three classrooms were limited, Nana Tagboto went ahead to construct two more
pavilion structures to cater for the Upper Primary classes. When asked why he invested
in the school so much, he would always say: “I believe in education”. The Assembly
Member of the town confirmed the influence of the Nana Tagboto, when he admitted
that: “I have not done much Agbetor because Nana Tagboto is influential and is able to
lobby the powerful people in government to solve the problems in the locality.”
Despite the influence of Nana Tagboto at the time of fieldwork, the school had many
problems, which were beyond the resources of Nana Tagboto and pointed to the
inadequacy of one influential person in the sustenance of a community–based project. A
normal primary school structure in Ghana has ten classrooms147; however, the Agbetor
School had only five classrooms: Three constructed under the CBRDP and the two
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pavilion structures constructed under the auspices of Nana Tagboto. Under the
circumstances, the teachers merged some of the classes as follows: 1) Kindergarten &
KG One; 2) KG Two & Nursery; 3) Class One; 4) Classes Two & Three; and 5) Classes
Four & Five. The situation meant that the pupils follow syllabi not appropriate to their
levels of education. Additionally, the furniture available to the pupils was so limited
that some of the pupils were literally sitting on the floor during class sessions. While
Nana Tagboto was doing his best to get the school running, it lacked many crucial
resources a mainstream school should have: textbooks, toys, writing materials and other
educational aids.
There seemed to be a sense of frustration among the teachers. Their concern was that
the paucity of facilities was retarding the progress of the children. A female teacher
said:
The children in Primary Four should be writing their names by now, but they
can’t. Even the Primary Five pupils have problems with reading and solving
simple arithmetic problems ... it is so sad. The children come to school virtually
empty–handed, without even a pencil. There have been instances that we have
tried to help with our own monies, but we can’t do that always. I have only one
textbook for the Classes Three and Four and had to photocopy the text for the
entire class out of my own pocket.
Another female teacher explained that:
When I want to teach them about computers, I have to walk all the pupils to
Nana Tagboto’s office because he is the only one who has the machine in this
locality. It’s hard to explain to these children the difference between a computer
mouse and the animal mouse. We lack so many basic learning materials. For
instance, if I want to teach them about geography, I use an orange because we
don’t have a globe. We love our jobs as teachers, but working in these
conditions is too frustrating.
Also, owing to the limited number of classrooms, pupils who completed Primary Five at
Agbetor Primary School must still travel on foot to Gorbeh to continue their Primary
Six and Junior High School (JHS) education respectively. Aside from the paucity of
educational resources, the school had no urinal and toilet facilities. The teachers had the
option of either using the public facility in the town, Nana Tabgoto’s house or the bush
– to which most of the pupils resorted. The females found the situation very
inconvenient. While the teachers commended Nana Tagboto for his efforts, they were
not enough to sustain a community-based project.
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The data pointed to a two–fold problem with the Agbetor CBRDP. First, the project
appears to have been implemented around Nana Tagboto, instead of the entire
residential population. As pointed out earlier, Agbetor seemed to have received the
project because of the influence of Nana Tagboto. As a result, the CBRDP secretariat
appears to have relied on the Chief during the implementation, rather than developing
and working in collaboration with the Agbetor ‘community’. Because Traditional
Chiefs are culturally expected to initiate and provide leadership for the maintenance of
local development projects, Agbetor residents interviewed appeared not to care about
the school’s welfare. Although, they indicated that they took part in the communal
labour during the building of the school, they considered it as a normal routine in the
locality and tended to regard Nana Tagboto as the one who has the responsibility of
maintaining the school. Interestingly, the residents thought that the project was Nana
Tabgoto’s own initiative, as they claimed that the CBRDP officials never came to the
town to explain the process to them. Others claimed that Nana Tagboto was not
categorical about the project being externally funded.
As a result of the erroneous impression created of the project as being one of the ‘usual’
initiatives of Nana Tagboto, the residents saw nothing wrong with not contributing any
money to buy books or educational materials for the school. The general impression
gathered through the interviews and questionnaires was that Nana Tagboto kept all the
funds of the town148, which they expected him to use to develop the school. While they
would concede that it was the duty of the entire locality to seek welfare for the school,
the residents’ perceived the maintenance of the school as the duty of the Chief. Thus,
respondents argued that Nana Tagboto had no right to request funds from the residents
to run the school. A woman, who had lived in the locality for over twenty years,
remarked: “the school is for all of us. But as a traditional town, we also have proceeds
from the sale of stool lands and the... stone quarry ... Nana Tagboto cannot levy anyone
to pay anything towards the school”.
Asked why the local people have left the entire school’s burden on him, Nana Tagboto
said out of frustration:
[Some] of my people don’t have foresight nor appreciate the value of education
…they feel it’s my responsibility to meet every need of the school. Although
I’m culturally expected to be responsible for the school, I cannot do it all alone.
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The default ‘elite capture’ scenario discussed above happened also because the local
people were poor and therefore lacked the financial resources to support the project.
Agbetor does not offer any jobs to its citizens. Many of them are not engaged in
profitable economic activities, aside from subsistence farming. Thus, in reality, such
residents appeared to lack the means to contribute any meaningful sums of money
towards the project’s upkeep. For example, 70% of the respondents of the
questionnaires in Agbetor indicated having no jobs. Being poor, they relinquished the
maintenance of the school on the shoulders of Nana Tagboto, although they claimed to
be a part of the Agbetor ‘community’ and attended local meetings. This finding is
consistent with Botchway’s (2001) observation during the implementation of a
Canadian water project in the northern parts of Ghana, where the locality but lacked the
resources to maintain it.
The case study of Agbetor’s CBRDP and the role of Nana Tagboto have demonstrated
what becomes of community-based projects that are driven by a Traditional Chief and
not the larger community. Irrespective of the influence of a person or Traditional Chief,
it is unsound to implement community-based projects around one person. Broader
support from the beneficiary ‘community’ must be established, if development projects
are to be sustainable. If this is ignored, ‘elite capture’ could happen by default, through
cultural institutions.
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter had one focus: were the so–called ‘communities’, which benefited from the
CBRDP worthy of the label? In answering this question, a conceptual framework for
‘community’, which drew on the works of several theoreticians, was outlined. The
framework, which showed the complexity of community, established its key attributes
and characteristics. These included the idea that: 1) Community is understood in the
functional sense; 2) Community must have a membership which is conscious of and
willing to contribute to it; 3) The group provides opportunity and structures for
interaction; and 4) The group has a unique culture, which non-members can identify.
Underlying these features was the notion that communities can be developed, if built
around functions to which a group is committed.
Drawing on the data from three localities, two conclusions emerged. The first was that
‘communities’ appeared not to exist in the selected CBRDP beneficiary localities.
Consequently, not only did the projects lack local support during their implementation,
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but also that they have been left unmaintained. As argued, the residents of Tease tended
not to associate with the town as ‘members’ and therefore had an attitude of
‘temporarility’ towards the locality because of its remoteness. The data on Tashie
showed that the residents were politically factionalised, apart from the common feeling
that the CBRDP did not meet their most crucial need, a public toilet facility. Agbetor
pointed to two basic issues that it is risky to build a community–based project around
one influential Traditional Chief, and the economic conditions of beneficiary localities
must be considered, and at best improved before the implementation of community–
based projects to forestall the possibility of an ‘elite capture’.
The second conclusion drawn was that the CBRDP designers and implementers
appeared not to have made any effort to build the ‘communities’ upon which to base the
projects. While many functions around which the CBRDP could have been built
abounded, they were ignored. Thus, the projects appeared to have been implemented in
‘spaces’ rather than ‘communities’. As they turned out, because there were no
‘communities’ to maintain the CBRDPs, they appeared to be in a state of complete
disarray at the time of the fieldwork.
This chapter has shown that it is not enough to base development projects on idealised,
yet complex and contested terms such as community. As the conceptual framework
indicated, community is a multi–faceted concept, and each of its features must be in
place or developed before its benefits can be realised. However, the analysis of the
empirical case studies showed that the four key attributes of the concept of community
were lacking in the selected CBRDP beneficiary localities. The discussions so far have
emphasised the importance of conceptualising key terms in development programs to
serve as road maps during implementation; while at the same time investing in social
research to understand local contexts before the designing projects meant to ‘improve’
the lives of people. The following chapter provides further insights into the reasons for
such an exercise being crucial to CDD programs by examining another ubiquitous, yet
complex and often misused term, ‘empowerment’.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
WHEN EMPOWERMENT DISEMPOWERS:
THE CASE OF GHANAIAN TRADITIONAL CHIEFS AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Of all the buzzwords that have entered the development lexicon in the past thirty years,
‘empowerment’ is probably the most widely used and abused
(Batliwala 2007)149
The concept of ‘empowerment’ plays a pivotal role in Community–Driven
Development (CDD). This stems from the supposition that CDD programs are able to
transform community social capital through the ‘empowerment’ of groups traditionally
disempowered or excluded from decision-making (Mansuri & Rao 2004). This chapter
argues that, like ‘community’, the concept of ‘empowerment’, as applied in Ghana’s
Community–Based Rural Development Project (CBRDP), appears to have been
conceptualised vaguely, overlooking the need to have considered the country’s
Chieftaincy institution, while monitoring the project for unintended outcomes. As
examined below, the CBRDP’s misguided application of the term ‘empowerment’ is
partly attributable to romanticising of the term in the literature.
Argued from the normative theoretical perspective (Nozick 1974; Scheffler 1982;
Dreier 1993) ‘empowerment’ seems to be ‘marketed’ as being inherently ‘good’ and a
value that the powerless should pursue, or that they should be aided in their obvious
quest to become empowered (World Bank 2000a; 2002; Binswanger et al. 2010;
Anyidoho & Manuh 2010). However, this chapter sees the concept of ‘empowerment’
as problematic, providing theoretical and empirical arguments for the need to go beyond
conceptualising the term normatively to appreciating its complexity and contextualised
application. Three sections are presented to support this assertion.
The first section briefly explores the concept of ‘empowerment’ to show its complexity.
The theoretical section begins by defining the term and discussing its supposed
advantages. A critical analysis of the term that follows depicts ‘empowerment’ as a term
that is: 1) Gendered; 2) Not easily measurable; and 3) Predicated on the notion of
‘power’. Drawing on the last point, the section argues that because ‘empowerment’
pivots on the notion of ‘power’, it is a value–laden term. In other words, because
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‘power’ is non–neutral and has to be reclaimed from the ‘powerful’ and given to the
‘less powerful’, ‘empowering’ one group actually ‘disempowers’ others; and that
‘empowerment’ and related programs can potentially lead to conflicts. This is especially
so in terms of this thesis as it found that if a program’s concepts, implementation and
outcomes are not carefully monitored and managed with tact, problems ensue.
The second section examines the CBRDP documents to unravel the seemingly vague
conceptualisation of ‘empowerment’ in the project’s design and implementation. The
final section, which consists predominantly of empirical data collected by the researcher
during fieldwork in Ghana, discusses certain unintended outcomes of the CBRDP. It
presents the cases of Aboloo (Greater Accra Region) and Ntoaso (Eastern Region) to
demonstrate the incidence of power struggles and conflicts between Traditional Chiefs,
who felt sidelined, and local government officials (Assembly Members and Unit
Committee Members). The conflicts are related to the question of who manages the
project. The analysis suggests that in their pursuit to strengthen Ghana’s
decentralisation process through the CBRDP, the designers of the project150 appear to
have focused only on the local government sub–structures, overlooking the country’s
influential politico–cultural heritage. The oversight, which has led to intense feuds, also
impacted negatively on the maintenance and outcomes of the CBRDP at the time of the
fieldwork.
7.1 Empowerment: Background and Conceptual Issues
‘Empowerment’ discourse has its roots in Frierean philosophy (Cleaver 2001). The
concept has, since 2000, become increasingly popular in development studies with a
significant body of literature, typically divided into distinct schools of thought,
discussing it in various ways (World Bank 2000a; 2002; Clifford 2001; Mosse 2001;
Narayan 2002; Parpart 2002; Stern et al. 2005; Cornish 2006; Binswanger et al. 2010;
Hancock et al. 2011; Maseno & Kilonzo 2011). The World Bank defines
‘empowerment’ as, “the expansion of freedom of choice and action. It means increasing
one’s authority and control over the resources and decisions that affect one’s life”
(World Bank 2002, p. 11). The World Bank argues that there is no single model of
‘empowerment’, and has put forward four elements which characterise the concept: 1)
Access to information; 2) Inclusion and participation; 3) Accountability; and 4) Local
organisational capacity. It argues further that regardless of the context within which it is
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applied, ‘empowerment’ outcomes are determined by: 1) The nature of public action;
2) Patterns of exclusion and conflict; 3) The extent of decentralisation; 4) The strength
of local–level institutions and civil society; and 5) The extent of political freedom
(World Bank 2002; Binswanger et al. 2010).
In tandem with the World Bank’s definition and drawing on Gidden’s (1984)
sociological theory of structure and agency, Apusigah (2004a), Binswanger et al. (2010)
and Tesoriero (2010) are of the opinion that in order to empower the powerless, their
‘assets’ must be developed, for assets determine a person or a group’s ability [agency]
to deal with structure [institutions and systems]. The World Bank has since 2000 been
arguing that attempts to empower the weak and poor should aim at promoting their right
of inclusion and participation, and capacity to make choices, while demanding
accountability from their leaders (World Bank 2000a; 2002; 2003b).
When targeted populations are ‘empowered’, the proponents of the concept argue,
powerless and vulnerable people may be able to participate in their ‘communities’,
reduce their poverty levels, and have a sense of confidence and independence. Central
to their argument is the notion that the common elements underlying poverty is the
exclusion, voicelessness and powerlessness of the poor; and that, faced with unequal
power relations, the poor lack the influence to negotiate better terms for themselves.
Thus, unequal power relations have to be addressed in order to expand the opportunities
and choices of the poor (Botchway 2001; World Bank 2000a; 2002; 2003b; Mosse
2001; Narayan 1995; 2002; Stern et al. 2005; Cornish 2006; Anyidoho & Manuh 2010;
Binswanger et al. 2010).
Consequently, ‘empowerment’ has become the objective of many development
initiatives of the UNDP, the World Bank and most aid agencies. For example, UN
MDG 3 aims to “promote gender equality and empower women” (Sachs 2005; MDG
Report 2011). Currently, operating through its ‘Empowerment’ Team, the World Bank
is one of the chief campaigners of the concept and employs it in a range of sectors,
including the provision of basic services; improving local and national governance, pro–
poor market development; and the enhancement of access to justice and legal aid151. On
the face of it, these arguments seem logical, and a solution simple. However, based on

151

http://go.worldbank.org/EEU9PYCWU0; retrieved February 25, 2012. According to Alsop et al.
(2006) in 2005, over 1,800 projects in the World Bank’s lending portfolio related to ‘empowerment’.
159

the data collected in this thesis, ‘empowerment’ is too complex a concept and should be
employed with trepidation.
The term ‘empowerment’ is criticised for various reasons. Three arguments are
considered in turn. First, although the term is inherently generic, its contemporary use
and application appears to have been made ‘gender–specific’ in many contexts. Since
2001, there seems to have been a consistent effort by the World Bank to ‘engender
empowerment’. A World Bank policy document, Engendering Development Through
Gender Equality in Rights, Resources, and Voice (Word Bank 2001), provides insights
into tools for integrating gender into development work. Furthermore, between 2006
and 2010, more than $65 billion, representing 37% of all the World Bank’s lending and
grants, were allocated to gender–informed operations.152The notion of engendering
‘empowerment’ also seems to underlie MDG 3, the 2012 World Development Report
and the ideals of organisations such as United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and
the Empowerment of Women153.
While ‘empowerment’ is applicable to either gender, due to gender inequality and the
prevalence of patriarchy globally, a focus on women is justified and should continue
until equality is achieved (Apusigah 2004a; 2004b; Anyidoho & Manuh 2010; Cornwall
& Edwards 2010; Hancock et al. 2011). However, negative outcomes result when the
term is used vaguely and is not theoretically explicit vis-a-vis gender specific outcomes,
and ‘forced’ into or applied to romanticise development projects, as Ghana’s CBRDP
seem to have done (see Section 7.2).
Scholars also disagree on whether ‘empowerment’ refers to a process or an outcome or
both. According to Mosedale (2003) ‘empowerment’ is an ongoing process rather than a
product, and that there is no final goal. Put in absolute terms, Mosedale argues that one
does not arrive at a stage of being empowered. Others argue that ‘empowerment’ is both
a process and an outcome. As a process, it involves building the capacities, skills and
competencies of either an individual or a group of people over a period of time, from a
lower to a higher state of ‘empowerment’. As an outcome, ‘empowerment’ becomes an
end in itself, where an individual or group enjoys a state of ‘empowerment’ (Arnstein
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1971; Lavarack & Wallenstein 2001; Cornish 2006; Binswanger et al. 2010; Tesoriero
2010154).
The lack of consensus on whether ‘empowerment’ is a process or an outcome or both
has critical implications for its measurement. Measuring ‘empowerment’ according to
Yaron (2008) is an important indicator of a country’s performance and opportunities
available to an individual. At the country level, they argued that, ‘empowerment’
indicators contribute to the process of strengthening governance and reducing
corruption. They further argue that empowerment aims at developing the capabilities of
the individual not just as beneficiaries, but also as agents capable of effecting
institutional change. What then are the indicators for measuring empowerment
outcomes?
Many independent scholars have suggested various indicators for measuring
‘empowerment’. These include, but are not limited to Mosedale’s (2003) ‘constraints to
action’, Alsop et al.’s (2006) ‘availability and use of choices’ and Yaron’s (2008)
‘mixed method diagnostic tools’. As individuals and groups may seek different forms of
‘empowerment’, the models above appear to be contextualised and cannot be
generalised (Zimmermann 1995; Lavarack & Wallenstein 2001; Cornish 2006). The
United Nations Gender Empowerment Measure, the Global Gender Inequality Index
and Global Gender Gap Index155 have also been criticised as being irrelevant to many
contexts (Beteta 2006; Klasen & Schelen 2007; Hancock et al. 2011). In lieu of the
impossibility of measuring empowerment, Yaron (2008, p. 8) observed that:
We cannot measure empowerment in a way that does justice to its inherent
complexity and … satisfactorily ... What we can do, however, is to identify
measurements that capture, albeit imperfectly, important dimensions of changes
in power, and that can be complemented by more interpretive and explanatory
forms of qualitative research.
The last and the most critical theoretical problem with ‘empowerment’ relates to the
concept on which it is pivoted, ‘power’ (Nelson & Wright 1995; Batliwala 2007). A
great deal of literature has tended to conceptualise ‘empowerment’ as a tool for
correcting unequal power relations or a way of increasing the power of the
disadvantaged (World Bank 2000a; Mosse 2001; Narayan 2002; Parpart 2002; Cornish
2006; Tesoriero 2010). Reference to ‘unequal power’ assumes that someone is
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disempowered or disadvantaged in relation to another (Mosse 2001; Mosedale 2003).
While scholars generally agree that power is a complex and multi–layered concept, they
disagree on its form, definition and dimensions.
Attempts to define the concept of power since the late 1980s include the works of Clegg
(1989), who categorises the different interactions of power relations; and Rowlands
(1997), who examines the four main forms of power as: 1) Power over; 2) Power to; 3)
Power with; and 4) Power from within. Others have also examined the concept of
power, including Klasen and Miller (2002), who explored different aspects of political
power; Csaszar’s (2004) conflictual or consensual approaches to power; and Vails’
discussion of ‘A Theory of Power’. Even so, Tesoriero’s (2010) discussion of power is
more appropriate for the purpose of this chapter because of its currency, conciseness,
and the fact that he draws on earlier theorists, such as Wright Mills, Robert Dahl,
Talcott Parsons and Michel Foucault.
According to Tesoriero (2010) the nature of power in modern societies is categorised
into Pluralistic, Elite, Structural and Post–structural perspectives. The Pluralistic
Perspective considers power as a type of game which the individuals and groups in a
given locality or society play competitively. It glosses over the disadvantages an
individual or group may have by virtue of their class, gender, race, ethnicity, age,
disability, sexuality and geographical location, postulating that all people have equal
opportunity to participate, as there is none all–powerful. To win or gain power, one
must be equipped or empowered with the capacity or assertiveness to compete
effectively, apart from understanding the rules of the game. The Elitist Perspective
Tesoriero argues, does not regard power as a game where all the players have equal
opportunities to win. Rather, it views society as hierarchical with a certain few groups
having more power than they should. Termed ‘elites’, they wield the influence to
control key institutions and decide on issues that affect the majority. To gain power in
an elitist domain, one has to become an elite.
The Structural Perspective of power, Tesoriero (2010) argues, relates to structural or
systemic inequality or even oppression as a form of power. By emphasising the
importance of class, race and gender, structural power holders, mainly the elites,
reinforce inequalities by putting barriers in place that will keep the disadvantaged
perpetually disempowered. Finally, the Post–structural Perspective of power relates to
the way language and discourse is used as mechanisms of control (Rabinow 1984).
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Drawing on the works of Michel Foucault, Tesoriero argues that power is not just about
action, as the earlier perspectives seem to portray; but rather other forms of power
which may relate to the way certain discourses are used by the ‘powerful’ as the norm
that should guide and shape communication, for example.
The fact that ‘empowerment’ is predicated on power gives the term a competitive slant.
According to Michel Foucault (1980; 1982) power is not neutral or a ‘zero sum’
concept and that it is required to overcome other forms of power, be they negative or
positive (Csaszar 2004; Cornish 2006). In lieu of its competitive tendencies, it can be
argued therefore that power cannot be ‘shared’ between the ‘powerful’ and the
‘powerless’. By implication, ‘empowerment’ actually means disempowering the one
wielding power. Depending on the context, ‘empowerment’ may dis–empower others
by breaking cultural norms, practices and /or certain monopolies and exclusivities
enjoyed by a few, usually the elite.
Owing to the simultaneity of ‘empowerment’ and ‘disempowerment’, it is crucial
development projects that seek to ‘empower’ people, facilitate, monitor outcomes, and
have project staff made aware of the adverse impact of power rather than just using it
normatively. Failure to address these concerns could lead to conflicts between those
supposedly being ‘empowered’ and the ‘traditionally powerful’, and from whom
‘power’ is being reclaimed. As the research findings show below however, although the
‘concept of empowerment’ was central in the design and implementation of Ghana’s
CBRDP, less attention appeared to have been paid to the complexity of the term as well
as the monitoring and managing of unintended outcomes. Owing to the conflicts that
the notion of power tends to generate, the project could have been more effective if
Traditional Chiefs were briefed to appreciate its theoretical intent as strengthening the
country’s local government sub–structures, and not as a challenge to their authority (see
section 7.3).
7.2 The CBRDP and the Concept of Empowerment
As described in Chapter One, Ghana’s CBRDP was designed to contribute to the overall
‘empowerment’ of the rural population, while simultaneously strengthening the
country’s decentralisation system. Despite being pivotal in the design and
implementation of the CBRDP, the project’s application of ‘empowerment’ had four
major flaws.
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First, a review of most of the CBRDP documents revealed that ‘empowerment’ was not
theoretically conceptualised, the researcher not being able to find a working definition
of the term (CBRDP Implementation Manual 2005; CBRDP Annual Reports 2005–
2010; Zone IV Annual Reports 2005–2010). Consequently, the project’s managers and
local government officials interviewed conceded that they did not receive any
background briefing on the theoretical intricacies of the term. As the empirical data will
show in the next section, local government officials seemed to understand
‘empowerment’ more in terms of having an oversight responsibility to manage the
project as well as rendering proper fiscal accounts to the CBRDP Headquarters in
Accra, the nation’s capital.
Second, the CBRDP officials on the ground targeted women and vulnerable groups,
while the project sought to ‘empower’ the general rural population (CBRDP
Implementation Manual 2006). During the interviews, most of the officials stated that
they involved women in local meetings during the implementation of the project. For
these officials, having women sit in meetings, meant ‘empowering’ them, while as
argued below, most of them were ‘coerced by culture’ to participate. Women’s
‘empowerment’ is a major topic for discussion in Ghana (Apusigah 2004a; 2004b;
Anyidoho & Manuh 2010) and was therefore not out of place in the CBRDP. However,
because the project was not explicit about having a gender–focus, it seemed to have
contradicted its aim of empowering the general population as stated in the CBRDP
Implementation Manual (2006, p. 1). Because of the lack of clarity on its gender–focus,
the project also failed to provide the necessary resources required for the
implementation of an effective gender–based ‘empowerment’ program (Mosedale 2003;
Apusigah 2004a; Anyidoho & Manuh 2010; Hancock et al. 2011).
Owing to the apparent disjunction between what the CBRDP sought to achieve relative
to ‘empowerment’, and its focus on the ground, the project appeared to have measured
‘empowerment’ more in terms of ‘participation’ by women and vulnerable peoples. For
example, each of the CBRDP Annual Reports (2005–2010) tended to measure women’s
‘empowerment’ in the project’s beneficiary localities by the numbers of women present
in local meetings. Interestingly, most women interviewed or who responded to the
questionnaires explained that they attended community meetings as a marital or cultural
obligation. For example, many Fulani women in one of the towns in the Volta Region
disclosed that they attended the local meetings as a gesture of respect for the Traditional
Chiefs and their husbands. Like these respondents, others from the Eastern Region
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made similar assertions; 80% of the women respondents from the Volta and Eastern
Regions conceded as having never contributed to discussions in local meetings. In the
Greater Accra Region 70% of women attending local meetings were non–contributors.
Furthermore, some of the married women, who admitted speaking in community
meetings, indicated that their husbands were unhappy, if their contribution sounded
dissenting.
Many scholars criticise participation as a yardstick for measuring ‘empowerment’
because of its coercive tendencies (Cooke & Kothari 2001; Cleaver 2001; Mosse 2001;
Cornish 2006). Moreover, because ‘empowerment’ is a broad concept and may not
always relate to participation of marginalised groups, many theorists argue that attention
should rather be paid to addressing the conditions that perpetuate any form of
disempowerment (Chambers 1983; Nelson & Wright 1995; Cleaver 2001; Mosse 2001;
Cornwall & Edwards 2010; Tesoriero 2010).
The discussions so far point to a rather nebulous conceptualisation and application of
the term ‘empowerment’ in the CBRDP. When development projects are unclear about
what they seek to achieve and how these ill-defined achievements are measured, as the
above typifies, unintended outcomes are inevitable. The section also implied that the
project’s designers overlooked the country’s traditional institutions, while no strategy
was put in place to monitor unplanned outcomes. The next section draws on two case
studies from the empirical data to support this assertion. It discusses the manner in
which tensions between Traditional Chiefs and local government officials, which were
unplanned consequences of the apparent misguided application of ‘empowerment’,
negatively impacted on the CBRDPs.
7.3 Traditional Chiefs versus Local Government Officials
As discussed in Chapter One, Traditional Chiefs are much respected in Ghana and in the
West African subregion156. Regarded as the custodians of the lands in the country, the
chieftaincy institution is recognised and enshrined in Article 246 of Ghana’s
Constitution, which restricts the state from interfering in its affairs. Aside from being
constitutionally recognised, 30% of the seats of District Assemblies are also reserved
for Traditional Chiefs, while the Assembly also pays them 22.5% of the revenue from
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Stool Lands (Donkor 2005; Ahwoi 2010; Knierzinger 2011).157 Obviously,
development projects (such as the CBRDP) that sideline them will have dire
consequences, as the two case studies below illustrate.
7.3.1 Aboloo, Greater Accra Region158
Aboloo is a semi–urban town in the Greater Accra Region. The locality is less than an
hour’s drive from the nation’s capital. The population of Aboloo was estimated in 2010
to be two thousand five hundred (District Medium Term Development Plan 2010). The
town is inhabited by a variety of ethnic groups: GAs form 55%, Ewes 25% and other
groups, including the Akan and people from the northern part of the country, account
for the remaining 20% (DMTDP 2010). The main occupation of the residents is
agriculture, specifically peasant crop and animal farming, while others are engaged in
petty trading. Aboloo had no health centre or clinic; thus, residents relied on health
facilities in nearby towns such as Yamfo and Twibloh. While Aboloo had electricity,
significant sections of the town used kerosene for lighting. The town also had four
standpipes and three bore holes (DMTDP 2010; Aboloo Area Council Action Plan
2006; Fieldnotes 2011).
The fieldwork revealed Aboloo to have four basic schools: three privately–owned and
one government–owned, the Awoyo Basic School. This was the basis for constructing a
Community Library under the CBRDP to lift the low academic performance of the
locality. This problem, the Area Council Action Plan (2006) stated, was due to the
absence of a library facility in the locality and the generally poor state of the educational
infrastructure at the government–owned school, which was a disincentive to teachers
posted to the town. The absence of a library facility in Aboloo, the Action Plan
explained further, led to high rate of school dropouts, as parents could not cope with
spending lots of money on extra tuition. The construction of a Community Library was
therefore regarded as a measure intended to motivate local school children to study,
while attracting teachers to the town (Area Council Action Plan 2006). In the words of
the Team Leader of the project:
We were worried that many pupils could not read in the town. In fact in the
lower primary of the Awoyo Basic School only thirty-four [out of 130] could
read. So we made it our target to raise that number to eighty-four by September
2007 [through the library project].
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The Senior Linguist159 of Aboloo also explained that the library was built to “help the
school children with their reading and writing ... [and] also prevent the pupils from
going to video game centres at the nights and involving themselves in vices.” Because
of the urgency to improve the academic performance in the locality, the Assembly
Member of Aboloo explained that the project was implemented as a Rapid Response
Initiative160 and strategically situated on the compound of the Awoyo Basic School.161
Despite the good intentions that informed the construction of the library, the researcher
found it in a state of dereliction. As argued below, the state of the project was largely
attributable to a power contest between Aboloo’s Traditional Chiefs and local
government officials resulting in a legal tussle. The problem, which was not envisaged
by the CBRDP Headquarters or the World Bank, has left the facility unmaintained since
its construction.
Aboloo has ‘powerful’ Traditional Chiefs who constantly make news for various
advocacy issues in the interest of the locality162. Because of their influence, they tended
to regard themselves as those to control all development projects in the town, including
the CBRDP Library Project. For example, the Senior Linguist of Aboloo when
interviewed kept emphasising his assertion that, “Aboloo is a GA traditional town, so
we [Traditional Chiefs and Elders] wield the power to control and manage all
development projects in the locality.”163 He went further in arguing that Aboloo
benefitted from the CBRDP because of the influence of the Traditional Chiefs in the
Municipal Assembly, a claim the local government officials refuted.
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Photo 7.1: Exterior of the Aboloo CBRDP library.

Photo 7.2: Interior of the Aboloo CBRDP library.
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As indicated above, the fundamental aim of the CBRDP was to empower the rural
population and the weak local government sub–structures164 to make the Area Councils,
Assembly Members and Unit Committees highly functional. Before the implementation
of the CBRDP, Area Councils and Unit Committees, for example, were virtually in a
state of inertia, some scholars contending they be dissolved (Gyimah–Boadi 2009;
Ahwoi 2010). The CBRDP was therefore a seminal initiative that tested the
implementation capabilities of the local government sub–structure to make them
effective (CBRDP Implementation Manual 2006). Thus, by its design, the CBRDP was
supposed to be managed by the local government officials, albeit in an ‘undefined’
consultation arrangement with Traditional Chiefs (CBRDP Implementation Manual
2006).
Mandated to manage the CBRDPs, the local government officials of Aboloo were not
prepared to be dictated to by the Traditional Chiefs. These officials, some of who did
not hail from the town, argued that the CBRDP was explicit about empowering local
government officials to manage the project. While admitting that Traditional Chiefs
were important stakeholders in the CBRDP implementation processes, the local
government officials indicated that their role was only ceremonial. A 48-year-old man,
who was a Unit Committee Member of Aboloo, captured this attitude succinctly when
he argued that:
At the training session, the CBRDP officials from Accra told us that we must
manage the project and render all accounts. So, we have a duty to the CBRDP
Headquarters and the people who elected us and not to Traditional Chiefs … the
[CBRDP] officials explained that if anything went wrong with the project, they
would hold us responsible and Aboloo may not get such a project again.
After the project was completed and commissioned on November 08, 2007165, the
Senior Linguist explained that the Traditional Chiefs and Elders of Aboloo demanded
the local government officials to hand over all documents and render accounts on the
project to them. Led by the Project’s Team Leader, who was also a Unit Committee
Member, the local government officials refused to heed the Chiefs’ requests on the
grounds that the CBRDP officials in Accra had not authorised the directive. Apparently
annoyed by the actions of the local government officials, the Traditional Chiefs of
Aboloo announced, in a dawn broadcast, that the Unit Committees Members had been
suspended indefinitely from operating in the locality. The announcement went further to
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indicate, “The Unit Committees Members would have themselves to blame if they
flouted the order”. Confirming the suspension, the Senior Linguist of Aboloo explained
that they took the action because, as he put it, “the local government officials were
challenging our authority”.
Threatened by the broadcast, a Unit Committee Member indicated that they had to
“wash their hands of” the library for fear of their lives. The project’s Team Leader
criticised the Chiefs’ action as unconstitutional and, in consultation with the Municipal
Assembly, filed a lawsuit against the Traditional Chief and Elders of Aboloo at the
Accra High Court. Although the Assembly Member would not comment on the issue,
he hinted that the attitudes of the Elders were impacting on his work and the organising
of assets in the locality. Indicating his resolve not to contest the 2010 local government
elections because of the conflict, the Assembly Member explained that the state of the
library was an embarrassment to the locality. Asked how best the situation could be
resolved, he indicated that, “Aboloo Traditional Chiefs need to come out of their power
stupor and imperialist mentality.”
Many local people, from whom the data was drawn, in apparent ignorance of the
lawsuit and the local power struggles, appeared to be disappointed with the performance
of their Assembly Member. In fact, 55% of the respondents to the questionnaire
indicated that they did not know the Assembly Member, while almost 90% had no
knowledge of their Unit Committee Members. As explained in Chapter Five (see 5.5),
Unit Committees are the bridge between the local people and the Area Councils.
Working with the Assembly Member, they relate to people at the grassroots level; they
listen to their concerns for onward discussions during the Area Council meetings. Unit
Committees are very instrumental in local mobilisation and project maintenance
(Article 240 [4–8], Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992). Owing to their
suspension, between November 2007 and March 2011, when the fieldwork was
completed, Aboloo did not have a functioning Unit Committee that would have
otherwise mobilised the local people to maintain the library. While the Senior Linguist
indicated that the Traditional Chiefs were sourcing resources for maintaining the library
the researcher did not witness the project improve in any way throughout the seven
months fieldwork.
Of all the projects studied in Zone IV, the researcher found the Aboloo Library to be the
most neglected. Several cracks were visible in the structure and staircase (see photo
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7.1). Many of the windows either had no louvers or were broken. The library had no
electricity connected and there were no fans. In the afternoons the place could be so hot
that one female JHS 1 pupil remarked, “It’s difficult to concentrate in the heat. It is
terrible to study without fans. Some of my friends even use the books to fan
themselves”. A majority of pupils in the JHS 2 and above also explained that most of
the books in the library were irrelevant to their studies or were outdated. Furthermore,
there were not enough books for some sections and subjects, while others had none. For
example, the French, Information and Communication Technology and Ghanaian
languages sections had no books, while the mathematics section had only five; the
library also had no computer. The Librarian explained:
We haven’t got any books since the library was commissioned. Those here were
made possible by the out–gone District Education Director. Sometimes, good
people also walk in and give us books ... because of the book deficits [when they
are torn] I mend the pieces and put them back on the shelves, even if some pages
are missing.
Because of the conflict, many crucial administrative and resource challenges impacted
on the efficiency of the library. The first related to the library’s operating hours. The
library opened and closed during the Awoyo Basic School’s operating hours (8:00 am–
3:30pm). It was not opened at nights, during weekends or on holidays. Pupils in the
private schools also found the opening and closing times of the library discriminatory.
A male JHS 2 student of one of the private schools said, “we are not experiencing the
benefits of the library because they close at the government school times, whilst we
finish later. They don’t also open it on Saturdays and Sundays.” When asked why the
library closes early, does not open in the nights, on weekend and holidays, the Head
Teacher of the Awoyo Basic School explained:
Hmm [deep sigh] I have discussed it with the librarian. But I have discovered
that he needs an incentive to do those extra hours. But the motivation is not
forthcoming because of the problem between the local government officials and
the Traditional Chiefs. Another issue is that unlike librarians employed by the
Ghana Library Board who work on weekends, in the evenings and on holidays,
our librarian is a teacher employed by the Ghana Education Service and
expected to work within our 8:00am –3:30pm opening and closing times.
She suggested that:
The community support has to support and pay him some extra money, if they
want the library opened outside the school hours. We hope the court matter is
resolved quickly so that the local opinion leaders can organise community
volunteers to man the library after school. Otherwise it will not be serving the
purpose for which it was built.
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Although the library was meant for all pupils in the locality, it could not accommodate a
standard class of forty pupils, as the quantity of furniture was inadequate. Whenever the
library was full, the other pupils had the options of either sitting on the floor or standing
to read. If the class was large, those who could not access the library had to sit in the
classroom, having missed the allocated “library hour” on the timetable. A teacher from
one of the private schools explained that they scarcely visited the library as it was
always full and there were not enough relevant textbooks. He was also of the opinion
that each school in the locality should be allocated days and times to use the facility. In
separate interviews, the Librarian, Head Teacher and the Senior Linguist appealed for
support for the library. The Project’s Team Leader expressed similar concerns when he
said:
I visited the library last week and I saw how the project has been left
unmaintained. The staircase has cracks all over and some of the louvers are off.
On top, there are not enough books ... this is becoming disgraceful. But what can
we do when ‘the powers that be’ would not allow us the freedom to operate?
The above analysis points to what could become of ‘good’ project such as Aboloo’s
Library Project, that are based on complex concepts, but whose outcomes are not
monitored and managed. While the CBRDP aimed to ‘empower’ Aboloo’s local
government officials, it seemed not to have envisaged the consequences of sidelining
the locality’s influential Traditional Chiefs; in fact the final outcome was
disempowering for many. Aboloo is just one of the many localities in Ghana where
fracas between Traditional Chiefs and local government officials negatively impact on
development projects (see Abotchie 2006; Ahwoi 2010). Ntoaso, a town in the Eastern
Region, is another case in point.
7.3.2 Ntoaso, Eastern Region166
Ntoaso received a sixteen-seater public toilet facility from the CBRDP. Located almost
seventy-five kilometres from Accra, Ghana’s capital city, Ntoaso falls under the
Asempa Municipality of the Eastern Region of Ghana. The town is inhabited by
Akyems, the traditional land owners, Ewes, Akwapims and people from the northern
parts of the country. Many of the residents engage in palm oil business, farming and
petty trading. Because the locality is not far from major trading spots such as Kwabre,
Winneba and Accra, many of the traders and farmers commute to these centres to sell

166

The original name of the town and others mentioned have been deidentified for ethical reasons.
172

their wares and return the same day. Ntoaso has electricity, pipe born water and one
government–owned basic school (Asempa Municipal MTDP 2010167).
Before the implementation of the CBRDP’s sixteen-seater facility in 2008, Ntoaso had
only one public toilet facility, which was donated by the European Union. As of 2009,
this facility located north of the town was insufficient to serve the town’s population of
almost nearly four thousand, (Ntoaso Area Council Action Plan 2006). Those on the
south opined it was too far from them, apart from the fact that they had to sometime join
long queues to use it. In fact, up to the period of the fieldwork, the EU toilet facility was
not in use as it had cracks and posed dangers for users. The lack of public toilet in the
town, the Ntoaso Area Council Action Plan (2006) stated, had led to indiscriminate
defecation in the town, a situation that led to the outbreak of cholera in the town. Thus,
when the town was chosen as a beneficiary of the CBRDP, it was greeted with joy as
many deemed it timely. The project was completed and in use as the fieldwork finished.
However, during most visits to the facility, the researcher observed that it was not being
well–maintained. For example, although tokens were being charged for using it, the
facility appeared to be untidy. This annoyed many of the users, some of who refused to
pay the token on the grounds that the monies were not being used for its maintenance.
Frustrated by the situation, the caretaker explained that she could not enforce the
payment of the user fees as the facility looked unkempt. As this case study will show,
the project was in this state because the Traditional Chief of the Town was quarrelling
with the Area Council Chairman and Assembly Member of the town over who had the
‘power’ to manage the facility.
An indigene of Yakoko, the Traditional Chief had ruled Ntoaso for twenty-one years.
As most Traditional Chiefs in Ghana would claim, the Ntoaso Chief indicated that his
ancestors owned the land of Ntoaso and therefore had a default right to oversee all
development projects in the locality, including the CBRDP public toilet facility. Since
October 2008, when it was completed, the Chief had complained about what he termed
as the “arrogance of the Assembly Member” of the locality. He argued that:
The Assembly Member and his so–called [Unit] Committee Members, who
manage the project, are over stepping their borders. Before he became the
Assembly Member I was the Chief. Yet, he is still holding unto the keys of the
toilet and has refused to hand them over to me and my Elders.
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The Chief considered the Assembly Member’s refusal to hand over the keys as a
challenge to his traditional authority and indicated that he was in a process of auditing
the facility’s user fee proceeds. Further probes during the interviews with him revealed
his poor understanding of the fact that the CBRDP was designed to be managed by local
government officials. For example, when the researcher asked him what he knew about
the project, he claimed that the CBRDP was sponsored from the coffers of the
Municipal Assembly; and that it was a way of thanking the residents for being stalwart
followers of the New Patriotic Party, under whose government (2001–2008) the project
was implemented. Apparently ignorant about the terms of the CBRDP, the Chief was
drawing on his traditional ‘powers’ to demand the right to control the project.
The Assembly Member in question had been in office for eight years (2003–2010) and
also served as the Area Council Chairman for four years (2006–2010). He recounted the
frustrations he encountered in getting the Municipal authorities to approve Ntoaso as a
beneficiary of CBRDP funds. Interestingly, the Chief also claimed that it was his
goodwill with the Municipal Chief Executive (MCE) that led to the choice of Ntoaso as
the location of the new toilet facility. The Assembly Member denied this, explaining
that the CBRDP was not for Traditional Chiefs, but about the strengthening of local
government institutions. As a result, he and the Unit Committees owed a duty to the
Government of Ghana to manage the project and not to the Traditional Chief, although
he was ready to render accounts to the latter, if asked.
During one of my visits to the town, the Traditional Chief and Elders had summoned
the Assembly Member to render accounts on the project. The Chief reported:
Last week the Assembly Member came and rendered the accounts on the
project. But we [the Chief and his Elders] were dissatisfied and doubted the
figures …We feel there is something fishy somewhere because although the
Assembly Member claimed that he sponsored part of the project with his
personal money and that the community owes him a total sum of about GHC
5000168, we are aware that that the District Assembly fully funded it, while the
community contributed labour.
According to the Assembly Member, as briefly explained in Chapter Five, when the
project was approved by the CBRDP secretariat, it was supposed to be a sixteen–seat
facility. When the work started, it was not known that the MCE had ordered the project
sum be equally divided between Ntoaso and Adoagyiri, a town in the Municipality also
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in need of a toilet facility. This brought the Ntoaso project to a standstill for a while as
the local government officials were finding it difficult to change the project to an eightseater facility. However, the Assembly Member decided to go ahead with the original
sixteen-seater plan and hoped that the local people would help with tokens.
Unfortunately, while some residents contributed, many did not. Under the
circumstances, he had to use his own monies to complete the project, hoping that he
would be reimbursed later from the facility’s user fee proceeds.

Photo 7.3: Male entrance of the Ntoaso CBRDP.

Photo 7.4: Female entrance of the Ntoaso CBRDP.
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The Assembly Member explained further that the Unit Committee Members and the
Zone IV Headquarters of the CBRDP were aware of the monies owed him. Further, he
explained that although he had produced receipts to support his claims, the Traditional
Chief and his Elders suspected that he had concocted the figures. He asserted that until
he recouped all the debt owed him, he was not ready to hand over the project to the
Chief.
Concerning the maintenance of the toilet facility, the Assembly Member indicated this
to be the responsibility of all the residents, the user fees not being enough for the
upkeep of the facility. In addition, because the facility was constructed as a community–
based project, the he expected that the Chiefs would support him to organise communal
labour for its maintenance. However, owing to the lack of cooperation from the
Traditional Chief and his Elders, he explained that he was reluctant to call for
communal labour to clean the toilets or clear the bushes around it (see photos above).
Such an initiative could be interpreted to mean he undermining the authority of the
Traditional Chief169. Some women the researcher interviewed indicated that as the
facility was surrounded by bushes they were concerned about being bitten by snakes if
they made use of it in the early morning or at night times.
The questionnaires and other informal interviews indicated that the Assembly Member
had the support of most residents in the locality, but he admitted to fearing for his life.
Consequently, although he was eligible to contest the 2010 local government elections,
he voluntarily stepped down, blaming the decision on his dispute with the Traditional
Chief and his Elders. He said:
I have had enough of the nonsense of these Chiefs, who know nothing about
local governance. I’m out and out for good. I’m only biding the time to recoup
my money and then hand over the keys to the CBRDP officials, who put me in
charge of the project. If they give the project to the Traditional Chiefs to manage
it, I care less.
Meanwhile, as of July 2012, key informants from Ntoaso contacted by the researcher
indicated the toilet facility to be in no better state than it was in March 2011 when the
fieldwork was concluded. Furthermore, while the former Assembly Member had
handed over the keys, the CBRDP authorised the new local government officials to
manage it. Consequently, as of July 2012 the Traditional Chief and his Elders have not

169

In many traditional areas in Ghana, Traditional Chiefs call for communal labour.
176

been cooperating with the new officers to organise communal labour to maintain the
toilet facility.
Notwithstanding the above case studies, the researcher found one example of positive
power relations between the Chief and the Assembly Member of Pakro in the Eastern
Region, one of the CBRDP beneficiary localities. During the fieldwork, the researcher
witnessed several instances where the two were conferring on local issues. In separate
interview sessions, both spoke kindly of each other and related several instances where
they had collaborated to solve problems in the locality. In the latter stages of collecting
data in Pakro, the researcher learned that the mutual respect between the Chief and the
Assembly Member was partly due to their familial ties. Nevertheless, the Pakro
mechanised borehole project was faced with challenges that were unrelated to power
relations, but involved technical issues and community resistance to paying user fees.
On a positive note, the Chief and Assembly Member were working hard to resolve these
problems.
7.4 Conclusion
This chapter set out to show how the vague application of the term ‘empowerment’ in
the design and implementation of Ghana’s CBRDP impacted on the project’s outcomes.
The first section of the chapter explained why ‘empowerment’ is too complex a concept
to be ‘cut and pasted’ into development aid project designs. It was argued that while
‘empowerment’ offers many advantages if used appropriately, the concept presents
many theoretical challenges. Aside from the tendency to be gender- specific, despite
being a generic term, measuring ‘empowerment’ can be challenging, as scholars
disagree on whether the term is a process or an outcome or both. The fact that
‘empowerment’ is pivotal to the concept of ‘power’ makes it even more problematic.
Because ‘power’ is not a neutral concept and cannot be shared, empowering one group
may mean disempowering others by breaking certain traditional norms or monopolies.
This may lead to conflicts if outcomes are not properly monitored.
The second section examined the CBRDP documents to reveal the manner in which
‘empowerment’ was applied in the project’s design and implementation. The section
showed that ‘empowerment’ was loosely applied by the CBRDP as the project: 1) Had
no working definition of ‘empowerment’; 2) Targeted women and vulnerable groups,
although it was meant to empower the general population; and 3) Measured
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‘empowerment’ only in terms of participation, ignoring the conditions that perpetuated
the ‘powerlessness’. As a result of the imprecise application of ‘empowerment’ in the
CBRDP, Ghana’s Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Environment
and the World Bank’s Advisory Team, who designed the project, appeared to have
overlooked the country’s institution of Traditional Chiefs and had no strategy in place
to monitor unintended outcomes.
To support this assertion, the last section of the chapter drew on the empirical data to
illustrate the manner in which power struggles and conflicts between Traditional Chief
and local government officials negatively impacted on the CBRDPs. The analysis
suggest that in their pursuit of strengthening Ghana’s decentralisation process through
the CBRDPs, the designers of the project appeared to have focused only on the local
government sub–structures, overlooking the country’s influential traditional
establishment. While the intent to empower Assembly and Unit Committee Members
was important, the project’s designers should have realised that the local government
officials did not function in isolation, but were a part of a very complex socio–cultural
system. It was therefore essential to have considered the whole context within which the
project was implemented, while having a strategy to monitor unintended outcomes.
As the case studies showed, the Traditional Chiefs of Aboloo and Ntoaso seemed to
have been uninformed about the CBRDP’s inherent intent of empowering the country’s
local government sub–structures, contradicting the World Bank’s claim that Ghana’s
decentralisation system is highly functional (see Chapter Five). Acting within their
usual traditional ‘powers’, the Traditional Chiefs clashed with the newly empowered
local government officials, who refused to pander to their whims. These conflicts have
left the projects poorly maintained and in a state of dereliction. The Aboloo Library
Project was faced with many crucial administrative and resource challenges that
impacted on its efficiency, while the Ntoaso public toilet facility was left almost always
in an untidy state, as the Traditional Chief of the locality refused to collaborate with the
Assembly Member to organise the residents to clean it periodically. Hence the two
CBRDP outcomes were not being fully utilised by the people for whom they were
designed, becoming the centre of a protracted legal battle.
The CBRDP Headquarters was aware of the state of the projects, expressing their
disappointment at the outcomes. Some of the Managers argued that, as the projects were
only pilots; their states were of no concern, as one of them asserted, “To be pedantic
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about terms and concepts”. The Managers appeared to be more concerned about the
sanctity of the financial accounts on the project that had to be rendered to the
government and the World Bank. The findings presented in the chapter reflect the
observation of many scholars that international development discourse is full of
normative and idealised terms that are not matched by clear conceptualisations.
Moreover the data and case studies presented in this chapter clearly show a ‘breakdown
of development’ as a result of power struggles and problems around ‘empowerment’.
As a result the project led to a poorly functioning local government system, the exact
opposite of what it was supposed to achieve.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION
Bad policies can easily destroy development and defy common sense…. This
has been one of our weaknesses in Africa over the last 50 years. Our policies
have been very much externally–driven, shaped and financed rather than
endogenous. Worse, they were often based on frequently shifting trends in
development thinking and practice, rather than our own internally generated
consensuses.
Donald Kaberuka170 (2011, p. 3)
This thesis has taken its researcher and now its reader from the macro–perspectives of
International Development Aid (aid) to the nuanced meanings derived from doctoral
fieldwork in three regions of Ghana. In between, the thesis has focused on the manner in
which the inappropriate application decentralisation theories and normative concepts,
such as community and empowerment, influenced the outcomes of the World Bankfunded Community–Based Rural Development Project (CBRDP) in Ghana. To remind
the reader the Primary Research Question was:
How were the outcomes of the Community–Based Rural Development Projects
in selected Districts of Ghana influenced by contested decentralisation theories
and complex concepts such as ‘community’ and ‘empowerment’?
Three key findings stood out in the thesis: 1) The World Bank’s mistaken categorisation
of Ghana’s decentralisation system as highly functional negatively impacted on the
design and outcomes of the CBRDP; 2) The lack of ‘community’ in the CBRDP
beneficiary localities affected the implementation and the maintenance of the projects;
and 3) The CBRDP’s inappropriate application of the concept of ‘empowerment’ led to
tensions between Traditional Chiefs and Local Government Officials. Below the
findings are discussed in turn, followed with a discussion of their implication for
development theory and practice.
Finding I: The World Bank’s Mistaken Categorisation of Ghana’s
Decentralisation System as Highly Functional Negatively Impacted on the Design
of the CBRDP
The thesis found that Ghana’s inter–governmental system is not highly functional, as
the World Bank claims. Although Traditional Chiefs play key roles in Ghana’s local
government system, it is inherently partisan and effectively controlled by central
government. Given this limitation, the CBRDP documents indicated that: “the CBRDP
170

President of the African Development Bank.
180

was designed to strengthen the country’s weak local government sub–structures”
(CBRDP Implementation Manual 2006, CBRDP Annual Reports 2005–2010, CBRDP
Zone IV Annual Reports 2005–2010). While this clearly contradicts the categorisation
of Ghana’s inter-government system as being highly functional, an analysis of the
country’s decentralisation set up within the framework of the World Bank’s four
indicators is even more revealing. The World Bank’s indicators of a highly functional
inter–government system include settings where there are: 1) Decentralisation laws that
create local government structures with autonomy in resource management; 2) Local
elections; 3) Fiscal decentralisation and; 4) Devolution of service delivery. Examined
within these indicators, Ghana falls short of the high-functioning labelling, and casts
serious doubts on the robustness of the World Bank’s indicators.
While the Ghana’s constitution and various Local Government Acts make provision for
a decentralised local government system, the same statutes appear to promote
centralisation, which hinders the autonomy of local authorities, and the realisation of an
effective fiscal and administrative decentralisation. Examples of such statutes include
Act 462, which allows the President to both appoint 30% of the DA membership and
sack those who constitute the other 70% elected by popular votes; Article 10 (3) of Act
462 that subjects the Medium Term Development Plans and budgets of DAs to central
government’s approval; and Act 462 (Section 88) and Financial Administration Act
2003 (Act 654), which limit the amount of loans DAs can contract. This finding shows
that the fact that a country’s constitution and legal framework makes provision for
decentralised local governance does not necessarily make it high functioning.
Fiscal decentralisation has not been achieved in Ghana. This is attributable to the weak
revenue base of DAs, existence of laws that limit the financial independence of local
government structures; and the unwillingness of the central government to undertake
true fiscal decentralisation. 81% of the revenues of DAs come from the central
government funding, specifically, the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF). Even
so, while the law that established the DACF enjoins the central government to transfer a
minimum of 5% of the total national revenue to the DACF, successive governments
base this percentage on the total national tax revenue instead. Additionally, DAs appear
not to determine how and where to utilise their DACF, as nearly 60% are limited to
specific sectors. While the realisation of true fiscal decentralisation has many benefits,
the central government seem unwilling to implement the composite budget, although
Section 10 (3) of the Local Government Act 462 directs them to do same.
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Securitized within the framework of local elections, the third indicator of a highfunctioning inter-governmental system, Ghana’s decentralisation set up still falls short.
Statistics from the country’s electoral commission shows that Ghanaians seem not to
take local government elections as a serious political exercise, when compared with
their patronage at presidential elections. For example, Voter turnout at local government
elections held between 1994–2010 averaged nearly 36%, considerably lower than the
approximately 70% patronage of presidential elections held for the 1992–2008 periods.
Administrative decentralisation (Devolution of Service) in Ghana is challenged by the
centralising tendencies of the Local Government Act 462 and the lack of infrastructure.
Therefore, government departments in the districts appear to function only as de–
concentrated offices of their parent Ministries in the capital, Accra. Owing to the
paucity of infrastructure in most regional areas, public servants tend to refuse posting to
such places; they consider it as punishment. The situation is impacting on the
availability of human resources needed to achieve true administrative decentralisation in
the country.
Aside from the evidence discussed above, analysis of the empirical data presented in
Chapter Five on issues affecting local government officials in Ghana, further confirms
the stalled nature of the country’s decentralisation system. The last section of Chapter
Five discussed the plights of Assembly Members, key facilitators of development at the
local. It was found that Assembly Members are challenged by the non-payment of
salary, working with partisan DCEs, weak Unit Committees and power-seeking
Traditional Chiefs. These challenges, the chapter revealed, do impact significant on
their overall role in the local government machinery.
The World Bank’s endorsement of Ghana’s decentralisation system as highly functional
meant that the CBRDP was designed under the so–called Matching Strategy. By this,
the project was designed and implemented on the country’s existing political systems
without adjustments. The design of the CBRDP on Ghana’s highly politicised local
government structures led to three problems. First, by its design, the CBRDP was
subjected to political machinations. District Chief Executives, who are appointees of the
central government and the most influential government representatives at the local
areas, had the freedom to choose which locality benefitted from the project and who did
not. As indicated above, some localities that did not qualify for the project benefited. In
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other instances, some DCEs used the projects as political campaign tool for their
political party and to seek election into parliament.
Second, the fact that the CBRDP was implemented on a system, which did not pay
salaries to Assembly Members, meant that the project could be bedevilled by corrupt
practises. Assembly Members work so hard, but earn virtually nothing. This explains
why, as Chapter Six showed, some Assembly Members awarded the CBRDP
purchasing contracts to themselves and cronies. Such corrupt practices, the thesis
argued, impacted on the overall quality of the projects.
Finally, the World Bank’s categorisation of Ghana’s decentralisation as highly
functional made them lose sight of the fact that the CBRDP was theoretically fashioned
on concepts, such as ‘community’ and ‘empowerment’, which were at variance with the
demographical realities of the country and the beneficiary localities. As it turned out
‘communities’ did not practically exist in the beneficiary localities, leading to the poor
maintenance of the projects. Furthermore, the inappropriate application of
‘empowerment’ in the CBRDP led to tensions between local government officials and
Traditional Chiefs. The impact of the inappropriate application of the concepts of
‘community’ and ‘empowerment’ on the outcomes of the CBRDP are discussed in
Findings II and III respectively.
Finding II: The lack of ‘community’ in the CBRDP beneficiary localities affected
the implementation and maintenance of the projects
The concept of ‘community’ is appealing, yet deceptive. Although a complex term,
community is often misused in development program designs, Ghana’s CBRDP being
no exception. As argued in Chapter Six, the designers of the CBRDP appeared not to
have appreciated the complexity of the term, conceptualising it in the spatial sense,
although the concept transcends the notion of territoriality. A community, it was argued,
must have: 1) Function that drives the group; 2) Opportunity for interaction; 3)
Membership who identifies with and contributes to it; and 4) Culture that makes it
distinct from others.
Analysis of the empirical data in the sixth chapter of the thesis showed that the
dynamics, ground settlement and mobility patterns of the CBRDP beneficiary localities
did not support interaction to the levels required for a coherent ‘community’ to exist, or
simply put, ‘communities’ did not seem to exist there. For example, the residents of
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Tease in the Afram Plains tended not to associate with the town as ‘members’ and
therefore had an attitude of the members being transient towards the locality because of
its remoteness. In the case of Tashie in the Tema Municipality, the data showed that the
residents were politically factionalised, apart from feeling in common that the CBRDP
did not meet their most crucial need, a public toilet facility. Furthermore, most
inhabitants of Tashie, some of whom had moved from other parts of the country to live
there or work in the capital171, tended not to regard themselves as members of the
locality who must, according to CBRDP official documents, contribute to its
development. The data from Agbetor in the Volta Region showed it to be risky to build
a community–based project around one influential Traditional Chief. Furthermore, it
revealed the importance of improving the economic conditions of development
beneficiaries, so that they can maintain and ‘own’ the said projects responsibly.
Despite these challenges, the designers of the CBRDP, it was found, did not developed
the communities within which to base the project in the beneficiary localities. Although
a complex term, the theoretical discussions revealed that communities could be nurtured
around a function. For example, the CBRDP officials could have developed a strong
Traders Community in Tease before implementing the market sheds project. This way,
the traders would have taken ownership of and maintained the shed better than was
apparent during the fieldwork. However, those who designed the project clearly ignored
the need to develop a community in Tease before constructing the now abandoned
market sheds. This explains why most of the CBRDP studied were in a state of
complete disarray at the time of the fieldwork as there were no ‘communities’, such as
those described above, in the localities to maintain them. Therefore the conclusion is
that projects such as CPRDP cannot be sufficiently based on idealised, yet complex and
contested terms such as community. It is important that programs attempting to apply
the concepts clearly define and conceptualise it within the confines of the grounded
realities and social dynamics of beneficiary localities. In this way development projects
may receive maximum local support and be more likely to be effectively maintained.
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Finding III: The CBRDP’s inappropriate application of the Concept of
‘Empowerment’ led to tensions between Traditional Chiefs and Local Government
Officials
The term ‘empowerment’ was inappropriately applied in the implementation of the
CBRDP as it led to tension between local government officials and Traditional Chiefs.
Like ‘community’, ‘empowerment’ is a complex term concept that presents many
theoretical difficulties when attempts to define it are made. Aside from the tendency to
be gender–specific and despite being a generic term, measuring empowerment presents
many challenges, scholars disagreeing on whether the term is a process or an outcome
or both. The fact that ‘empowerment’ is predicated on the concept of ‘power’ makes it
even more complicated. The reason for this dilemma is that ‘power’ is not a neutral
concept and cannot be shared; empowering one group may mean disempowering others
by breaking certain traditional norms or monopolies. This may lead to conflicts, if
outcomes are not properly monitored as shown in this thesis.
Despite these theoretical challenges ‘empowerment’ was loosely applied in the CBRDP
as the project: 1) Had no working definition of ‘empowerment’; 2) Targeted women and
vulnerable groups, although it was meant to empower the general population; and 3)
Measured ‘empowerment’ only in term of participation, ignoring the conditions that
perpetuated the ‘powerlessness’. As a result of the inappropriate application of
‘empowerment’ in the CBRDP, Ghana’s Ministry of Local Government and Rural
Development and the World Bank’s Advisory Team, designers of the project, appeared
to have overlooked the country’s Traditional Chiefs and had no strategy in place to
monitor unintended outcomes.
Analysis of the data drawn from Ntoaso in the Eastern Region and Aboloo in the
Greater Accra Region points to a policy error. In their pursuit to strengthen Ghana’s
decentralisation process through the CBRDP, the designers of the project appeared to
have focused only on the local government sub–structures, and overlooked the
country’s influential traditional establishment. While the intent to empower Assembly
and Unit Committee Members was important, the project’s designers ignored the reality
that the local government officials do not function in isolation, but are part of a very
complex socio–cultural system; a system that draws heavily on the influence of
Traditional Chiefs to provide social capital.
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As the two case studies showed, the Traditional Chiefs of Aboloo and Ntoaso appeared
to have been uninformed about the CBRDP’s objective of empowering the country’s
local government sub–structures. Acting within their usual traditional ‘powers’, the
Traditional Chiefs clashed with the ‘newly empowered’ local government officials.
These conflicts have left the projects poorly maintained and in a state of dereliction, as
the Chiefs who wield the social capital to organise such maintenance activities felt
sidelined. The Aboloo Library Project was faced with many crucial administrative and
resource challenges that impacted on its efficiency, while the Ntoaso Public Toilet
Facility was almost always left in an untidy state. In the latter case, the Traditional
Chief of the locality refused to collaborate with the Assembly Member to organise the
residents to clean the toilet facility periodically. Hence the researcher found that the
CBRDP’s two major assets were not being fully utilised by the people for whom they
were designed; instead they had become the centre of a protracted legal battle.
Implication for Development Theory and Practice
The most important implications from this thesis is that international development
agencies and donors need to understand the contextual realities of countries and
localities in which they wish to bring about improvements. In the case of Ghana, those
who designed the CBRDP failed to appreciate the dynamics of the country and the
beneficiary ‘communities’, leading to the poor maintenance of the aid-funded project.
The lack of appreciation for the CBRDP beneficiary localities was evident in the
designers’ failure to adjust the project and its pivotal concepts to suit the country’s
highly politicised, weak local government and influential chieftaincy systems. Four
themes that emerged strongly in the thesis may be considered for their implications for
aid effectiveness discussion, development theory and practice.
First, the findings have brought to the fore the need for international development
agencies to move beyond conferences and mechanisms that are results-based in their
quest for ways of making their aid effective. It is crucial that stakeholders in aid
effectiveness discussions carefully consider aid recipients’ social, political, economic
and cultural settings in the design of program-based aid initiatives. For example, while
Community-Driven Development Program is hailed as a ‘messianic’ aid delivery
mechanism at the World Bank, the thesis has shown that CDD, in itself, is not the
panacea to aid ineffectiveness. While it offers some advantages for delivering aid
effectively, the thesis has exposed its operations as systematically underpinned by
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theories and concepts that may have little relevance to the social and politico–cultural
realities of beneficiaries.
The findings of the thesis resonate with the ‘Principle of Alignment’, captured in the
2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The principle enjoins donors to arrange
their aid through the recipient countries’ priorities and make better use of their policies
and systems (OECD 2011). The thesis has provided the empirical basis for extending
the principle to include “the need for donors to align and design their aid programs to
suit the social and politico–cultural realities of aid beneficiaries”. This is important
because although the Paris Declaration (2005) instructs donors to commit and
implement 66% of their aid as programs, the findings of the thesis show that aid
programs cannot produce any positive outcomes, if they are based on theories and
concepts that are contextually flawed.
Second, the thesis has underscored the importance of investing in social research before,
during and after the design and implementation of aid programs. Researching aid
beneficiary settings is crucial, as it provides empirical grounds for designing and
implementing programs in a contextually appropriate manner. Such an exercise may be
cost effective, compared to the consequences of ignoring it. The thesis has established
the usefulness of ethno–methodology as a credible technique for understanding how aid
works on the ground. Termed ‘aidnography’, the qualitative study of aid, the data and
insights produced herewith confirm the potency of the research methodology. Beyond
the ‘politicised’ depiction of Ghana as an ‘evidence that developments works’172 and the
country’s economic–centric aid literature, aidnography enabled the researcher to
experience the convoluted nature of the contexts in which aid programs are
implemented. The technique also allowed the researcher to examine the CBRDP
through the eyes and the lived–experiences of the beneficiaries.
Development pundits and donor agencies tend always to cite Ghana as the ‘Star of
Africa’. This labelling appears to mask the realities of the country’s political and
cultural systems, while discouraging investment in social research before development
programs are designed and implemented there. This projection, which has made Ghana
one of the preferred destinations for donor support in Sub–Saharan Africa, the thesis has
shown, has not necessarily guaranteed the success of aid programs implemented in the
country; Structural Adjustments, Millennium Development Goals and the Community172

See DFID Ghana webpage: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/ghana, retrieved August 10, 2012.
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Based Rural Development Projects (CBRDP) being cases in point. While Ghana may be
benefitting from the ‘misrepresentation’ in the short term, the researcher argues that the
distortion of the country’s grounded realities is detrimental to the country’s overall
growth in the long term. To obtain first hand information on aid beneficiary grounded
realities, it is important that international development organisations move beyond
‘celebrity labels’, and meticulously study the country or locality’s relevant
demographical dynamics.
The thesis has also underscored the need for international development organisations to
expose local project officials to the theoretical intricacies of key terms and concepts that
underpin their development projects. Such terms as community, community
engagement, empowerment, participation, sustainability, gender–equality, social capital
and power are discussed at length in the thesis. Relative to the Ghana’s CBRDP, the
research findings showed that the CBRDP Managers and Officials involved with the
project did not have a clear theoretical or even practical understanding of the key
concepts on which the project was based. As a result, they appeared to be ignorant about
the fact that they were: 1) Implementing a community–based project in a location where
a coherent ‘community’ did not seem to exist; and 2) Creating tensions by focusing only
on ‘empowering’ local government officials, while sidelining local Traditional Chiefs,
forgetting that the former were a part of a very complex socio–cultural system. In lieu
of their apparent misapprehension of the complexity of the key concepts on which the
CBRDP was predicated, there were no contingency plans and strategies in place for
monitoring and managing the project’s unintended outcomes. This oversight, the thesis
has shown, had a debilitating impact on the maintenance of the CBRDP projects, some
of which were completely abandoned.
Finally, the thesis has highlighted the importance of channelling aid funds into
improving the political institutions of developing countries, as the latter invariably
impact on how development programs work on the ground. The thesis revealed the fate
of the CBRDP, when it interacted directly with Ghana’s political institutions and
culture. It showed that it is not enough to blame the failure of aid programs on
international development agencies alone, as the outcomes of the CBRDP may have
been different, if Ghana had an efficient decentralisation system. While it is essential for
donors to invest directly in health, education and transportation programs, the thesis has
revealed that the poor functioning of these interventions is directly linked to the state of
the beneficiaries’ political systems. Interestingly, on December 12, 2012, Janmejay
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Singh, a World Bank CDD expert, posted an article on the institution’s website calling
on practitioners to put institutions at the centre of CDD programs173.
While seeking to wean itself off aid in the long term, the Ghanaian Government may
have to seek development assistance to address the following. First, the country’s
Constitutional Review Commission may need to consider drafting legislative
instruments to strengthen the country’s local government institutions. Specifically, such
legislation should consider reducing the powers of District/ Municipal Chief Executives
or make [DCE/MCEs] electable by popular vote rather than continuing to employ the
existing practice of appointment by the President. It may also be worthwhile to make
DCE/MCEs ineligible to contest for parliamentary elections; this way, the politicisation
of the system may be reduced considerably.
Second, the government may also have to consider enacting laws that support policies
for engendering effective fiscal decentralisation. As the thesis showed, local
government authorities in the country seem to be constitutionally subjected to the
whims of the central government; the situation breeds corruption and political
machinations. It may be crucial for the state to amend laws which subject the financial
transactions of local authorities to the approval of the central government and caps the
amount of loan a District Assemblies can contract to only GHC 2000. Such statutes
include the 2003 Financial Administration Act 654, the Financial Administration
Regulation, 2004; the Internal Audit Agency Act, 2003, Act, (Act 655); the Public
Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663); and Section 88 of the Local Government Act 462
(Kyei–Baffour 2006; Gyimah–Boadi 2009; Ahwoi 2010). As argued in the thesis, these
statutes appear to centralise financial administration and deny local authorities the
needed fiscal autonomy to operate effectively. It is therefore important that the Ministry
of Finance and Economic Planning heed Section 10 (3) of the Local Government Act
462, which enjoins them to implement a composite budget. When implemented, these
structures would strengthen the country’s fiscal decentralisation agenda, as local
government authorities would have the authority to control their revenues, budgets and
expenditure.
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Finally, it would be useful if Ghana’s Ministry of Local Government and Rural
Development put in place structures that screen and orientate prospective Assembly and
Unit Committee Members. This is important because some of these aspirants, as this
thesis showed, take up the role and later become disillusioned when faced with the
sacrificial realities of the job. At the same time, the state should consider paying these
officials salaries if the expectation is that they work with dedication. It is also equally
important that Traditional Chiefs be educated on the country’s local government system
so as to avoid their tendency to feel sidelined, and therefore compelled to draw on
traditional powers to control, or as the case may be, frustrate development projects in
their localities. Being agents of social capital at the local level, Traditional Chiefs wield
the power to influence the outcomes of development programs in their traditional areas.
In sum, global efforts at making aid effective should pay closer attention to the use of
contested theories and normative, yet complex concepts in aid-program designs. Such
attention should begin with investing in social research activities that employ credible
methodologies for understanding the grounded realities of development beneficiaries.
This is crucial if projects meant to improve the lives of people in developing countries
are to be sustainable. As the thesis has shown, understanding the grounded realities of
‘development’ beneficiaries is more important than heeding the politicised and
contested theories espoused by leading international aid agencies and institutions, who
seem to be constantly moving, shifting and changing the aid discourse ‘landscape’ at
times without empirical justification. These changes appear to be at variance with the
contextual realities of ‘development’ recipients.
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APPENDIX A: CBRDP Components
Like most CDD programs, Ghana’s CBRDP strategy was aimed at investing in
community capacity building and empowerment. The project had six components
namely: (I) Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building (ISCB); (II)
Infrastructure for Agricultural Development (IAD); (III) Rural Enterprise and Learning
Centres (RELC); (IV) Infrastructure for Social and Human Development (ISHD); (V)
Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM); and (VI) Project
Management (PM). The first and last components were predominantly administrative
and had no subprojects. The other four components included subprojects which ranged
from: rehabilitation of feeder roads; building of schools; health facilities; providing
potable water; skills training to the unemployed; and dams for agricultural purposes; to
protecting the environment and natural resources (CBRDP Imple. Manual 2005).
I. Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building
The ISCB component had three main objectives. (i) Strengthen the capacity and skills
of Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD), Regional
Coordinating Councils (RCCs), District Assemblies (DAs), Area Councils (ACs),
Community-Based Organizations, (CBOs), Not-For-Profit and Non –Governmental
Organizations (FNGOs), private and public service providers, and rural communities to
deliver cost-effective services to rural communities, manage, monitor, evaluate and
maintain public and private goods and strengthen functional and governance capacities.
(ii) Strengthen the financial and procurement management capacities of MLGRD and
regional and district tender boards, committees, councils, ACs and other procurement
entities. (iii) Strengthen the decentralization secretariat to pursue the decentralization
agenda pursuant to the Local Government Service Act.
This category was largely borne by the CBRDP secretariat in conjunction with the
RICUs. Primarily, it involved a training process, which was delivered by the project’s
consultants. The above listed organizations and institutions were taken through two or
three weeks workshops on the CBRDP (the other four components), Ghana’s
decentralization concept, participatory planning, monitoring and evaluation, resource
mobilization, leadership, communication, community decision- making processes, how
to prepare community action plans, records keeping, procurement and contract
management, and financial management. All who attended were given handouts
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(CBRDP Trainers Manual for Area Councils Members and Opinion Leaders, 2005;
Annual Reports 2006-2010).
II. Infrastructure for agricultural development
Under this component, beneficiaries ACs were given grants for four purposes: (i) Water
for agriculture, including small-scale irrigation from stream flow diversions, pumping
and run-off management, ponds, dugouts and tube wells; earthen banks, bunds and
other flow control structures. (ii) Improving skills for management of facilities,
including development of basic skills of beneficiaries for the appropriate application of
recommended best catchment management practices and operation and maintenance of
investments in water. (iii) Rehabilitation of priority feeder roads, provision of culverts
and appropriate drainage; and upgrading of farm-to-village tracks and trails to facilitate
use of bicycle trailers, donkey carts and other light vehicles. (iv) Post-harvest
infrastructure, including provision of storage facilities, drying floors, cribs, crop
processing and smoking units, and other processing equipment and facilities (CBRDP
Implementation Manual 2006; CBRDP Annual Reports 2006-2010).
III. Rural Enterprise Development
This component advanced grants to beneficiaries for training in technical and
business management for (i) the acquisition of employable skills in rural areas,
establishment of agro-based micro enterprises, and upgrading and rehabilitation of
equipment; (ii) establishment of learning centers to serve as focal points for processing
units, marketing outlets, and empowering the poor through the acquisition of knowledge
and skills; (iii) and the establishment of rural enterprises, including co-operative
business activities, market research, business linkages and joint ventures (CBRDP
Implementation Manual 2006; CBRDP Annual Reports 2006-2010).
IV. Infrastructure for social and human development
Many of the projects studied fell in this category. It provided sums for rehabilitating and
improving existing rural community educational structures and constructing new
community health compounds and nutrition centres. It aimed at constructing health
compounds for the community health planning services, rehabilitating nutrition centres
in association with the World Food Program; and also potable water and sanitation
facilities for rural communities (CBRDP Implementation Manual 2006; CBRDP
Annual Reports 2006-2010).
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V. Community- based natural resource management
The last component prepared natural resources management plans in DAs, ACs and
local communities’ in collaboration with relevant public agencies including the
Environmental Protection Agency, Savannah Resources Management Centre, Ministries
of Food and Agriculture, Lands and Forestry and the Wildlife Division. It also targeted
establishing tree and tree-crop nurseries for the production of seedlings, adoption of soil
and water conservation measures, control of bush fires, and establishment of wood lots,
rehabilitation of critically degraded watershed areas to ensure regular flow of water and
effective management and use of water resources. Finally, the component sought to
provide incentive schemes to natural resource collectors, processors and traders, wood
carvers, traditional medical practitioners, wildlife traders and breeders and rural ecotourism operators, excluding loggers, to increase income earning capacities of
beneficiaries and provide skills to the rural unemployed (CBRDP Implementation
Manual 2006; Annual Reports 2006-2010).
VI. Project Management
This component was more administrative. It financially supported the management and
implementation of the five components above in areas such as technical assistance and
services to communities to prepare development and investment plans, feasibility
studies, detailed engineering designs, procurement, supervision contracts and
monitoring (CBRDP Implementation Manual 2006; Annual Reports 2006-2010).
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APPENDIX B: Questionnaire
EDITH COWAN UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF PSYCHOLOGY& SOCIAL SCIENCE
JOONDALUP CAMPUS, WESTERN AUSTRALIA
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CBRDP BENEFICIARY LOCALITIES
This study, funded by the above University, aims at understanding how theories and
concepts impact on aid funded development projects. The questionnaire is meant to
elicit information on what you know about the CBRDP, your involvement in local
initiatives as well as the functions of the Assembly and Unit Committee Members.
There are seven questions in all and will take fifteen to twenty minutes to complete. It
is meant for purely academic purposes. You are assured of confidentiality; however you
may withdraw from answering any question that makes you feel insecure.
Locality…………………………………Project Type………………………………
Age.........................................................Gender........................................................
Religion..................................................Marital status..............................................
No of Children..................... …………..Profession...................................................
1. How long have you lived in this locality?..............................................................
2. What are the five most important needs in this locality?
…………………………………………………………………………………………..
…………………………………………………………………………………………..
…………………………………………………………………………………………..
3. What do you know about the CBRD Project?.............................................................
.............................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................
4. What did you contribute towards the implementation of the CBRDP?
.............................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................
5. Do you take attend local meetings? If yes what issues are discussed often?
If No why?
.............................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................
6. How do you rate the function of your Assembly and Unit Committee Members?
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.............................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................
7. Could you identify some causes of developmental problems in this locality?
.............................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................
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APPENDIX C: Permission to Study the CBRDP

Joondalup Campus
270 Joondalup Drive, Joondalup
Western Australia 6127
Telephone 134328
Facsimile (08) 93001257
August 03, 2010
To:
The Country Director
CBRDP-Ghana
Accra, Ghana
Dear Sir/Madam,
PERMISSION TO USE YOUR COMMUNITY-BASED RURAL
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
I am a Ghanaian and a PhD student in the above named university. As part of my
research on ‘Communities and International Development Aid’, I am expected to carry
out fieldwork to collect data on an Aid funded development project. I am greatly
interested in your Community-based Rural Development Project funded by the World
Bank that I would use as a case study to inform theory and practice in International
Development Studies. I am by this letter asking for permission to use the project for the
study and also obtain relevant documents. These will be used to produce an academic
thesis, which will incorporate your organization’s views on some of the issues that may
emerge out of the communities who are involved in the above-mentioned project.
I am due to arrive in Ghana in 26 August, 2010 and collect the data until March 31st
2011. I would be grateful if this is granted.
I count on your cooperation.
Please contact me with any further questions.
Sincerely Yours,
Kwadwo Adusei-Asante
PhD Candidate
School of Psychology and Social Science
Edith Cowan University
Joondalup Campus
Ph 61 0404509736
Kaduseia@our.ecu.edu.au
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APPENDIX D: Letter of Introduction from the CBRDP
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APPENDIX E: Letter of Introduction from the Edith Cowan
University

Joondalup Campus
270 Joondalup Drive, Joondalup
Western Australia 6127
Telephone 134328
Facsimile (08) 93001257
August 15, 2010
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN
LETTER OF INTRODUCTION: KWADWO ADUSEI-ASANTE (10136963)
The above named person is a PhD student at our university. I am his Principal
Supervisor. He is on an Australian Doctoral Scholarship and as part of his proposed
research on how theories and complex concepts influence foreign aid outcomes. He will
be carrying out fieldwork to collect data in Ghana (September 2010-March 2011) using
the Community-Based Rural Development Projects (CBRDP) as a case study. The data
collected will be used to produce an academic thesis. I would be grateful if you could
offer him the assistance he needs.
We count on your cooperation. Please contact me with any further questions.
Sincerely Yours,
Dr Peter Hancock
Senior Lecturer
School of Psychology and Social Science
Edith Cowan University
Joondalup Campus
Ph 61 8 6304 5804
Fax 61 8 6304 5957
p.hancock@ecu.edu.au
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APPENDIX F: Permission to Obtain Secondary Data from Ghana’s
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning

Joondalup Campus
270 Joondalup Drive, Joondalup
Western Australia 6127
Telephone 134328
Facsimile (08) 93001257
January 27, 2010
The Hon Minister of Finance
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
Accra
ATTN:
The Chief Director
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
Accra
Dear Sir/Madam,
REQUEST FOR SECONDARY DATA ON AID TRENDS IN GHANA
I am a Ghanaian postgraduate student at the Edith Cowan University, Perth in Western
Australia. My research focus is on International Development, particularly how theories
and concepts impact on aid funded projects.
Currently, I am collecting data on a World Bank funded project in Ghana for my thesis.
To produce a good one, I would need to provide some background information on aid
trends in the country. I am therefore by this letter kindly requesting your good offices to
provide me with some secondary data on:
1) The history of Ghana-World Bank Relations
2) The trend and quantum of ODA/Foreign Aid in Ghana from 1980-2010 by:
o Net ODA or official aid
o Aid per capita
o Aid as a % of GNI
o Net ODA as a % of government expenditure
I am counting on your cooperation.
Regards.
Sincerely Yours
Kwadwo Adusei-Asante
(ECU DETAILS)
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